Heart of Sadness: Congo
by Adam Hochschild
Amnesty International Amnesty
- Now, Fall 2003
News from the misnamed Democratic Republic
of Congo in recent months has been so grim as to make one want
to turn the page or flip the TV channel in despair: mass rapes
by HlV-infected troops, arms hacked off with machetes, schools
and hospitals ravaged, killers jubilantIy draping themselves in
the entrails of their victims, 10-year-old soldiers bearing AK-47s
and hand grenades. The death toll in this bewilderingly complex
civil war has reached at least 3.3 million in less than five years,
according to the International Rescue Committee. Another 3 million
or more people are refugees, inside the country and out. Few of
the dead are soldiers. Most are ordinary men, women, and children.
They were deliberately targeted, caught in crossfire, or unlucky
enough to have stumbled onto land mines. Many-forced to flee their
homes for forests and crowded refugee camps that turn into fields
of mud in the rainy season-died of illness and malnutrition. This
is the greatest concentration of war-related deaths anywhere on
earth since World War II.
Africa is seldom popular with the U.S.
media, and the Congo's civil war has largely dropped out of the
news in recent weeks. But the departure of journalists for other
stories does not mean that the bloodshed has stopped. Despite
a shaky coalition government at the national level, raids by rival
warlords and the killing of civilians continue, particularly in
the provinces of North and South Kivu, and in the Ituri district,
all in the northeastern corner of the country. The recent, temporary
reinforcement of the small United Nations military force in Bunia,
capital of Ituri, has not been substantial enough to stop the
fighting that has claimed the lives of more than 50,000 people
in Ituri alone in the last four years.
The country has a long and unhappy history.
A hundred years ago, it was the privately owned colony of King
Leopold 11 of Belgium. Joseph Conrad explores that regime's rapacious
lust for ivory in Heart of Darkness. Leopold went on to make an
even larger fortune by turning much of the Congo's adult male
population into a slave labor force to gather wild rubber. His
private army worked large numbers of men to death, raped and starved
their wives (held hostage to make the men work), shot down 20
years of uprisings, and terrified hundreds of thousands of people
into flight to avoid rubber slavery. Just as today, disease took
the greatest toll, ravaging a traumatized, half-starving people,
many of whom hid unsheltered in the rain forest. The birth rate
dropped dramatically. Using official Belgian statistics, demographers
estimate a loss of population of some 10 million during Leopold's
rule and its immediate aftermath.
In 1908, the Belgian government took over
the colony from Leopold. Gradually the carnage slowed and stopped.
But, as in much of colonial Africa, forced labor remained, and
the chicotte (a hippopotamus-hide whip) was a principal, legal
tool of governing. The Belgians built schools and hospitals, as
well as road, rail, and steamboat networks, but mining profits
flowed to Europe and the United States. The Belgians controlled
Congolese political activity and made virtually no preparation
for independence. This came abruptly, after popular protests,
in 1960.
The Congo's first-and last-territory-wide
free election that year brought the brilliant, mercurial Patrice
Lumumba to power as prime minister. His demands that Africa be
economically as well as politically independent of Europe set
off alarm bells in Washington and Brussels. The Eisenhower administration
swiftly developed plans for his assassination. With strong U.S.
and Belgian support, anti-Lumumba factions killed him in early
1961. The murder has been the subject of two recent notable works
of art: Raoul Peck's film Lumumba and The Catastrophist, a novel
by the Irish writer Ronan Bennett.
For most of the years since Lumumba's
death, the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the Congo. He came
to power with U.S. support, renamed his country Zaire, and was
given more than $1 billion in U.S. aid, all told, under both Democratic
and Republican presidents. With his marble palace in the remote
northern jungle; his love of pink champagne and chartered Concordes;
his luxury homes dotted around Paris, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal,
Spain and the Riviera (where, 20 minutes' drive away, Leopold
had spent much of his Congo fortune building villas), Mobutu and
an entourage of members of his small Ngbandi ethnic group plundered
the country's treasury of an estimated $4 billion. In health,
nutrition, life expectancy, schooling, and income, the Congolese
people were far worse off at the end of his reign than they had
been after 80 years of colonialism. Soldiers supported themselves
by collecting tolls at roadblocks, generals sold off jet fighters
for profit, and during the Tokyo real estate boom, the country's
ambassador to Japan sold the embassy and apparently pocketed the
money. Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent Kabila in 1997 and died
a few months later.
Since then, Congo (which lost its article
when it regained its old name) has progressed quickly from anarchy
to civil war. One early trigger for the war came in 1994, when
the United States and its allies blocked any possibility of United
Nations intervention to stop the slaughter of some 800,000 Tutsi
and moderate Hutu in Rwanda. When the Hutu regime that carried
out this genocide was deposed, its leaders and roughly a million
other Hutu fled next door to Congo. Angry at continuing attacks
mounted from there, the army of the new Rwandan government eventually
occupied part of northeastern Congo and carried out something
of a counter-genocide in revenge.
Seeing a huge, resource-rich country whose
sclerotic Mobutu regime had collapsed, other nearby African nations
quickly joined in dividing the spoils. (Like Rwanda, several others
were also being attacked by rebels using Congo's vast and lawless
territory as a base.) At various points, the armies of seven of
them-most importantly Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe- have had troops
on Congo's soil. The Rwandan army stole natural resources worth
$250 million in 1999 and 2000 alone, according to a U.N. report
cited by Newsweek. For the moment the foreign troops have supposedly
gone home, but many of their commanders have lucrative mineral
concessions and an ever-changing web of alliances: with the forces
controlling the country's nominal national government, with three
main rebel groups in the east, with local warlords and ethnically
based militias, and with a wide variety of foreign corporations.
These corporations have been eagerly buying Congo's diamonds,
gold, timber, copper, cobalt, and coltan. Eastern Congo has more
than half the world's supply of coltan, which is used in computer
chips and cellphones, and has occasionally sold for as much, per
ounce, as gold. The multi-sided war is driven by greed, not ideology;
the worst fighting sometimes shifts location with the rise and
fall of commodity prices.
Among the many companies involved are
America Mineral Fields, Inc., formerly headquartered in President
Clinton's hometown of Hope, Arkansas, and the Barrick Gold Corporation
of Canada, which until recently listed former President George
H.W. Bush on its international advisory board. Few of these companies,
the rebel militias, or Congo's African neighbors have much interest
in ending the country's Balkanization. They benefit far more from
a cash-in-suitcases economy than they would from a highly taxed
and regulated one that would tightly control natural resources.
For Congo, the combination of a vast mineral
treasure house and no functioning central government has been
catastrophic. When there is little money in the public treasury,
armies become self-financing networks of miners and smugglers.
When there are few schools or jobs, they can easily recruit children.
When the millions of small arms circulating in Africa can be bought
in street bazaars or from unpaid police, there are guns for all.
For people who care about human rights,
Congo presents a new kind of challenge. The problem is not a harsh
and authoritarian state; it's no working state at all. Furthermore,
the traditional villains-globalization, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, colonialism, neocolonialism-cannot be blamed
for everything. Yes, colonialism left Congo a terrible heritage
of violence and plunder. But to look around the world today is
to see striking examples, from Ireland to Vietnam, of countries
that have successfully thrown off colonialism's legacy.
Beyond colonialism, Africa has other historical
burdens. One is the heritage of widespread indigenous slavery,
which, like the long centuries of serfdom in Russia, is deeply
and disastrously woven into the social fabric. Another is the
abysmal position of women: Women and girls are routinely kidnapped
to serve as "wives" of soldiers who use rape and, reportedly,
HIV transmission as weapons of war; many women are also subjected
to female genital mutilation. And a third burden, shared with
such places as Afghanistan and parts of the Caucasus, is a tradition
of loyalty to the ruler of an extended clan or ethnic group, rather
than to a nation-state marked by boundaries on the map. Furthermore,
in Africa those boundaries were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial
powers for their own convenience; Congo's people speak more than
200 languages and dialects.
Peace won't come easily in Congo, and
a stable, democratic government will come harder still. Don't
expect any dramatic moments of transformation, like the fall of
the Berlin Wall or the election of Nelson Mandela. Yet there are
ways the outside world can help: First of all, the minuscule United
Nations peacekeeping force now in the country needs to be greatly
expanded. Enough troops to provide security for the entire nation,
which is as big as the United States east of the Mississippi,
is too much to hope for. It has, after all, taken more than 28,000
soldiers to keep the peace in Kosovo, whose population is 1/25
of Congo's. But a U.N. force at least that big could begin to
halt the terrible bloodshed in the northeastern corner of the
country, where the most carnage has taken place, and the United
States should be shamed into at least helping to pay for it. The
force's length of service should be seen as a matter of years,
and its mission drastically toughened.
We should have no illusions, however,
that enough U.N. troops could restore the economy, stop all plunder,
or build a sound government. Intervening in Congo is a bit like
asking security guards to patrol a huge bank in mid-robbery. There
is a risk that the guards may end up robbing, or running, the
bank-whether at the level of a sergeant dealing diamonds or a
major power contributing troops but demanding favored treatment
for a particular mining company. But the alternatives are worse.
Such a force could save lives-millions of them.
Besides its tiny present size, however,
two things threaten to sap the effectiveness of that U.N. force.
One is that it is currently led by France. President Bush is still
enraged over French opposition to the war on Iraq, and the two
countries have long been quiet rivals for neocolonial influence
in central Africa. (Neither power has clean hands: Both long supported
the odious Mobutu. France continued to back him to the last moment,
while the United States switched horses to train the Rwandan army
that helped to overthrow him and then remained to loot eastern
Congo.)
The other problem is that Congo's immense
blood-letting does not seriously threaten Western interests because
it is unlikely to spill over into other parts of the world or
to stop the export of strategic minerals. Without vested economic
interests at stake, countries contributing peacekeeping troops
may not tolerate the casualties. If they won't, no force of any
size will work.. . :;
Another way the world could help is by
dealing squarely with the fact that anarchic civil wars like those
in Congo are fueled by valuable minerals. Recognizing how diamonds
have helped drive the conflicts in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, more than 50 nations recently agreed to cease trading in
"conflict diamonds." Startlingly, given its scorn for
most international agreements, the United States is among the
signatories. It remains to be seen whether the agreement is followed
and violators punished. But, a recent World Bank study suggested,
if conflict diamonds can be outlawed, why not conflict gold and
conflict coltan? Agreements like this could begin to slash the
funding for Congo warlords. Such a pact would be difficult to
enforce, but for many years, so was the ultimately successful
ban on the Atlantic slave trade.
Finally, the world must stop arming Africa.
The United States and France have been among the worst offenders,
along with Israel, Britain and Russia. During the 1990S, for example,
Washington alone gave more than $200 million worth of equipment
and military training to African armies, including six of the
seven with troops in Congo's civil war. This arms traffic has
continued under both Democratic and Republican administrations;
it took a particularly shocking turn at a U.N. conference in 2001,
when the Bush administration, closely adhering to positions of
the National Rifle Association, single-handedly blocked a series
of measures to restrict trade in small arms. The arms traffic
to Africa is the modern version of what happened hundreds of years
ago, when American and European ship captains used muskets and
ammunition as a currency for purchasing slaves from African dealers.
It has been disastrous for Africa, then and now.
Is there hope that any of these | changes
will happen? As Samantha Power points out in her Pulitzer I prize-winning
book A Problem | from Hell: America and the Age of I Genocide,
the United States has a _ long tradition of speaking piously while
ignoring mass murder. In 1978, some 120 million U.S. TV viewers
watched the mini-series Holocaust while Pol Pot, with no interference,
carried out the genocide of some 2 million Cambodians. In 1993,
President Clinton helped dedicate the United States Holocaust
Museum, where Elie Weisel pleaded with him in vain to halt the
long Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo. In the next year or two,
President Bush may officiate at the ground-breaking ceremony for
another museum, the one of African-American life planned for the
Mall in Washington, D.C. Doubtless on that occasion he will decry
the terrible crime of slavery. But will he be able to say that
either the U.S. government or the larger community of nations
did anything meaningful to stop the slaughter in Congo, a slaughter
now already more than half the size of the Holocaust? The answer
depends on how forcefully people who care, here and around the
world, speak out.
Adam Hochschild's most recent books are
King Leopold's Ghost and Finding the Trapdoor.
Africa Watch
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