Invasions,
Catastrophic Success
excerpted from the book
Overthrow
America's Century of Regime Change
from Haiti to Iraq
by Stephen Kinzer
Times Books, 2006, paper
Invasions
p219
In mid-October, a bizarre series of events on the tiny Caribbean
island of Grenada, including the summary execution of the prime
minister, raised the sudden possibility of American intervention
there.
p220
... officials in Washington were sensing both danger and opportunity
in the unfolding Grenada crisis. The island's pro-Cuban government,
which the United States mightily disliked, had just been overthrown
and its leaders shot. A new clique declared that the old regime
was not militant enough, and vowed to impose pure Marxism-Leninism
on this small island.
It seemed at least conceivable that the
newly empowered radicals might try to capture or harm the American
medical students, and this danger lent an air of urgency to the
deliberations in Washington. Another factor also fired enthusiasm
there. Reagan's advisers immediately realized that this crisis
gave the United States an unexpected chance to win a strategic
Cold War victory. Americans were hungry for one. Many felt frustrated
after a decade of what they considered global humiliation, marked
by defeat in Vietnam and the long, agonizing Iran hostage crisis.
They voted for Reagan in 1980 because he promised to restore the
"standing" of the United States. Grenada gave him his
chance.
p221
Vice President Bush called to report that the Special Situation
Group favored an operation that would not only secure American
citizens but restore democratic rule and end Cuban influence.
That meant a full-scale invasion and the overthrow of Grenada's
government. Without hesitating or asking a question, Reagan agreed.
"If we've got to go there,"
he told Bush, "we might as well do all that needs to be done."
When Reagan retired that Saturday night
in what had once been President Eisenhower's bedroom, he had every
right to hope for a good night's sleep. He did not have it. At
2:27 in the morning, McFarlane came to his room to awaken him.
With him he carried one of the most devastating reports Reagan
would hear during his presidency. The United States Marine Corps
headquarters in Beirut had been destroyed in a suicide-bomb attack,
leaving hundreds dead. It was among the bloodiest attacks ever
on an American military post, and one of the greatest tragedies
in Marine Corps history.
... The bombing in Lebanon had inflicted
another grievous blow on the United States. It intensified the
desire of many Americans for some kind of revenge, some flash
of vindication or redemption somewhere in the world, some chance
to show their national power.
Reagan had already approved the idea of
invading Grenada but had not issued any final orders. There was
still time to pull back, to limit the operation to a simple evacuation
of American citizens. The prime ministers of Guyana, Belize, and
the Bahamas were urging this course. Aides asked Reagan whether
the Beirut bombing had led him to reconsider his endorsement of
the Grenada invasion. On the contrary, he replied, it steeled
his will.
"If this was right yesterday,"
he said, "it's right today."
p223
Grenada had been a relatively quiet British colony for more than
a century when, at the beginning of 1951, it was paralyzed by
a general strike. The strike's chief organizer, Eric Gairy delighted
audiences wit his biting attacks on the mulatto aristocracy, and
when the British held an election for a home-rule government,
he formed a political party and rode it lo victory. He dominated
Grenada for most of the next quarter century ...
p224
In the 1970s a group of ... young visionaries met in St. George's,
formed the New Jewel Movement, and began campaigning against Gairy.
Several had recently returned from London, including the tall,
bearded Maurice Bishop, a recent law school graduate ...
... the evident impossibility of democratic
change and New Jewel's increasing radicalism-propelled Grenada
into its next era. On March 11, 1979, Gairy flew to New York to
discuss "cosmic phenomena" with United Nations Secretary
General Kurt Waldheim. Bishop and other New Jewel leaders believed,
or claimed to believe, that he had left orders for the Mongoose
Gang to kill them all. They decided to strike first.
... Their first proclamation, which Bishop
read on the newly renamed Radio Free Grenada, promised that "all
democratic freedoms, including freedom of elections, religion
and political opinion, will be fully restored to the people."
p225
The small group of men and women who ran New Jewel-there were
only forty-five party members at the time of the 1979 coup, and
never more than eighty-were idealists. Once in power, they built
roads, opened a new high school and several free clinics, developed
agriculture and the fishing industry, and cut the unemployment
rate. They also abolished Parliament and the constitution, muzzled
the opposition press, and drew up a "watch list" of
potential enemies to be kept under surveillance. The cornerstone
of their ideology, as Bishop outlined it in a 1982 speech to party
members, was their belief that they comprised a I Leninist "vanguard"
entitled to rule by decree.
p226
New Jewel leaders proclaimed themselves part of an anti-Yankee
'alliance that included Castro's Cuba, the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua, and rebels throughout the region who were defying what
Bishop called "the vicious beasts of imperialism." They
sharply increased the size of Grenada's army and sent officers
to Cuba for training. Several hundred Cuban construction workers,
some of them trained as members of the militia, arrived to build
an airport at Point Salines, a few miles south of St. George's,
that would be big enough to accommodate jumbo jets full of tourists-or,
as officials in Washington repeatedly pointed out, combat jets.
New jewel leaders signed three military agreements with the Soviet
Union that brought them millions of dollars' worth of weaponry
at no charge. They struck up friendships with East Germany, Libya,
North Korea, and almost every other country in the world that
was hostile to the United States.
p230
... October 20, the Crisis Pre-Planning Group, whose job was to
monitor world trouble spots, met at the Executive Office Building
in Washington, across from the White House. Its chairman, Admiral
John Poindexter, presented a variety of military options. Driven
in part by the strong views of his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North, and Constantine Menges, a former CIA officer and adviser
to the National Security Council, the group decided to endorse
a radical course: the invasion of Grenada and the overthrow of
its government.
p237
About six thousand American soldiers ultimately landed in Grenada.
... eight days after the invasion, the
American force had dwindled to three thousand. By the end of the
year, only a few companies of military police remained.
... The United Nations General Assembly
overwhelming passed a resolution "deeply deploring... a flagrant
violation of international law."
President Reagan, as was his wont, brushed
this criticism aside. When asked how he reacted to news that more
than one hundred member states had voted for the United Nations
resolution, he replied, "One hundred nations in the United
Nations have not agreed with us on just about everything that's
come before them where we're involved, and it didn't upset my
breakfast at all." He knew he had given Americans a psychological
as well as a strategic victory, and had reason to feel proud.
A few weeks later, Reagan gave an emotional
speech to the Congressional Medal of Honor Society in New York.
Aides took pains to tell reporters that he had written it himself.
In a few words, he distilled what he believed the Grenada invasion
should teach Americans and the world.
"Our days of weakness are over!"
Reagan proclaimed. "Our military forces are back on their
feet, and standing tall."
You're No Good
p239
During the mid-1980s, senior American leaders, including President
Ronald Reagan, vigorously supported military regimes in Guatemala
and El Salvador ...
... General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander
of the Panama Defense Forces, had good reason to believe himself
above the law. Within Panama he ruled almost by whim. In the wider
world, he had accumulated a remarkably diverse set of friends.
He collaborated simultaneously with some of Colombia's most powerful
drug dealers and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; with
the Sandinista army in Nicaragua and guerrillas who were fighting
to depose it; with the CIA and the Cuban intelligence service.
Wealthy beyond the wildest dreams of an illegitimate child of
the Panama City slums, amply supplied with all he needed to feed
his considerable private appetites, and with powerful allies around
the world, he came to consider himself invulnerable.
p240
In 1968, Panamanian military officers seized power in a bloodless
coup. [Hugo] Spadafora joined an underground cell devoted to overthrowing
their regime. He was soon arrested. In other Latin American countries
he might have rotted in jail or been made to "disappear,"
but the new Panamanian strongman, General Omar Torrijos, was not
a dictator in the classic mold. Although hardly a paragon of democratic
virtue, he was a visionary determined to wrest power from the
country's entrenched elite and pull the Panamanian masses out
of poverty. Two weeks after Spadafora was arrested, Torrijos summoned
him from his cell for a long conversation about revolution, social
reform, and the challenges of power. When it was over, he made
Spadafora an offer: instead of returning to prison, he could go
to a remote spot in the Darien jungle and open a health clinic.
Spadafora instantly accepted and plunged into his work with zealous
passion. Later Torrijos named him director of medical services
in Colon, the country's poorest province, and then promoted him
to deputy minister of health. In the late 1970s, bored with the
bureaucrat's life, Spadafora asked for and received Torrijos's
permission to raise a guerrilla squad to fight alongside Sandinistas,
who were rebelling against the dynastic Somoza dictatorship in
Nicaragua.
... Torrijos was an idealist who scorned
the ideologies of left and right, and looked everywhere for ideas
that were practical enough to improve the lives of ordinary people.
He was also a career soldier who had seized power in a coup, knew
he had many enemies, and relied on amoral thugs like Noriega to
protect his one-man rule. In 1970 he promoted Noriega to one of
the most sensitive of all government posts, chief of G-2, the
office of military intelligence Spadafora was everything Noriega
was not: tall, fair-skinned, highly articulate, improbably handsome,
and immensely self-confident. Over the years, as Noriega slipped
steadily toward the criminality that would become his hallmark,
Spadafora came to detest him.
p242
At his home in San José, Costa Rica, Spadafora rose early
on September 13, 1985. He began his day with yoga exercises, then
ate breakfast and set off in a taxi toward the Panamanian border.
One of his friends had offered to meet him there and drive him
to Panama City, but Spadafora decided to take a bus instead, fearing
that if he traveled in a private car, Noriega's men might arrange
to kill him in a staged crash. The bus made its first stop in
Concepción, a dusty little town about ten miles inside
of Panamanian territory. There an officer of the Panama Defense
Forces stepped aboard, found Spadafora, and lifted his bag off
the rack above his head.
... The next day, a Costa Rican farmer
who lived near the Panamanian border was rounding up stray chickens
when he saw two legs sticking up from a muddy pond. He waded out
and found that a human body had been dumped into a sack marked
as property of the United States Postal Service. When police arrived,
they found that the body had no head. The next day it was identified
as that of Hugo Spadafora. It bore clear evidence of torture he
stomach was full of blood that Spadafora had swallowed as his
head was being slowly cut off.
"They Executed Spadafora!" screamed
the banner headline in the beleaguered opposition newspaper La
Prensa. It carried a statement from the victim's father, a revered
figure in his own right, that set the terms for the conflict that
would build for the next four years before exploding into a world
crisis.
"The macabre murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora
was planned and coldly executed by the chief of G-2, Colonel Julio
Ow Young, carrying out the orders of the commander of the [Defense
Forces], General Manuel A. Noriega," the statement said.
"We have complete and authentic proof of these facts."
p244
By 1983 ... General Noriega, had emerged as commander of the National
Guard-which he renamed the Panama Defense Forces and the country's
strongman. The first figure to dispute his power was Hugo Spadafora,
who paid for his brazen challenge with his life.
Noriega was at a dermatology clinic in
Geneva when Spadafora was killed, undergoing treatment that he
hoped would repair his deeply scarred face. There he received
an urgent telephone call from Major Luis Córdoba, head
of the unit that had captured Spadafora. Evidently neither man
realized that American intelligence agents were eavesdropping.
"We have the rabid dog in our hands,"
Major Córdoba told his commander.
"And what does one do with a rabid
dog?" Noriega asked in reply. That was the go-ahead soldiers
needed in order to begin the long night of torture that ended
in Spadafora's decapitation.
p243
Noriega had good reason to believe he could ride out this storm.
He had accumulated an extraordinarily diverse and powerful group
of friends. Among them were dictators, guerrilla fighters, drug
smugglers, and a variety of high-ranking American officials.
The CIA first recruited Noriega as an
informer when he was a young cadet at the Peruvian military academy.
His salary increased as he rose through the military ranks, and
by the time he became chief of military intelligence, it reached
$110,000 annually. He was one of the agency's most important "assets"
in Latin America, even meeting personally with CIA director George
H. W. Bush during a visit to Washington in 1976.
In the early 1980s, Noriega formed a partnership
with the drug cartel based in MedellIn, Colombia, allowing it
free access to clandestine airstrips in Panama from which it shipped
vast amounts of cocaine into the United States. For this service,
the cartel paid him fees in the range of $100,000 per flight.
Typically for Noriega, however, he was also working as a principal
informer for the Drug Enforcement Administration. He gave it valuable
information that led to the arrest of hundreds of traffickers
from rival cartels, and to the seizure of tons of cocaine. Senior
American officials sent him flattering letters of commendation.
During this period, Noriega further endeared
himself to the Reagan administration by agreeing to help the Nicaraguan
contras. While publicly mouthing platitudes about the need for
peace and cooperation among Central American countries, he gave
the contras invaluable covert support.
p247
Opinion in Washington slowly began to turn against Noriega. The
director of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Jack Lawn, began
a quiet investigation of his role in the drug trade, and refused
a request from one of Noriega's advocates, Colonel Oliver North
of the National Security Council staff, that he call it off. Then
two United States senators from opposite ends of the political
spectrum, Helms and John Kerry of Massachusetts, introduced an
amendment to the 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act that required
the CIA to investigate Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking,
arms smuggling, money laundering, and the Spadafora murder.
p249
Two of Noriega's most powerful supporters in the Reagan administration,
Elliott Abrams and Oliver North, fell from power as a result of
their involvement in the Iran-contra scandal, a covert scheme
to sell arms to Iran and use the proceeds to prop up the contras.
Then, early in 1988, two grand juries in Florida handed up criminal
indictments charging Noriega and more than a dozen others, including
Pablo Escobar, the boss of the MedellIn cartel, with conspiring
to send tons of cocaine into the United States.
These indictments were not the only reason
the United States began turning against Noriega. He had embraced
a peace plan for Central America-named after Contadora, the Panamanian
island where regional leaders launched it-that the Reagan administration
strongly opposed. Noriega's friends in Washington began looking
for a way to ease him out of power.
p250
For many years Noriega seemed able to manipulate presidents of
the United States almost as easily. Jimmy Carter cut off his CIA
stipend but blocked efforts to indict him on drug and arms-smuggling
charges. Ronald Reagan ignored his crimes in order to ensure his
continued support for the contras. When George H. W. Bush, a former
CIA director who was intimately aware of Noriega's activities,
took office, in January 1989, Noriega had good reason to believe
he had another friend in the White House.
Bush, however, came into office with the
handicap of being considered weak and indecisive, and had to deal
with what commentators called "the wimp factor." In
May, after Noriega imposed his own president against the will
of Panamanian voters, Bush announced that he was sending 1,800
troops to American bases in Panama, a step that was intended as
a message to Noriega. When a reporter asked the president that
he would like the Panamanians to do, Bush replied that they :should
"just do everything they can to get Mr. Noriega out of there."
p254
General Powell presented the Blue Spoon plan. It was to be a massive
invasion by 25,000 troops, about half of them from the Canal Zone
and the other half from bases in the United States. They would
strike twenty-seven objectives simultaneously, destroy the Panama
Defense Forces, capture Noriega, and oversee a quick return to
civilian rule. Bush asked if a smaller operation, targeted specifically
against Noriega, might be feasible. Powell said it was not, because
Noriega moved quickly and American commandos might not be able
to find him.
p255
The Panama Defense Forces had 13,000 soldiers, but most of them
were police officers, customs agents, or prison guards. Only about
3,500 were trained or armed for combat. They had no hope of resisting
the overwhelming power that came down upon them in the predawn
hours of December 20.
More than 3,000 Rangers parachuted onto
and around airports, military bases, and other objectives in Panama,
making this the largest combat airdrop since World War II.
p257
Although Noriega managed to elude his pursuers for several days,
he soon realized that he could not hide indefinitely. Holed up
in a small apartment on the edge of Panama City, he became morose.
On Sunday afternoon-it was Christmas Eve-he decided to call Monsignor
José Sebastian Laboa, the papal nuncio in Panama City.
Laboa was an outspoken critic of Noriega and the defense forces,
but also a sophisticated diplomat who wished to see this conflict
ended without more bloodshed. He agreed to grant Noriega asylum
at the nunciatura, as the Vatican embassy was known.
p259
... the defeated strongman walked out. As soon as he was off the
embassy's property, American soldiers pounced on him, taped his
wrists behind his back, and hustled him into a waiting helicopter.
By sunrise the next day, he was in a cell at the Metropolitan
Correction Center in Miami.
*
Catastrophic Success
p301
[President George W Bush] represented the continuity of American
policy during the long "regime change" century. Bush's
decision to invade Iraq was no break with history but a faithful
reflection of the same forces and beliefs that had motivated McKinley
and most of the presidents who would later sit in his shadow beneath
Chartran's historic painting.
Both McKinley and Bush rose to the presidency
in eras when Americans were feeling surges of patriotism and religious
fervor, and when American corporations were eagerly looking abroad
for new markets and sources of raw materials. During their campaigns
for the White House, each promised to use American military power
with extreme care. Once in office, they justified their overthrow
of foreign governments by insisting that the United States sought
no advantage for itself and was intervening abroad only "for
humanity's sake," as McKinley put it, or, in Bush's words,
"to make the world more peaceful and more free."
Neither man was troubled by his ignorance
of the countries whose governments he overthrew. McKinley admitted
that he had only a vague idea of where to find the Philippines
on a map. Bush explained his certainty that the invasion of Iraq
would go well by saying, "I rely on my instincts." Both
were deeply religious men imbued with the conviction that humanity
is locked in a constant struggle between good and evil. Both believed
that God was guiding them and that therefore they did not need
to ponder abstruse questions of culture and identity before ordering
the overthrow of foreign regimes.
The parallels between McKinley's invasion
of the Philippines and Bush's invasion of Iraq were startling.
Both presidents sought economic as well as political advantage
for the United States. Both were also motivated by a deep belief
that the United States has a sacred mission to spread its form
of government to faraway countries. Neither doubted that the people
who lived in those countries would welcome Americans as liberators.
Neither anticipated that he would have to fight a long counterinsurgency
war to subdue nationalist rebels.
p315
There is no stronger or more persistent strain in the American
character than the belief that the United States is a nation uniquely
endowed with virtue. Americans consider themselves to be, in Herman
Melville's words, "a peculiar, chosen people, the Israel
of our times." In a nation too new to define itself by real
or imagined historical triumphs, and too diverse to be bound together
by a shared religion or ethnicity, this belief became the essence
of national identity, the conviction that bound Americans to each
other and defined their approach to the world. They are hardly
the first people to believe themselves favored by Providence,
but they are the only ones in modern history who are convinced
that by bringing their political and economic system to others,
they are doing God's work.
p315
When the United States acts in the world " it acts, as other
nations do, to defend its interests. Americans, however, do not
like to hear or believe that their government has such self-centered
motives. Generations of American leaders have realized that they
can easily win popular support for their overseas adventures if
they present them as motivated by benevolence, self-sacrificing
charity, and a noble desire to liberate the oppressed. The blessings
of freedom that McKinley said he wanted to bestow on Cubans, Puerto
Ricans, and Filipinos, that William Howard Taft said the United
States would bring to Central America, and that later presidents
claimed they were spreading from Iran to Grenada are the same
ones that George W. Bush insisted his invasion of Iraq would bring
to people there.
p316
Generations of Americans have eagerly embraced this belief, largely
because it reinforces their self-image as uniquely decent people
who want only to share their good fortune with others. More sophisticated
defenders of the regime change idea make a better argument. They
recognize that the United States considers principally its own
interests when deciding whether to overthrow foreign governments,
but insist that this is fine because what is good for the United
States is also good for everyone else. In their view, American
power is intrinsically benign because the political and economic
system it seeks to impose on other countries will make them richer,
freer, and happier-and, as a consequence, create a more peaceful
world.
A clear truth lies behind this belief
in the transformative value of American influence. For more than
a century, Americans have believed they deserve access to markets
and resources in other countries. When they are denied that access,
they take what they want by force, deposing governments that stand
in their way. Great powers have done this since time immemorial.
What distinguishes Americans from citizens of past empires is
their eagerness to persuade themselves that they are acting out
of humanitarian motives.
p318
George W. Bush and his supporters never wavered in their belief
that the United States has the right to wage war whenever it deems
necessary, regardless of how loudly domestic critics or foreign
leaders might protest. "At this moment in history, if there
is a problem, we're expected to deal with it," Bush explained.
"We are trying to lead the world." American leaders
made clear, however, that they did not accept the right of other
countries to act this way. Those other nations, they warned, would
abuse this right by waging wars of conquest or selfaggrandizement,
something they insisted the United States would never do.
Countries that have the power to interfere
in foreign lands almost always do so. Military historians since
Thucydides, who wrote that nations feel "an innate compulsion
to rule when empowered," have observed that no state ever
acquires great military strength without using it. As a country
grows more powerful, it inevitably becomes greedy and succumbs
to the temptation to take what it wants. Time and again over the
course of history, greed has led great nations to overreach and
sow the seeds of their decline.
p319
The United States has been a world power since the end of the
nineteenth century. By using its might to overthrow foreign governments,
it acted not in a new or radical way but in accordance with a
long-established law of history. When no power restrained it,
it did not restrain itself.
Several other factors led the United States
to embrace the idea of "regime change." One was the
desire to find a means of shaping world events that did not involve
old-style colonialism. Another was the rise of giant corporations
able to finance election campaigns and buy political power, a
phenomenon that is nowhere more pronounced than in the United
States. Perhaps the most deeply rooted was the unique combination
of beliefs that give Americans a messianic desire to combat evil
forces in the world, a conviction that applying military power
will allow them to reshape other countries in their image, a certainty
that doing so is good for all humanity, and a fervent belief that
this is what God wants the United States to do.
One of the most immutable patterns of
history is the rise and fall of empires and great nations. Some
Americans, however, believe their country to be so far beyond
comparison with any other country or empire that has ever existed
that it has passed beyond the reach of history. This belief has
allowed them to embark on ambitious "regime change"
projects with supreme confidence that they would succeed, and
equal confidence that no matter how badly the projects might turn
out, the United States would not suffer because its power is so
overwhelming.
For most of the twentieth century, and
even more as the twenty-first century dawned, the United States
commanded enough military might to defeat any nation or group
of nations on the battlefield. The history of this period, however,
shows that military power, even combined with political and economic
power, is not enough to bend the will of nations. In almost every
case, overthrowing the government of a foreign country has, in
the end, led both that country and the United States to grief.
p321
Once the Cold War ended, Americans seemed to believe that they
no longer needed to teach anyone about their way of life. They
came to accept two great fallacies. First, they assumed that the
collapse of Communism would lead people around the world to agree
that the American political and economic model was best for everyone.
Second, they imagined that their overwhelming military power would
allow them to crush any power that dissented from this consensus.
If it were possible to control the course
of world events by deposing foreign governments, the United States
would be unchallenged. It has deposed far more of them than any
other modern nation. The stories of what has happened in the aftermath
of these operations, however, make clear that Americans do not
know what to do with countries after removing their leaders. They
easily succumb to the temptation to stage coups or invasions but
turn quickly away when the countries where they intervene fall
into misery and repression.
p321
The fundamental reason why countries invade other countries, or
seek forcibly to depose their governments, has not changed over
the course of history. It is the same reason children fight in
schoolyards. The stronger one wants what the weaker one has. Most
"regime change" operations fit within the larger category
of resource wars. When the United States intervenes abroad to
gain strategic advantage, depose governments it considers oppressive,
or spread its political and religious system, it is also acting
in its commercial self-interest. The search for markets, and for
access to natural resources, is as central to American history
as it has been to the history of every great power in every age.
Overthrow
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