Resistance
excerpted from the book
Pox Americana
Exposing the American Empire
Edited by John Bellamy Foster
and Robert W. McChesney
Monthly Review Press, 2004, paper
The New Age of Imperialism
John Bellamy Foster
p164
U.S. militarism, which in this analysis went hand in hand with
its imperial role, was not simply or even mainly a product of
the cold war competition with the Soviet Union, by which it was
conditioned. Militarism had deeper roots in the need of the United
States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world economy,
to keep the doors open for foreign investment, by force if necessary.
At the same time, the United States was employing its power where
possible to advance the needs of its own corporations-as for example
in Latin America where its dominance was unquestioned by other
great powers. Not only did the United States exercise this military
role on numerous occasions throughout the periphery in the post-Second
World War period, but it was also able to justify this role as
part of the fight against Communism. Militarism, associated with
this role as global hegemon and alliance-leader, came to permeate
all aspects of accumulation in the United States, so that the
term "military industrial complex," introduced by Eisenhower
in his farewell address as president, was an understatement. Already
in his day there was no major center of accumulation in the United
States that was not also a major center of military production.
Military production helped prop up the entire economic edifice
in the United States and was a factor holding off economic stagnation.
In mapping contemporary imperialism, Magdoff's
analysis provided evidence demonstrating how directly beneficial
imperialism was to capital within the core of the system (showing,
for example, that earnings on U.S. foreign investments, as a percentage
of all after-tax profits on operations of domestic nonfinancial
corporations, had risen from about 10 percent in 1950 to 22 percent
in 1964). The siphoning of surplus from the periphery (and misuse
of what surplus remained due to distorted peripheral class relations
characteristic of imperial dependencies) was a major factor in
perpetuating underdevelopment. Unique and less noticed, however,
were two other aspects of Magdoff's assessment: a warning regarding
the growing third world debt trap and an in-depth treatment of
the expanding global role of banks and finance capital in general.
It wasn't until the early 1980s that an understanding of the third
world debt trap really surfaced when Brazil, Mexico, and other
socalled new industrializing economies were suddenly revealed
to be in default. And the full significance of the financialization
of the global economy did not really dawn on most observers of
imperialism until late in the 1980s.
In this systematic historical approach
to the subject of imperialism, as depicted above all by Magdoff
[Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of US Foreign
Policy, 1969] U.S. military interventions in places like Iran,
Guatemala, Lebanon, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, were
not about "protecting U.S. citizens" or fighting the
expansion of the Communist bloc. Rather they belonged to the larger
phenomenon of imperialism in all of its historical complexity
and to the U.S. role as the hegemonic power of the capitalist
world. However, this interpretation was directly opposed by liberal
critics of the Vietnam War writing at the time, who sometimes
acknowledged that the United States had been engaged in the expansion
of its empire, but saw this, in line with the whole history of
the United States, as a case of accident rather than design (as
defenders of the British Empire had argued before them). American
foreign policy, they insisted, was motivated primarily by idealism
rather than material interests. The Vietnam War itself was explained
away by many of these same liberal critics as the result of "poor
political intelligence" on the part of powerful policy makers,
who had taken the nation off course. In 1971, Robert W. Tucker,
professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, wrote The Radical
Left and American Foreign Policy, in which he argued that the
"saving grace" for the United States in Vietnam was
the "essentially disinterested character" with which
it approached the war. Tucker's perspective was that of a liberal
opponent of the war who nonetheless rejected radical interpretations
of U.S. militarism and imperialism.
Tucker's main targets in his book were
William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Harry Magdoff. Magdoff
was attacked specifically for arguing that control of raw materials
on a global basis was crucial to U.S. corporations and the U.S.
state that served them. Tucker went so far as to claim that the
error of Magdoff's view was shown where the issue of oil arose.
If the United States were truly imperialist in its orientation
to third world resources, he argued, it would attempt to control
Persian Gulf oil. Defying both logic and history, Tucker declared
that this was not the case. As he put it:
Given the radical view, one would expect
that here [in the Middle East], if anywhere, American policy would
faithfully reflect economic interests. The reality, as is well
known, is otherwise. Apart from the increasing and successful
pressures oil countries have employed to increase their royalty
and tax income (pressures which have not provoked any notable
countermeasures), the American government has contributed to the
steady deterioration of the favorable position American oil companies
once enjoyed in the Middle East. A New York Times correspondent,
John M. Lee, writes: "The remarkable thing to many observers
is that the oil companies and oil considerations have had such
little influence in American foreign policy toward Israel."
The case of Persian Gulf oil, then, according
to Tucker, disproved Magdoff's insistence on the importance of
controlling raw materials to the operation of U.S. imperialism.
The U.S. political commitment to Israel was counter to its economic
interests but had overridden all concerns of U.S. capitalism with
respect to Middle East oil. Today it is hardly necessary to emphasize
how absurd this contention was. Not only has the United States
repeatedly intervened militarily in the Middle East, beginning
with Iran in 1953, but it has also continually sought to promote
its control over oil and the interests of its oil corporations
in the region. Israel, which the U.S. has armed to the teeth and
which has been allowed to develop hundreds of nuclear weapons,
has long been part of this strategy of controlling the region.
From the first, the U.S. role in the Middle East has been openly
imperialistic, geared to maintaining control over the region's
oil resources. Only an analysis that reduced economics to commodity
prices and royalty income while ignoring the political and military
shaping of economic relations-not to mention the flows of both
oil and profits-could result in such obvious errors.
p166
Nothing, in fact, so reveals the new age of imperialism as the
expansion of the U.S. Empire in the critical oil regions of the
Middle East and the Caspian Sea basin. U.S. power in the Persian
Gulf was limited throughout the cold war years as a result of
the Soviet presence. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, to which
the United States was seemingly helpless to respond, was the greatest
defeat of U.S. imperialism (which had relied on the Shah of Iran
as a secure base in the region) since the Vietnam War. Indeed,
prior to 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet bloc, a major U.S.
war in the region would have been almost completely unthinkable.
This left U.S. dominance in the region significantly constrained.
The 1991 Gulf War, which was carried out by the United States
with Soviet acquiescence, thus marked the beginning of a new age
of U.S. imperialism and expansion of U.S. global power. It is
no mere accident that the weakening of the Soviet Union led almost
immediately to a full-scale U.S. military intervention in the
region that was the key to controlling world oil, the most critical
global resource, and thus crucial to any strategy of global domination.
p168
The Imperial Temptation, Robert W Tucker, along with David C.
Hendrickson, published by the Council on Foreign Relations in
1992.
"There is no other commodity, that
has the crucial significance of oil; there is no parallel to the
dependence of developed and developing economies on the energy
resources of the Gulf; these resources are concentrated in an
area that remains relatively inaccessible and highly unstable,
and possession of oil affords an unparalleled financial base whereby
an expansionist developing power may hope to realize its aggressive
ambitions."
p169
In March 1992, a draft of the Defense Planning Guidance, also
known as the "Pentagon Paper," was leaked to the press.
This secret working document authored by the elder Bush's Defense
Department under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz (then undersecretary
for policy) declared, "Our strategy [after the fall of the
Soviet Union] must now refocus on precluding the emergence of
any potential future global competitor."
p170
By November 2000, just before he was hired to be head of policy
planning in Cohn Powell's State Department in the administration
of President George W. Bush, [Richard N.] Haass [ former member
of the National Security Council under George H.W. Bush] delivered
a paper called "Imperial America" that urged the United
State to fashion an "imperial foreign policy" that makes
use of its "surplus of power" to "extend its control"
across the face of the globe. While still denying that lasting
hegemony was possible, Haass declared that the United States should
use the exceptional opportunity that it now enjoyed to reshape
the world in order to enhance its global strategic assets. This
meant military interventions around the world. "Imperial
understretch, not overstretch," he argued, "appears
to be the greater danger of the two." By 2002, Haass, speaking
for an administration preparing to invade Iraq, was pronouncing
that a failed state, unable to control terrorism within its own
territory, had lost "the normal advantages of sovereignty,
including the right to be left alone inside [its] own territory.
Other governments, including the U.S., gain the right to intervene.
In the case of terrorism this can even lead to a right of preventative,
or preemptory, self-defense."
In September 2000, two months before Haass
presented his "Imperial America" paper, the neoconservative
Project for the New American Century had issued a report entitled
Rebuilding America's Defenses, drawn up at the request of Dick
Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, George W. Bush's younger
brother Jeb, and Lewis Libby. The report declared that "at
present the United States faces no global rival. America's grand
strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position
as far into the future as possible." The main strategic goal
of the United States in the twenty-first century was to "preserve
Pax Americana." To achieve this it was necessary to expand
the "American security perimeter" by establishing new
"overseas bases" and forward operations throughout the
world. On the question of the Persian Gulf, Rebuilding America's
Defenses was no less explicit: "The United States has for
decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional
security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the
immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force
presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein."
Even before September 11, therefore, the
ruling class and its foreign policy elites (including those outside
neoconservative circles) had moved toward an explicit policy of
expanding the American empire, taking full advantage of what was
regarded as the limited window brought on by the demise of the
Soviet Union-before new rivals of scale could arise.
p171
The administration's National Security Strategy statement, transmitted
to Congress in September 2002, promoted the principle of preemptive
attacks against potential enemies:
"The United States must and will
maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy... to
impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends
.... Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries
from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States."
p172
James F. Dobbins, director of the Rand Corporation Center for
International Security and Defense Policy, in the Council on Foreign
Relations report - Iraq: The Day After, 2003:
"The partisan debate over nation-building
is over. ' Administrations of both parties are clearly prepared
to use American military forces to reform rogue states and repair
broken societies."
p172
Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism
There is now agreement within the establishment
that objective forces and security requirements are driving U.S.
expansionism, that it is in the general interest of the high command
of U.S. capitalism to extend its control over the world-as far
and for as long as possible. As the Project for the New American
Century puts it, it is necessary to seize the "unipolar moment."
p173
... it is clear that in the present period of global hegemony,
imperialism the United States is geared above all to expanding
its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating
the rest of the capitalist world to its interests. The Persian
Gulf and the Caspian Sea basin represent not only the bulk of
world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly increasing proportion
of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves
elsewhere. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United
States to gain greater control of these resources-at the expense
of its present and potential rivals. But U.S. imperial ambitions
do not end there, since they are driven by economic ambitions
that know no bounds. As Harry off noted in the closing pages of
The Age of Imperialism in i969, "It is the professed goal"
of U.S. multinational corporations "to control as large a
share of the world market as they do of the United States market."
And this hunger for foreign markets persists today. Florida-based
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization
contracts in Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada,
New Zealand, and the Netherlands Antilles. Promotion of U.S. corporate
interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities of the
U.S. state. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically modified
food, Microsoft and intellectual property, Bechtel and the war
on Iraq. It would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this
dual expansionism of U.S. corporations and the U.S. state is to
the world at large. As István Mészáros has
observed, the U.S. attempt to seize global control, which is inherent
in the workings of capitalism and imperialism, now threatens humanity
with the "extreme violent rule of the whole world by one
hegemonic imperialist country on a permanent basis ... an absurd
and unsustainable way of running the world order."
This new age of U.S. imperialism will
generate its own contradictions, among them attempts by other
major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent
means, and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state
actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. Given
the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which
are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population
of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before
witnessed. Rather than generating a new Pax Americana, the United
States may be paving the way to new global holocausts.
The greatest hope in these dire circumstances
lies in a rising tide of revolt from below, both in the United
States and globally. The growth of the global justice movement,
which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following
the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February
2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history.
Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and
in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist
war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The
Vietnam Syndrome, which has so worried the strategic planners
of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have
left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been
coupled this time around with an Empire Syndrome on a much more
global scale-something that no one really expected. This more
than anything else makes it clear that the strategy of the American
ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed
in the long run and will prove to be its own-we hope not the world's-undoing.
Pox Americana
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