Quotations and Excerpts 1
from the book
Corporation Nation
by Charles Derber
St. Martin's Griffin, 1998
p12
... With the 1990s came a second hint of a new Gilded Age [late
1800s]: the revelation that the United States had become the most
unequal country in the developed world-with the gap between rich
and poor growing disturbingly vast. By the mid-nineties, not only
was the gap the largest in fifty years, but as the United Nations
reported, "the United States is slipping into a category
of countries-among them Brazil, Britain, and Guatemala-where the
gap [between rich and poor] is the worst around the globe."
The Gilded Age was marked by the accumulation of great wealth
in the midst of overwhelming poverty... A hundred years later,
America [is] movoing again toward a great divide of vast wealth
and mass poverty.
... In 1996, the richest 1 percent of the population enjoyed
a median net worth of several million dollars and had accumulated
40 percent of the nation's wealth - the highest proportion since
the 1920s. At the same time 40 million Americans - including one
of every four children - had fallen into poverty, also the highest
percentage in decades.
p14
The Gilded Age brought both hope and tragedy. It ushered in the
American century, with the United States emerging as the new industrial
power that would replace Britain as the guardian of a new world
order. Americans-among them millions of immigrants who dreamed
of a better future-were never more hopeful about their prospects
for prosperity. The booming new industrial economy created by
the robber barons-the popular name given to Gilded Age business
leaders-allowed many citizens to realize their dreams, and the
Gilded Age showed the remarkable potential of American business
to harness the resources of the nation.
Yet millions of Gilded Age Americans worked in sweatshops,
and the intensity of economic and social exploitation wrought
by the robber barons became legendary. The growth of urban slums,
the concentration of new monopoly power in the trusts, and the
scandalous corruption of politics made many turn-of-the-century
Americans feel their nation was losing its democratic promise.
Today's new Gilded Age order stems from an economy fueled
by revolutionary advances in market scale and technology. It is
dominated by dynamic corporations larger than any in history,
and run by men possessed of power, business networks, and personal
fortunes far exceeding those of the robber barons. It is defined
by a democracy in which popular sovereignty is eroding. And it
features a culture in which old-fashioned "virtues"
like laissez-faire economies, social Darwinism, and accumulation
of wealth are enjoying redoubled popularity. Despite some central
differences, the new order and the old reveal parallels at almost
every level.
p16
Like the robber barons, today's business elites have radically
restructured the economy in ways that promise both dynamic technical
progress and frightening social polarization. Despite the current
rhetoric of social responsibility, they, like their descendants,
are presiding over supercharged corporate systems that will be
remembered for their irresponsibility.
p17
President Rutherford B. Hayes about the Gilded Age
"Shall the railroads govern the country or shall the
people govern the railroads? ... This is a government of the
people, by the people and for the people no longer. It is a government
of corporations, by corporations and for corporations."
p18
Gilded Age elites shifted constitutional powers from the public
to corporations and their leaders-a legal and political transformation
that continues today in subtle yet alarming ways. The result was
a tension between corporate and popular sovereignty that exploded
violently in epic riots and strikes at the end of the last century
- but is being played out today largely off the public radar screen.
p18
Corporations, at base, are legal devices for concentrating capital
of the many in the hands of the few.
p20
The social disuniting of America is the most important parallel
between the Gilded Age and today. We may have a much larger and
more affluent middle class today, as well as some safety nets
that did not exist a hundred years ago. America's class structure
and standard of living have changed dramatically. But once again
today we are in the grip of a perverse form of economic growth
that polarizes America into increasingly separate worlds.
The richest 1 percent of Americans today own more than $4
trillion in assets, enough to pay down the national debt themselves.
The bottom 80 percent own only 6 percent of the nation's financial
wealth. To find a comparable wealth gap in American history we
have to go back before the New Deal era, when new policies were
implemented to alleviate poverty and inequality. A leading scholar
at the turn of the last century concluded that the poorest "seveneighths
of the families hold but one-eighth of the national wealth, while
but one percent of the families hold more than the remaining ninety-nine
percent." The 1890 census data suggested that the richest
1 percent of Americans owned 54 percent of national wealth, compared
to about 42 percent today.
Wealth became the great corrupting symbol of the Gilded Age,
with robber barons, such as the Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, and
Fricks, aping the lifestyles of European aristocrats. Their estates
were replicas of palaces like Versailles; at their parties one
might see "monkeys seated between the guests, human gold
fish swimming about in pools, or chorus girls hopping out of pies."
Richard Hofstadter writes that the Gilded Age's wealth and
economic dynamism were achieved at "a terrible cost of human
values.... The land and the people had both been plundered."
In slums like Pittsburgh's Painter Mill, people cooked in dark
cellar kitchens in houses without ventilation or drinking water.
Neighborhoods in New York City had higher population density than
that of Bombay, the most densely populated city in the world.
More than 80 percent of the Gilded Age workforce was poor.
Today, while the nation's official poverty rate is only 15
percent, it is much higher than in any Western European country
orJapan. The parallel with the Gilded Age is especially notable
in the huge scale of child poverty, with a million children expected
to become newly poor as a result of welfare reform. Dr. Deborah
Frank of Boston City Hospital reports that it has become common
in the city to see malnourished poor infants "whose mothers
were diluting their formula with water because they couldn't afford
more." The main cause of poverty, as in the Gilded Age, is
not unemployment so much as very low wages; 70 percent of today's
poor have jobs. The corporate social contract, while far more
protective today, is moving back toward the Gilded Age model.
The pattern includes not only low wages but the creation of a
disposable workforce, harsh working conditions, and a relentless
assault on unions.
p24
The robber barons virtually reinvented politics. Had they been
only wealthy captains of industry, they would be today simply
a fascinating historical curiosity. But because their economic
achievements were based on a political reconstruction of the corporation
that eroded the sovereignty of the public, they had a profound
and enduring impact on American democracy.
Gilded Age politics can be defined simply: It used the language
and machinery of formally democratic government to weaken real
democracy. The Gilded Age suffered "a government of Wall
Street, by Wall Street and for Wall Street," in the heated
1890 rhetoric of populist orator Mary Ellen Lease. While the robber
barons preceded Ronald Reagan in denouncing big government as
evil, they quietly expanded the intricate web of connections that
linked the corporation and the government, and in the process
broke down the barriers between economic and political power on
which capitalist democracy presumably rested. Corporations became
private governments with quasi-public powers, while government
itself became a servant of private interests.
The corporate undermining of democracy was so blatant in the
Gilded Age that it gave rise to the Progressive Era and its "clean
politics" reforms. While hardly hostile to business, Progressivism
and the New Deal restored a modicum of democracy, eliminated the
most outrageous corruption, and created a Democratic party not
entirely under the sway of business.
p25
We live in a period of moral fervor. The Christian Right, calling
for restoration of discipline and faith, wields vast power in
the Republican party. President Clinton increasingly uses his
bully pulpit to call for V chips, school uniforms, and a general
return to "family values.
A new rhetoric of personal responsibility is transforming
American politics. The discourse of responsibility has become
a central part of President Clinton's lexicon: We all must take
responsibility for our own lives, he argues. The focus is on each
individual's moral development. This new ethic is seen by many
to offer the hope, in this most materialist of ages, of a great
moral awakening.
The new politics of responsibility has both liberal and conservative
poles. Among liberals, it is associated with personal growth,
the revival of civil society, and a grassroots renewal of blighted
neighborhoods and a return to community-level democracy. Among
conservatives, it takes a more traditional focus on religious
revival and a new entrepreneurship. The almost messianic quality
of this vision among mainly conservative of ficials in Washington
invests their efforts to cut off welfare with a sense of moral
rectitude: The poor should take responsibility for themselves,
the argument goes; America's great social programs, including
Social Security, should be privatized. Now it will be each person
responsible for herself or himself.
Such moralism is hardly new in American life. It has roots
in American Puritanism, and is strongly linked to rugged individualism
and the American Dream. The rags-to-riches success story is one
of America's most enduring myths-it was already familiar by the
time the Horatio Alger stories codified it during the Gilded Age-and
it constitutes one of the common threads between the new politics
of responsibility and the old politics of business. Particularly
in its conservative manifestation, the new morality is linked
to broader philosophies of individualism and social Darwinism
dominant in the Gilded Age.
Gilded Age culture saturated Americans with the morality of
business and individual responsibility, equating wealth with virtue.
Robber-baron morality might seem an oxymoron; the greed and corruption
of the nineteenth-century industrialists set a new low standard
in American life. Yet the robber barons were among the nation's
most moralistic leaders. They draped themselves in the lofty rhetoric
of social Darwinism, which framed the workings of the free market
as a blessing from God and subjected the unwashed poor to a religion-fueled
moral indignation. John D.
Rockefeller, for example, readily used Darwinist language:
"The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the
fittest . . . it is merely the working-out of a law of nature
and a law of God." Rockefeller could conclude that "God
gave me my money."
Social Darwinism dominated the thinking of the Gilded Age.
It made poverty, competition, and exploitation all part of the
natural struggle for existence. Said one railroad baron, "Society
as created was for the purpose of one man getting what the other
fellow has." Social Darwinism and rugged individualism intertwined
to create a theology that gave spiritual meaning to the terrible
gulf between rich and poor. The robber barons' conversion of their
own ill-begotten wealth into a symbol of God's favor, and reading
of God's mysterious purposes into the misery of the poor, was
the great spiritual accomplishment of a passionately commercial
and otherwise notably nonspiritual age. It helped engender the
public worship of wealth and acceptance of poverty that is among
the cruelest of the robber-baron legacies.
p28
Today, as in the Gilded Age, we live in a world where a morality
of personal responsibility rubs shoulders with a culture of greed
and of flagrant social irresponsibility. Now as then, business
has shed its collective responsibility for employees-just as government
has for its citizens. Yet this threat to the common good is organized
in the name of nurturing responsibility itself. The politics of
personal responsibility offers a public moralism that does not
disturb the culture of greed or existing relations of power. Making
money is again a sign of personal responsibility while the failure
to do so suggests a moral lapse.
The specter of moral breakdown that permeates our own times
also lingered nearby during the Gilded Age, a sure product of
the cynical rhetoric of personal responsibility and the erosion
of public hope for social change.
p35
Today, as in the Gilded Age, countervailing power to business
has been severely eroded. Without the emergence of more robust
countervailing power ... competition on its own will not be enough
to protect democratic pluralism, or, indeed, civil society itself.
p35
Our present era is defined by three central tendencies. The first
is the rise of giant global corporate empires linking producers,
retailers, distributors, and suppliers in integrated worldwide
business networks. The second is the downsizing of the federal
government and its increasing role as an advocate for, rather
than adversary to, business. The third is the erosion of labor
unions. Together, these trends mark a great decline of the forces
of countervailing power that had developed through much of the
twentieth century, and a return to a balance of forces reminiscent
of the late 1800s.
p37
[Ronald] Reagan turned the full weight of [the labor bureaucracy]
apparatus against the labor movement, appointing regulators to
the National Labor Relations Board who sided routinely with corporations
on jurisdictional and certification disputes and would make it
difficult to contest even blatantly illegal corporate acts such
as firing organizers. The Great Communicator also used his bully
pulpit to persuade the public, already predisposed to think of
unions as corrupt, to see unions as special-interest groups which
corrode democracy-a view that many labor leaders contributed to
by their own blatant abuse of union power or dues. In tandem with
the corporate campaign that pictured unions as subverting competitiveness,
Reagan helped turn most Americans into foes of unions, an especially
notable achievement while massive downsizing and declining wages
were the order of the day.
Combined with changes in market scale and technology, those
antilabor campaigns sounded the death knell of labor as a vigorous
countervailing force while also signaling the shift of government
from countervailing power to corporate booster. Union membership
fell precipitously-from its peak of 34 percent in 1954 to its
current low of 15 percent of the nation's workforce. The influence
of labor plummeted. While there are promising signs of revival
in the late nineties, the labor movement has not been so weak
since before its takeoff in the New Deal.
p55
Corporations have succeeded in diverting the frustration generated
by downsizing and stagnant wages into a furious attack on governments
rather than on themselves. Terrorist "patriot militias,"
who bomb public facilities, are symptomatic of the millions who
blame government rather than business for their economic stress
and in their anti-government zeal have no inkling of business
as a kind of government itself.
p55
Corporate money pours into American political coffers while corporate
welfare-in the form of public subsidies and tax breaks-has become
central to the profitability of America's biggest firms. Public
and private government remain formally distinct and continue to
confront each other with hostility on occasion... But as in the
Gilded Age, our public leaders have increasingly accepted their
new role as advocates for our private corporate government.
p56
Americans have been schooled to deny the existence of overwhelming
corporate power, or to see nothing wrong with it... America's
leading companies cast a spell over many Americans, who are charmed
by their technological wizardry, mesmerized by their advertising,
and often understandably grateful for the products they serve
up. Americans have been persuaded that the main threat to the
nation is not the growth of American corporate power, but its
potential collapse in the wake of relentless global competition.
p78
The worship of money - symbolized by the hypnotic focus of the
nation on the stock market - becomes the new religion. Finance
capital ... creates a surreal obsession with money and money markets.
The value of patient production in early America yields to an
ethos of pursuing money without any regard to making something
useful. Personal identity shifts from the sense of self as life-long
worker to that of short-term investor.
p79
The financial analysts employed on Wall Street personalize the
immense power and partially countervailing force exercised by
the investment banks. As the high priests of the economy, the
analysts are increasingly in a position to dictate standards of
corporate performance, and they provide the assessments which
can mean life or death for big companies. A new, upstart elite
on which leading executives have become frustratingly dependent,
they act as a force of severe discipline on corporate behavior,
and helped create the restructuring revolution of the 1 990s.
Harvard Business School's Joel Kurtzman points out that under
their mathematical formulae and quantitative market models lies
a stark new ethos: "American corporations exist for their
shareholders. Period." The analysts are helping transform
banks into institutional investors enforcing the crystalline new
logic of shareholder value. The interests of workers and communities
are not part of their equation.
p91
... governments themselves continue to downsize, devoting an increasing
percentage of their declining resources to subsidizing corporate
growth and profitability. As public governments decline, the top
200 corporations - which make up our new private government -
are increasingly becoming the government that matters.
p95
A social contract is the set of laws and social norms that establishes
long-term responsibilities and protective moral covenants among
employers, employees, and communities. While it seems the foundation
of any society, a social contract is not to be taken for granted
in market societies... the Gilded Age model is instructive. The
robber barons purged social covenants by crushing nonmarket forces
and enshrining the amoral ideology of the market as the ultimate
morality.
In the Gilded Age, business leaders, politicians, and intellectuals
preached the gospel of social Darwinism-a variant of market fundamentalism
that has resurfaced today. Herbert Spencer, one of England's leading
Darwinist thinkers a century ago, summed up the Gilded Age view
of safety nets and social contracts: "The whole effort of
nature is to get rid of such {the poor}, to clear the world of
them, and make room for better . . . it is best that they die."
William Graham Sumner, another of the period's most influential
writers, saw the rich as nature's elect-and any effort to distribute
wealth to help workers or the poor as contrary to the natural
order: "The millionaires are a product of natural selection
. . . if we do not like the survival of the fittest, we have only
Ir one possible alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest.
The former is the law of civilization; the latter is the law of
anti-civilization." He argued that poor workers were nature's
losers and should be treated as such.
p101
... the termination of the New Deal social contract represented
an economy-wide initiative by leading corporations-some exposed
to new competitive pressures and some protected from it-who no
longer found themselves compelled to make a deal with unions or
communities.
Contractors constitute only one category of the virtual workers
who make up America's new contingent labor force. The others include
roughly three million temps; a million leased workers, who-like
temps-are rented by the hour, day, week or month; and nearly 25
million part-time workers. Collectively, contingent ~ workers
now make up between one-fourth and one-third of all American workers.
"If there was a national fear index," says economist
Richard Belous about these new charter members of the anxious
class, "it would be directly related to the growth of contingent
work."
p119
A basic faith in the separation of public and private arenas
plays a central role in American thought. This faith enables us
to believe ( that it is possible to have great concentrations
of power and wealth in the "private" sphere while still
practicing true democracy in the | public. It is a notion that
masks the melding of government and | business that is one of
the defining features of our times.
Corporation
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