American Democracy
as a Legitimating Device
excerpted from the book
The Democratic Facade
by Daniel Hellinger and Dennis
R. Judd Brooks
Cole Publishing Company,
1991, paper
American Democracy as a Legitimating Device
p1
The Oldest Democracy
Thomas Jefferson, 1786
" ... a little rebellion now and then is a good thing....It
is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government....God
forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion....The
tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood
of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
p2
From the early nineteenth century to the present, school textbooks
have functioned as catechisms to teach a civic religion whose
central article of faith is that America's government is the most
perfectly functioning democracy humans have thus far devised.
p3
In colonial America the top 20 percent of wealthholders owned
68 percent of total assets, and inequality in wealth distribution
was about the same in New England as in the slave-holding South.
In 1771, the top 10 percent of Boston's population held 63 percent
of the wealth-and the lowest three-tenths held less than one-tenth
of one percent of taxable assets. On the frontier, in contrast
to the cities, a considerable equality prevailed, but this was
because almost no wealthy people were living there.
The founders were an aristocratic group;
several of them were the richest individuals in all the colonies.
The merchant and landowning elites gathered in Philadelphia were
keenly aware of the threats that faced them. Many white Americans
had been brought, often forcibly, to the British colonies as indentured
servants (three out of four persons in Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Virginia at the time of the Revolution). They had filled the
ranks of the revolutionary armies, risked their lives, and were
armed. For elites, it was urgent that a new government be founded
that would elicit a widespread sense of legitimacy. Democratic
symbols were crucial for accomplishing this purpose. But it was
equally important to the founders that their own wealth and political
power be preserved. This is not to say that most of the founders
were antidemocratic per se, or that they were cynical about the
limited democracy they were creating. They were, however, unable
to distinguish the preservation of their own property from the
establishment of democratic principles. Thus it should occasion
little surprise that, as Charles Beard observed, "The overwhelming
majority...were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries
from the adoption of the Constitution."
p4
Elites and Their Strategies
Elites in every society employ strategies
to keep themselves in power, but it IS not necessary to think
that they must, or ordinarily do, engage in conspiracies for this
purpose. At times, of course, elite groups do act conspiratorially:
The founders did so when they drafted the Constitution and plotted
to get it ratified; Richard Nixon and his advisors did so in the
1972 presidential campaign (but then all election campaigns are
partially, by their nature, conspiratorial). Corporations constantly
engage m conspiracies; the term accurately describes a strategic
plan or a product advertising campaign. But it is usually more
accurate to consider the political strategies employed by elites
as instinctive responses to threats to their political power and
economic privilege rather than as conspiracies. It would be illogical
to expect elites not to try to maintain their position in society.
And it also would make little sense to believe that elites would
respond to threats to their power in completely chaotic, ineffectual
fashion. Elites share common interests, and they likewise share
perceptions about how to respond when these interests are threatened.
The composition of elites has changed
markedly during the nation's history reflecting changes in the
American economy and social structure. Consequently, the challenges
to elites' autonomy and power, and the political options available
to them have changed. In the past two hundred years three elite
"constellations" have dominated the U.S. economy and
polity. The constitution of 1789 constituted a compromise between
merchant elites in New England, who derived their wealth from
banking, trade, and land speculation, and the owners of large
estates in the South whose wealth depended on a slave economy
based on agricultural products-principally cotton, rice, and tobacco-that
were traded on the world market. The delicate balance struck among
the elite factions involved, among other things, an agreement
by the merchant elites to count slaves in calculating representation
in Congress (the three-fifths compromise), and an agreement not
to abolish the international slave trade until 1808. Westward
expansion eventually strained the compromise to the breaking point,
at which point Southern elites tried to secede from the union
By the 1870s, a new class of industrial
capitalists consolidated their grip on economic and political
institutions. The Industrial Revolution fundamentally transformed
the nation's social composition and economic structure. Soon after
the Civil War, the value added from industry exceeded that of
commerce and agriculture. The nature of business organizations
also changed. By the late nineteenth century, corporations accounted
for 60 percent of value in manufacturing. In 1896, twelve firms
were valued at more than $10 million, but by 1903 fifty of them
were worth more than $50 million. The giant corporations that
formed between 1896 and 1905 included (among others) U.S. Steel
(now USX), International Harvester, General Electric, and American
Telephone and Telegraph. These firms concentrated legal expertise,
accountants, a growing army of white-collar workers, and finance
capital into huge enterprises.
Over the past half century, another elite
"constellation" has replaced the industrial capitalists.
The idea of the "postindustrial" economy describes several
phenomena: Individual wealthy industrialists have been replaced
by professional managers and executives who run far-flung multinational
corporations, though some families still control great wealth
and institutional power, such as the du Ponts in Delaware and
the Bushes and Danforths in Missouri. Families in the top 10 percent
income bracket own 72 percent of all stock holdings and 65 percent
of all bonds; the top 2 percent of families own 50 percent of
stocks and 39 percent of bonds.
Corporate institutions control an overwhelming
proportion of America's productive, financial, intellectual, and
governmental resources. The executives of the one hundred largest
industrial corporations controlled 58 percent of all industrial
assets in 1984, and the fifty largest banks held half of all banking
assets. The three television networks produced 90 percent of television
news, and the fifty richest foundations presided over 40 percent
of all foundation assets. The 7,300 persons holding the top positions
in the institutions of the economy, government, and private foundations
and in research and higher education institutions were in a position
to make the key decisions about "war and peace, wages and
prices, consumption and investment, employment and production,
law and justice, taxes and benefits, education and learning, health
and welfare, advertising and communication, life and leisure."
A few hundred individuals with leverage in the largest private
and public institutions make the decisions that decide the well-being
and life chances of all Americans.
All of the elite constellations that have
dominated American life have been confronted with challenges,
and in response they have employed a variety of strategies to
maintain their political control. From time to time they have
resorted to repression. The application of repression however,
is costly and full of risk The brushfires of rebellion must be
constantly put out. Intrigues and divisions within the ranks of
the rulers are more or less built into repressive regimes, and
thus they are frequently short lived. It is far preferable for
elites to find a way to elicit the voluntary acquiescence, loyalty,
or, if possible, positive support of groups that are not in power.
America's elites have always attended closely to the processes
that nurture and build legitimacy, and they have been remarkably
successful. Otherwise, repression would have been more frequent
and more violent than it has been in our national history.
For elites, it is imperative that citizens
embrace their rule as necessary and just. In a polity with democratic
political processes, legitimation is necessarily based on the
idea of the consent of the governed (as opposed, for example,
to the "divine right of kings"). Therefore, elites must
ensure that the institutions of socialization carry the message
that the government in power represents "the people."
Schools, media institutions, and elections themselves have been
crucial socializing mechanisms organized and run by America's
elites.
Despite the application of huge political
and economic resources to the institutions of legitimation, America's
elites have evinced a chronic anxiety about their position. Therefore,
they have employed a panoply of strategies to manipulate democratic
processes. They have successfully controlled the composition of
the electorate and restricted political discourse, with the consequences
that elections concern "safe" political issues and voters
are able to decide only between candidates who represent elite
preferences.
Since the Second World War, elites have
invented a new set of strategies to supplement and amplify the
effect of those inherited from the past. Whereas elites historically
resorted to tinkering with the electoral system to keep it operating
within narrowly circumscribed limits, in the past decades they
have taken decisive steps to insulate government policy making
from elections altogether. Government officials now possess an
unprecedented capacity to manipulate information and shape public
opinion, both at election time and in the periods between. The
presidency and the executive agencies have vastly expanded their
ability to define and control the public agenda, with profound
effects. Most domestic policy is now made within the confines
of hidden "subgovernments" made up of congressional
career incumbents, key executive branch agencies, and relevant
industries and corporate lobbyists. In a sense, government policy
has become privatized, a state of affairs that has proceeded even
further in foreign policy making than in domestic policy. Postwar
foreign policy has been moved behind an impenetrable Veil of secrecy
and deception insulated almost completely from democratic processes.
p6
Repression As a Political Strategy
The fact that repression is always available
to elites, even as a last resort, exerts a powerful influence
on the political activity of ordinary citizens. From time to time
it has flared to ominous levels, rising during wars and periods
of popular discontent receding into the background when elites
have felt more secure. When other strategies have proven insufficient,
repression has always been readily available, and elites have
made much more liberal use of it in American history than the
mainstream textbooks will ever reveal. Coercion and the threats
of force against political enemies were used as instruments for
keeping elites in power even before the Constitution was drafted.
During the American Revolution, the estimated one-third of the
population that opposed the revolt faced retribution from supporters
of independence. Those who sided with the British faced confiscation
of their property and physical violence including Iynching, and
they either fled to Canada or retreated into silence. In the eighty
years between independence and the Civil War, slavery laws were
enforced Native Americans were annihilated, and labor organizers
were fired, harassed, and sometimes murdered. Today these events
normally are treated as unfortunate episodes that have little
or no connection to the present. Never would a term like genocide
be introduced in a school textbook, regardless of the appropriateness
of the term as applied to the experience of indigenous Americans.
To use such an expression would be to raise troubling thoughts
about America's identity and obligation to the victims better
to treat such events as sidebars in a history whose main plot
involves the extension and consolidation of freedom and democracy
for all.
Likewise, episodes of repression of workers
are represented in official history as unusual deviations from
a democratic heritage. Of course, such an interpretation ignores
the inconvenient fact that America's history of violence against
workers is , one of the bloodiest among Western nations. Between
1880 and l900, there were ,' almost 23,000 strikes in the United
States, and even more over the next several ~ decades. Repeatedly,
federal troops, state militias, and hired thugs were used to break
strikes. In 1877, railroad workers across the country called a
strike rather than accept a second 10 percent cut in wages imposed
within an eight-month period. The national and state governments
mobilized 60,000 troops against the workers; in less than two
weeks, almost one hundred strikers were killed. A few years later,
in 1886, a national strike for an eight-hour day led to a police
massacre of union organizers in Chicago, then prosecution, trial,
and death sentences for several unionists. In the Homestead, Pennsylvania,
strike against Carnegie Steel in 1892, a gun battle broke out
between Pinkerton agents and strikers in which nine workers and
seven agents died. Ten thousand state militia were mobilized.
Two years later, during the Pullman railroad strike, state militias
were sent against workers in seven states and federal troops poured
into Chicago and Pullman, Illinois. Thirty-four strikers were
killed. In 1914, in a dawn massacre near the coal fields at Ludlow,
Colorado, state militia soldiers fired into the tents of striking
workers and their families and killed twenty-six men, women, and
children.
The government also targeted political
radicals in the labor movement without waiting for strikes. Workers
who joined the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) were singled
out for furious repression. In the years before the First World
War, vigilante mobs organized by corporations and state politicians
attacked IWW members ("Wobblies") all across the country.
The level of repression escalated when the United States entered
the war. Congress used the war as a pretext for passing the Espionage
Act of 1917, which was nominally aimed at spying activities. Relying
on this legislation, the government sent more than 900 people
to prison in one year for their political views, including the
entire leadership of all the socialist organizations in the United
States, as well as hundreds of labor union leaders. The states
and the federal government worked with employers to ferret out
"traitors." In 1917, the Department of Justice founded
the American Protective League; within a year there were local
chapters in six hundred towns and cities. The Post Office Department
refused to handle magazines and newspapers it considered politically
unacceptable. The repression continued for years after the war
had ended. In 1920, raids coordinated by Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer rounded up hundreds of Wobblies. Government agents ransacked
IWW offices and confiscated or destroyed their records. In scores
of trials, some lasting only a few minutes, defendants were tried
en masse and convicted for conspiracy, treason, and other "crimes."
After midnight raids and secret deportation hearings, the federal
government deported more than 4,000 people in less than a year.
There is little question that a well-orchestrated government repression
from 1915 to 1920 effectively destroyed the socialist movement
and almost eradicated militant labor leadership in the United
States.
World War II provided the pretext for
a new wave of restrictions on civil liberties. Hundreds of pacifists
were jailed for their political beliefs. Newspapers and movies
were censored. Over I00,000 Japanese-American citizens were rounded
up and interned in detention camps sprinkled throughout the western
states. In the years after the war, congressional committees,
federal agencies, state governments, and private employers hounded
thousands of citizens in search of the "enemy within."
The litmus test for disloyalty was defined as previous membership
in any of several dozen civil rights, union, or left-of-center
organizations that had flourished in the 1930s-or family or friendship
connections to suspected individuals. In less than five years,
the American left was decimated.
During the civil rights campaigns of the
l950s and 1960s, FBI agents infiltrated civil rights organizations
and harassed and intimidated activists. All groups identified
as "leftist" were similarly targeted. During the 1960s,
for example, at least 10 percent of all members of the Socialist
Workers' Party and about 8 percent of the Young Socialist Alliance
actually were FBI informants. The FBI's activities continued until
the late 1980s, possibly ceasing in 1988 as a result of a federal
court injunction (though, more plausibly, these activities continue
but have become, once again, wrapped in a cloak of secrecy). The
FBI infiltrated meetings, photographed people attending demonstrations;
searched the household garbage of individuals working for peace
in Central America; ran checks on license plates of cars parked
near meetings and demonstrations; confiscated personal notes and
books from people returning from visits to Latin America; and
interviewed family members, landlords and employers. The investigation
embraced dozens of organizations, including the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, Amnesty International, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the American Federation of Teachers.
Repression and threats of repression remain
important guarantors of elite rule and governmental power. Too
much or too blatant a use of violence, however, may provoke protest
and opposition from elites more willing to accommodate change
more committed to democratic ideals, or fearful of the backlash
that frequent resort to violence might generate. Such a backlash
occurred in the early 1960s, when state and local law enforcement
authorities brutalized civil rights marchers in the South and
again in 1968, when Chicago police went on a rampage against demonstrators
at the Democratic National Convention. Repression has helped to
preserve elites and governments in power in America because it
has been applied selectively within the context of a political
system that is widely regarded as legitimate.
p8
Legitimacy and the Democratic Facade
Strategies for creating a popular sense
of legitimacy have been far more important to America's elites
than have strategies of repression. However, legitimation through
a democratic ideal of rule "by the people" has often
posed serious problems for elites because populist groups have
repeatedly tried to use the electoral system to change the political
balance of power. When confronted with such threats elites have
adjusted the rules of the game: They have expanded or reduced
the size of the electorate, pushed for new campaign and election
laws, and regulated the political parties. Invariably, reforms
have been justified as necessary for improving democratic processes.
Elites have expended a great deal of energy to fine-tune the day-to-day
rules and procedures of the political system to protect their
interests. If they are so troublesome to elites as to require
constant tinkering, why have democratic processes been tolerated
at all?
The delegates who convened in Philadelphia
during the summer of 1787 agreed that there was an urgent need
for a central government strong enough to contain popular discontent
and protect property. Though it was not clear to all of them that
democratic symbols were the answer, they faced the problem of
creating a new government that would not soon be overturned. The
landowner and merchant elites had just enlisted farmers and workers
to overthrow British rule. The citizenry was now well armed and,
as was so convincingly shown by Shays' Rebellion, it was capable
of challenging the indigenous aristocracy. The Constitution was
a brilliant solution to a practical problem. It legitimated aristocratic
control by articulating a language of democratic participation.
The idea of democracy is immensely powerful.
The measure of its symbolic value can be seen everywhere in the
world: in the habit of dictators who hold rigged elections to
prove their popularity (e.g., Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines),
in the one-party elections that prevailed until recently in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union, in the U.S. State Department's
routine application of the label "democratic" to authoritarian
regimes and military juntas that happen to be allied with the
United States. The idea of democracy is irresistible. It would
be odd indeed-even perhaps impossible-for American politics to
proceed without the manipulation of the symbols of democracy by
all who take part in it. These symbols are essential to elites
as a means for preserving their political hegemony.
The term hegemony comes from the Greek
word hegeisthai, meaning to guide. To speak of the hegemony of
the elites means to speak of their capacity to "guide,"
in particular to have the rest of us accept as "common sense"
that the economic and political system that perpetuates their
rule is the best and most just. This production and reproduction
of what people come to think of as truth and common sense is not
carried out through some grand, well-organized conspiracy, but
by a variety of institutions, controlled by elites, that specialize
in the production and distribution of ideas.
Political socialization takes place in
a wide variety of settings, including the family, workplace, and
church. But there are three principal arenas used by elites for
the express purpose of political communication and socialization.
The first arena is comprised of the institutions presiding over
the process of schooling. These institutions assume the crucial
task of inculcating in each new generation apolitical ideology
that legitimates the state. This is accomplished in a straightforward,
expensive, overt, meticulously organized manner: approved curricula,
civics and history courses, textbooks, class discussions, and
exams. By the age of eighteen, an American student has run an
impressive gauntlet of political indoctrination. Schools have
been regarded by elites as essential institutions for teaching
Americans that their democracy is the "one best" system
and that capitalism is essential for its success. Every generation
of schoolchildren has been taught loyalty to the flag and the
nation. More specifically, for most of our national history a
great deal of energy has been expended to teach schoolchildren
that America is governed by "We, the people," that all
groups can easily assimilate into American life (if they want
to), that Americans are prosperous and free, and that America
is the beacon of freedom for all the world.
A second crucial arena of socialization
is made up of institutions of the mass media. Americans are literally
bombarded by images and words carried by the electronic media.
Because most of our information, ideas, and opinions are derived
from these media sources, the mass media industry has become a
principal arbiter and interpreter of mass culture and political
opinion. A survey conducted by the Roper Organization in l 983
asked Americans what appliance they enjoyed owning the most. More
than half of the respondents mentioned their television sets.
Which activity did they enjoy or look forward to during a day?
Nearly one-third answered, "Watching television." The
average American is exposed to l,000 commercial messages each
day-about l90 on television alone. Per capita media consumption
in the United States exceeds that of almost every other nation
on earth.
How do Americans cope with this information
flood tide and what role do media play in shaping political behavior?
The question is not easy to answer because there is a key difference
between exposure and consumption. People screen information. On
average, people read only about half the stories they notice in
a newspaper, and many of these only partially. They read less
than one-fifth of the stories in full. Similarly, of the fifteen
to eighteen stories reported in a typical television newscast,
viewers retain only one "sufficiently well so that it can
be recalled in any fashion shortly afterwards." But the details
are less important than the abstract messages. The media sustain
and reinforce cultural values and political beliefs. Media institutions
are pivotal for socializing mass publics into accepting sanctioned
versions of political and economic reality.
Electoral processes make up a third crucial
arena used by elites for political indoctrination and communication.
Campaigns and elections have become elaborate pageants experienced
by most citizens vicariously through television. The "key
linkage now in American democracy is the spectacular presentations
of the electronic media," which mediates national politics
and culture as "sound bites and film clips on the screen."
5 As a result of this development, a lucrative industry of media
consultants, pollsters, advertising agencies, and professional
campaign managers has evolved, skilled at applying the techniques
of persuasion borrowed from product advertising and applied to
political campaigning. In the United States elections do not mainly
serve the purpose of allowing voters to choose their political
leaders. Rather, they are invested with the crucial legitimating
symbols of democratic rule. They provide ritualized opportunities
for people to participate, as individuals and as members of a
collective citizenry, in the political process. When people vote,
they reaffirm their belief that the political system listens to
their voice.
p10
Manipulating Democratic Processes
If socialization were a perfectly efficient
process, elites would comfortably allow democratic processes faithfully
to represent popular preferences about leadership and public policies
because all political expression would be entirely predictable.
Dissent would be literally unimaginable. However, as evidenced
by the political turbulence that has characterized U.S. history,
the values, opinions, and actions of ordinary people have been
far from predictable. Populist movements have repeatedly been
mobilized to challenge ruling elites, and in each historical period
elites have responded to these challenges by taking steps to ensure
that the political system cannot be used to upset existing social,
economic, and political relationships In short, democratic processes
have been rigged to produce acceptable outcomes.
The Constitution can be regarded as the
new nation's first successful attempt to rig the rules of government
and democratic participation in favor of elites. Having won the
war for independence, the creditors, merchants, and landowners
now faced serious threats. State taxes imposed to pay the debts
incurred to fight the war were resented by farmers and workers.
In New England, farm foreclosures were common and the courts made
matters worse by frequently jailing farmers who could not pay
their debts. Between 1784 and 1786, almost one-third of the farmers
in one Massachusetts county had been hauled into court to force
them to pay their debts as well as the new taxes imposed by the
Massachusetts government. Shays' Rebellion was a reaction to these
conditions.
Had the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention been representative of the people instead of the merchants,
bankers, and plantation owners who composed it in secrecy in 1787,
a much more democratic document would have emerged. In 1776, for
example, backwoods farmers, laborers, artisans, and small tradesmen
had taken control of Philadelphia and drafted a constitution that
extended popular control to an extent "beyond any American
government before or since." It created a single-house legislature
and a weak executive (composed of twelve elected members of a
Supreme Executive Council). Representatives had to stand for election
every year before an electorate made up of anyone, propertied
or not, who paid taxes. Compared to this plan, the Constitution
should be regarded as a conservative, even counterrevolutionary
document.
American history and civics texts reflexively
praise the ingenious structure of the government that the Founders
produced, yet the result was hardly democratic. Only the members
of the House of Representatives were directly elected by the people.
With each legislator representing a small geographic constituency,
an effective check was placed against what James Madison called
the "sudden passions and impulses" of the mass electorate.
Senators were chosen by the states. Electors who chose the President
were selected by state legislatures. Aside from the checks on
popular democracy written into the Constitution, electoral participation
was strictly controlled. From the constitutional period to the
late 1820s, the states imposed property restrictions that limited
the number of eligible voters, which had the effect of excluding
from the electorate riffraff like Daniel Shays and his ilk.
Jacksonian democracy, which resulted in
the dropping of property restrictions and the vast expansion of
the electorate, eventually presented problems to a new generation
of elites. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, giant
industrial corporations dominated the economy. After the 1860s,
an agrarian and labor rebellion against the new capitalists waxed
and waned, keeping time with economic cycles. The Democratic party
channeled protests against "big money" into the electoral
arena by constructing a fragile coalition of midwestern farmers,
southern white populists and laborers. In the presidential campaign
of 1896, William Jennings Bryan led the Democrats in a campaign
against the "money interests" symbolized by such financiers
and industrialists as Andrew Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, James Fisk,
and J. P. Morgan. The Democratic platform advocated a reduction
of tariffs to force eastern businesses to lower prices and compete
with imported goods. Bryan called for a paper currency backed
by silver as well as gold that would, it was presumed, benefit
indebted farmers and small businessmen. The Democrats also proposed
a graduated income tax, a government takeover of land grants previously
given to the railroads and public ownership of telegraphs and
telephones. In the campaign of l900, when he was once again the
Democratic nominee, Bryan assailed trusts and monopolies, urged
the direct election of senators, opposed court injunctions against
strikes, and favored the creation of a Department of Labor.
Elites in the South reacted to populism
by disenfranchising much of the t electorate. The South's defeat
in the Civil War had given blacks the vote, but by the early years
of the twentieth century voter registration laws, literacy requirements,
and poll taxes had effectively taken it away. Working-class and
poor whites were discouraged from voting by these same reforms.
In the North, voter registration and other reforms adopted during
the Progressive Era reduced voting participation by foreign immigrants
and by people on the lower end of the social scale. The consequences
of these reforms are still felt; compared to other democratic
nations, voter turnout in the United States is abnormally low.
Proposals to increase electoral participation by easing voter
registration requirements still meet with resistance from political
elites.
Elites also have successfully managed
democracy by manipulating voter choice and political debate. Political
scientists have often blamed the objects of this manipulation-the
voters-for the sorry state of political discourse in American
politics... voters are quite adept at linking their votes to issues
they consider important-despite being presented with very little
concrete information in campaigns, which in any case are conducted
within very restricted ideological confines.
... campaigning has become a significant
growth sector of the American economy, and its ostensibly public
function-to give the electorate a choice among candidates-has
substantially been eclipsed. Elections have been privatized. Candidates
employ a campaign industry of consultants, pollsters, and media
specialists. The escalating cost of these kinds of campaigns have
cast wealthy individuals and corporate interests as arbiters of
the electoral process. By their contributions they winnow out
candidates in the "hidden primary" that precedes the
official nomination primary contests. Favored candidates who survive
this stage then use money to buy the powerful technologies of
modern campaigning. Thus election campaigns have been made a straightforward
extension of corporate America, a growth sector of the capitalist
economy.
Historically, the political parties served
as mechanisms for mediating political competition among elites
and for facilitating political communication between elites and
the mass electorate. The parties also engaged in coalition building
on behalf of political candidates and political agendas... the
political parties have been eclipsed as the gatekeepers of the
electoral process by professional campaign specialists and financial
contributors. The fact that parties no longer serve their historic
functions means that elections have been reduced to media-managed
passion plays for the voters by professional campaign specialists
and financial contributors.
p13
Insulating Government from Accountability
... America's policy-making institutions
have become remarkably isolated from electoral decisions. Presidential
power has expanded partly because the presidency has become the
center (or object) of a continuous, sophisticated image-making
industry. Presidents do not now campaign only for election and
reelection. Pollsters and image makers work full time between
elections to sell presidential policies to the public. No other
institution has such a capacity for organizing such a well-organized,
sustained public relations campaign. When selling policy does
not work, presidents are able to insulate themselves from public
accountability through covert, ad hoc agencies and groups that
define and implement policies without the consent or knowledge
of Congress, the courts, or the public. Since the Second World
War, there has been a tendency for all presidents to expand their
power in this way by exaggerating threats to national security.
Congress also has become remarkably insulated
from electoral decisions, an outcome of the fact that elections
have become less and less competitive. More than half of the representatives
in the House elected in 1870 were serving their first term. By
1900, only about one-third were newly elected, and this proportion
fell to about 15 percent by the 1970s. In the 1986 congressional
elections, 98 percent of incumbents who ran were reelected, and
99 percent were returned in 1988. Most representatives and senators
have served for several terms, a fact that is virtually institutionalized
in an era of high-cost media campaigns, when incumbency confers
a decisive advantage in fundraising. Congressional representatives
and senators derive most of their campaign funds from political
action committees (PACs) representing corporations and large interest
groups; and they spend their money on expensive media campaigns.
Senators and congressional representatives have become accustomed
to conducting much of their business outside the public's scrutiny,
through hidden subgovernments in which they can more or less continuously
negotiate with executive agencies and corporate and interest-group
lobbyists.
p14
Elites and the Democratic Ideal
Except as a device for legitimating their
control, elites in the United States have little attachment to
democracy. At first blush, this assertion may seem indefensible.
There are no cases in which these elites have abrogated democracy
through resort to a coup d'etat. The Constitution has never been
suspended (though during the Civil War and the Second World War
some of its provisions were ignored). It would appear that America's
elites have convincingly demonstrated their support for democratic
processes; they seem to have met a two-hundred-year loyalty test.
Actually, however, on many occasions America's
elites have demonstrated a distrust and disdain for democracy
to the point where they have been willing to destroy it when it
seemed inimical to their interests-that is, when it threatened
their political hegemony and control over wealth-producing institutions...
In its self-proclaimed sphere of influence, the Caribbean and
Latin America, the United States has repeatedly destroyed democracy
and protected repressive regimes. Democracies based on mass participation
have consistently been opposed, often violently, by U.S. political
and corporate elites. Conversely, political systems pasted over
with a transparent patina of democracy have been both supported
and sponsored. These ostensible democracies are often as far removed
from popular influence as are the military dictatorships that
they often replace, but they are enthusiastically embraced as
"democratic" by U.S. foreign policy elites. These cynical
manipulations of democratic symbols can be used as a mirror that
faithfully reflects the ideal of democracy embraced by America's
elites. They tolerate democratic processes only if these processes
pose no significant danger to their autonomy and political hegemony.
p14
Must Democracy in America Be a Facade?
In his textbook written for college students
enrolled in courses on American government, the political scientist
Robert Dahl suggested several principles that may be used to judge
whether a political system is genuinely democratic. He asserted
that every citizen must have "unimpaired opportunities"
to formulate political preferences. For these opportunities to
exist, a formal educational process and a communications (media)
system must present significant political alternatives so that
citizens can make informed judgments by engaging in lively political
debate. Second according to Dahl, citizens must be able to express
their preferences. This takes place in the voting booth but also
in other contexts, such as demonstrations and associational activities.
And third, citizens must have their expressed preferences "weighed
in the conduct of government." Electoral procedures must
provide access to alternative sources of information and genuine
competition among candidates. Incumbent officeholders must always
be at risk of replacement when citizens preferences are at variance
from their own
Citizens in the United States have neither
an education system nor a media system that provides "unimpaired
opportunities" for them to formulate and signify preferences.
Neither liberal/conservative nor the Democratic/Republican spectrum
of alternatives is sufficiently broad today to merit much confidence
that competition among leaders for votes provides either meaningful
political debate or a mechanism for mass influence over government.
The decay of political parties and their replacement by a private-sector
campaign industry has transformed elections into exercises in
electronic advertising and information management. And, in any
case, most of the government institutions that make both domestic
and foreign policy now operate outside and beyond the reach of
electoral politics.
The American political system amounts
to a democratic facade. It is important 3 to note that this label
should not be equated with dictatorship or the kind of authoritarian
government in which participation is prohibited, governmental
power is concentrated into one institution or person, and only
a few people are allowed a political voice. The American system
does respond to well-funded and highly organized mass-membership
interest groups. When energetic social movements emerge, whether
or not they are encouraged by some elite sectors, they can wrest
important concessions. In some circumstances, elections have taken
on considerable significance. But recent national elections have
become little more than symbolic exercises. They function mainly
as mechanisms for conferring legitimacy on the elites that "win."
This situation need not persist. American
politics is not and never has been quiescent. Beyond the world
of the textbooks, American history is the story of political struggles.
The symbols of democracy manipulated by elites inspire ordinary
people to work for political change. The most significant reforms
in our time would open up the political system so that democracy
would not only legitimate government, but also keep it accountable.
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