Voting as a Symbolic Act
excerpted from the book
The Democratic Facade
by Daniel Hellinger and Dennis
R. Judd Brooks
Cole Publishing Company,
1991, paper
Rigged Electoral Processes
Voting as a Symbolic Act
p84
Despite his landslide victory in 1984, for example, President
Ronald Reagan received less than 30 percent of the votes of the
potential electorate. The largest party in American politics is
neither Democratic nor Republican; it is the party of nonvoters.
p87
The Symbolic Meaning of the Vote
The act of voting is invested with immense
symbolic meaning. Elections are, in part, an exercise that ties
the masses to political leaders by giving ordinary citizens the
feeling that they can influence government and its policies. At
election time, citizens take part in an elaborately orchestrated
pageant that invests officeholders with the aura of legitimacy.
By reference to this one means of participation, government officials
claim the right to govern and to make policy. The act of voting
also serves as an emotional catharsis essential for reaffirming
the individual's participation in a political community. Elections
give people a chance to express discontents
and enthusiasms, to enjoy a sense of involvement....Like all ritual...elections
draw attention to common social ties and to the importance and
apparent reasonableness of accepting the public policies that
are adopted.
A remarkable feature of the American political
system is that elites have managed to retain all the benefits
of ritualistic participation despite low voter turnout.
Exposed to the ritual, drama, and circus-like
panorama of election night returns and interviews, even the potential
voters who stayed at home on election day are hard put not to
feel that they, too, have participated. Low turnout might seem
to make it difficult for a politician or media analyst to read
a policy mandate into election results, but election winners nevertheless
always claim a mandate. In 1980, 70 percent of the potential electorate
did not vote for Ronald Reagan. Still, Reagan's pollster offered
the following analysis shortly after the President's election:
The nineteen eighty election provided
a mandate for change. That mandate was not clearly defined beyond
the electorate wanting a strong leader to deal with inflation,
but It was a rejection of the New Deal agenda that had dominated
American politics since the mid-thirties.
Reagan's opponents disagreed with the
claim that the 1980 election constituted a mandate for abandoning
programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged. They cited
polls showing that the most common reason that people voted for
Reagan in 1980 was that they were dissatisfied with Jimmy Carter's
administration. Even in the wake of the president's landslide
victory in 1984, it could be shown that on only a very few issues
did a majority of the electorate agree with specific positions
adopted by the President or included in the Republican platform.
For candidates though, it matters little if mandates can be objectively
read into election returns. What they seek is the legitimacy to
govern.
Elections provide this legitimacy, but
they are always problematic, because elections can be won, in
principle or potentially, by popular majorities that may wish
to overturn existing property and social class arrangements. Throughout
U.S. history, elites have expended considerable resources trying
to walk a fine line: They persuade citizens that elections are
meaningful political events, but they also try to make sure that
the political choices made in the electoral arena are acceptable
to elites.
Controlling voter participation has been
an important means that elites have used to accomplish two objectives-legitimation
and social control. In the nineteenth century, participation rates
were high partly because voting was easy to do and the political
parties had an interest in mobilizing the electorate. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries turnout rates began to
fall when elites made it much more difficult for ordinary citizens
to register to vote. New restrictions on the franchise were proposed,
in large part because elites became convinced that the electoral
process might produce unacceptable results.
p88
The "Problem" of Mass Suffrage
The delegates who gathered in Philadelphia
to draft a new constitution during the summer of 1787 agreed that
there was an urgent need for a central government strong enough
to contain popular discontent against wealth and property. In
response to Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts, George Washington
exclaimed, "Good God! there are combustibles in every state,
which a spark might light a fire to." By late 1786, the army
of farmers and debtors led by Daniel Shays had seized several
towns in Massachusetts and threatened to overrun the Springfield
military garrison. An army assembled by the state's merchants
finally routed Shays' volunteers, and the insurrection collapsed.
But the threat of civil turmoil existed elsewhere, too. Debtors
rioted in Maryland in 1786; a year later, farmers in Vermont tried
to stop foreclosures. In this atmosphere, the Founders drafted
a constitution that established a democratic form of government,
a daring step at a time when European nations were still ruled
by hereditary monarchies and rumors of rebellion filled the air.
But it was a cautious step as well. The Founders established a
republic that simultaneously allowed democratic expression and
contained effective safeguards against popular majority rule.
The Founders were divided on the question
of how narrowly the franchise should be restricted. Though he
was the principal architect of "checks and balances,"
James Madison believed that additional safeguards were needed.
Convinced that a property qualification should be written into
the Constitution, he told delegates to the convention: "In
England, at this day, if the elections were open to all classes
of people the property of the landed proprietors would be insecure."
Roger Sherman of Connecticut feared that the people "are
constantly liable to be misled." And George Mason of Virginia
argued that "it would be as unnatural to refer the choice
of a proper character for [president] to the people as it would
be to refer a trial of colors to a blind man."
In the aftermath of the Revolution, however,
political elites urgently needed a way to legitimate the new government.
The entire white male population was armed, a condition that had
been indispensable to victory over the British. But many of those
who had served in the revolutionary armies were poor and in debt,
and capable of turning their fighting experience against the rich
and well born. Extension of the right to vote was an important
instrument for institutionalizing the Revolution and calming political
unrest. In the end, the Founders left the regulation of the vote
to the states. Because all the states imposed property qualifications,
only about 5 percent of the male population was eligible to vote.
The concern that popular majorities might
use the vote to threaten property rights remained an issue whenever
the states adopted voting regulations, and this concern persisted
long after the constitutional period. In Massachusetts, delegates
to the state constitutional convention of 1820-21 were warned
that they should take a lesson from Great Britain, where elites
were resisting pressure to extend the right to vote to males who
did not own property: "All writers agree, that there are
twenty persons in Great Britain, who have no property, to one
that has. If the radicals should succeed in obtaining universal
suffrage, they will overturn the whole kingdom, and turn those
who have property out of their houses."
Following the Revolution, the states making
up the original colonies continued to restrict voting to property-owning
white males. Such restrictions helped eastern patricians to maintain
a stranglehold on national politics for more than forty years
after the Constitution was adopted. In the 1824 presidential race,
John Quincy Adams of the Old Guard defeated Andrew Jackson despite
the fact that Jackson carried the popular vote. The more populous
eastern states delivered a solid block of Electoral College votes
for Adams, ensuring his victory.
States that joined the Union after the
Revolution did not generally impose property restrictions on voting
because social relations in frontier cities and small towns were
far more fluid than in the East. As more states joined the Union,
it did not take long for voters in the new states to tip the balance
of power in the Electoral College. Property or tax-paying restrictions
were applied to voting in fourteen states in 1828, but they were
dropped rapidly in the next few years. Five states still imposed
them in 1840. Connecticut, Louisiana, and New Jersey dropped their
restrictions in the 1840s, and Virginia followed suit in 1851.
The last state to retain property restrictions, South Carolina,
lost its right to impose them at the end of the Civil War.
The Old Guard of the revolutionary period
finally was forced to give way to a new generation whose fortunes
were tied to westward expansion. In 1824,355,000 voters participated
in selecting the president. Only four years later, turnout more
than tripled, to 1,155,000 people, and the "new" Jacksonian
Democratic party became the first mass-based political party in
the country. Jackson's opponents, including the emerging "Whigs,"
had to learn to play the mobilization game as well. Stimulated
by keen competition between the parties, turnout levels in the
nineteenth century rose well above levels known in Europe, where
the right to vote was still tightly restricted or completely denied.
p90
The Decline of Participation The South
In the six presidential elections from
1840 to 1860, national rates of voting turnout in the non-southern
states varied from 72 percent to 83 percent. In the states outside
the South, turnout rates remained high until the turn of the century,
then began a steady decline to 55 percent by the election of 1920.
Turnout rates in the South were always somewhat lower than elsewhere,
and they fell somewhat after the Civil War. Voting participation
dropped precipitously after the election of 1896, when 57 percent
of the electorate voted. In the presidential election of 1912
28 percent of the South's potential electorate went to the polls.
By the election of 1924, only 19 percent of the southern electorate
voted.
It is not difficult to identify the reasons
for the sharp decline in voting participation throughout the southern
states. Property-owning southern elites lost their grip on electoral
policies for a brief time after the Civil War, but when the northern
occupation ended following the 1876 election, they quickly began
searching for ways to drive blacks and poor whites out of the
electoral system. In this effort they were remarkably successful.
The political control exercised by propertied
southern elites was shattered by the outcome of the Civil War.
Backed by military occupation, Reconstruction Republicans flooded
into the South and guaranteed an expansion of political power
for blacks, and also incidentally for poor whites, by extending
the vote to the former slaves. Hundreds of blacks were elected
to state and local public offices, and a few were elected to Congress.
With the withdrawal of federal troops from the southern states
in 1877, however, southern white elites organized to reverse the
enfranchisement of black and white voters. By the late 1890s,
they had achieved their objective.
In 1877, Georgia imposed a mandatory poll
tax that prompted an immediate decline in turnout, and Georgia's
example was soon followed elsewhere. The poll taxes levied by
Georgia and other states required voters to pay one or two dollars
annually, a considerable amount for sharecroppers and agricultural
workers whose annual income was measured in tens of dollars. Estimated
per capita income in the South including the value of crops and
goods produced at home, was only $100 in 1900 i5 In 1882 South
Carolina passed the "eight-box" law, and Florida adopted
this procedure in 1889. This law required voters to place their
ballots in separate boxes labeled for each candidate. The intent,
and the effect, was to make it impossible for illiterate voters
to cast their ballots accurately. But such a complicated system
proved to be unnecessary because most states pioneered in more
direct methods to disenfranchise their illiterate citizens. Mississippi
adopted a poll tax and a literacy test when it revised its state
constitution in 1890. In Mississippi's literacy test, a black
voter would be asked to read a passage from the state constitution
and then was required to give a "reasonable demonstration"
of its meaning. The judgment about whether the voter passed the
test was left entirely to the registrar. By 1900, overall voter
turnout in Mississippi had dropped to 17 percent.
Additional insurance against black political
influence was secured by instituting the all-white primary. The
legal rationalization for this device to remove blacks from the
nomination process relied on the argument that political parties
were akin to private clubs with a right to make their own rules,
and that as a consequence they could not be regulated by the government.
White primaries withstood federal court challenges until 1944.
Terror was employed to achieve the final
destruction of political influence by blacks. The Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments had been enacted by the post-Civil
War Congress to empower blacks politically, but before long the
U.S. Supreme Court moved to limit federal enforcement of blacks'
voting and civil rights. In 1876, for instance, the Supreme Court
dismissed one hundred federal indictments against the perpetrators
of sixty political murders of blacks, on the ground that Congress
could not make murder a crime prosecutable under federal law (U.S.
v. Cruickshank)
The many strategies to disenfranchise
black voters were effective. Within a few years, the southern
black electorate was "expeditiously destroyed." In Louisiana,
registered black voters fell from 130,334 to 1,342 between 1896
and 1904. In five other southern states it was halved.
Many of the efforts to reduce the political
influence of blacks were aimed at poor whites as well. Proponents
of election "reform" understood that restrictions on
voting by blacks could be used to undercut whites who might challenge
oligarchic control by big landowners and employers. A white politician
in Virginia stated: "It is not the negro vote which works
the harm, for the negroes are generally Republicans, but it is
the deprived and incompetent men of our race who have nothing
at stake in government, and who are used by designing politicians
to accomplish their purposes, irrespective of the welfare of the
community." An Alabama lawyer observed in 1905: "How
to get rid of the venal and ignorant among white men as voters
was a far more serious and difficult problem than how to get rid
of the undesirable among the negroes as voters."
In the North as well as in the South,
elites were concerned that workers might close ranks to forge
a political movement aimed to regulate corporations and financial
institutions. Agrarian populism was on the rise at the same time
that the industrial and trade unions were growing in strength.
In cities, socialist parties were attracting an increasing number
of followers, and the party machines seized power by mobilizing
immigrant voters. Such developments prompted elites to seek reform
of election
p95
The Contemporary Politics of Voter Registration and Turnout
The best testimony to the continuing importance
of the politics of turnout is the response when proposals are
put forth to relax voter registration requirements. In 1971, the
League of Women Voters completed a study of registration laws
and practices in 251 counties in various states. After noting
a pattern of inefficiency and delay in the system of registration,
the league reported an oft-expressed fear by election officials
that any easing of registration laws inevitably would lead to
voter fraud. The league's response: "More noteworthy...is
the fraud perpetuated on the American people by a system which
excludes millions of eligible voters from the electoral process
in the name of preventing a few dishonestly cast votes."
The league found that "long lines,
short office hours, inaccessible registration and polling places,
and registration periods remote from the date of election are
common experiences to many Americans." Election officials
were "generally insensitive" to these problems, evincing
"an attitude...which tends to obstruct rather than encourage
the efforts to expand the electorate." The result was that
three out of every one hundred people who showed up to register
left without enrolling. Analyzing the league's report, a political
scientist concluded: "The question arises that if the government
can find a citizen to tax him or draft him into military service,
is it not reasonable to assume that the government can find that
same citizen to enroll him as an eligible voter and include him
in the active electorate?"
Despite election day rhetoric, voters
are often discouraged from going to the polls. For example, in
New York City a voter registration drive in 1984 bogged down after
registration officials built a backlog of 50,000 registrations.
It was estimated that 62,000 voters were turned away on election
day because they were not yet listed on the rolls.
Inefficient registration procedures reduce
voter participation. The lack of uniformity in electoral laws
exerts a similar impact. Registration requirements differ from
state to state, or even from county to county within a state.
Americans are a mobile population; about one-third of the respondents
in a recent election study had lived at their address less than
two years. Probably half of voters change addresses in the four
years separating presidential elections. After each move they
are expected to reregister. A few states and counties still require
double registration- once for local and separately for national
elections. In some places, voters are expunged from the rolls
for failing to vote in a single election. Several Georgia counties
require a citizen to drive up to fifty miles to register at a
courthouse. In some counties in Alabama, registration offices
are open only two to three days a week for limited hours. Across
most of the country, offices are rarely open except during working
hours.
In the last few years, registration by
mail has become more common, by 1988 twenty-five states allowed
it. But the registration forms are not easy to get because they
are not available to people outside registration offices. Locating
the registration offices' phone numbers is not always as simple
a task as it might seem because the elections boards are listed
under various names in different counties and states. In some
states, forms must be notarized before they can be returned. When
a prospective voter returns the form, election officials may find
a multitude of ways to classify the forms as faulty, because the
"forms themselves are booby-traps":
In New York City, the board of elections
routinely discards forms that are completed in pencil, or signed
only on one side, or signed with a middle initial on one side
but not the other, or with Mr. or Mrs. on one side only.
The hurdles to registration are many;
there is no guarantee of success once they are negotiated, and
they must be jumped over and over again in the life of the ordinary
citizen. Better-educated people accustomed to bureaucratic processes
find it easier to negotiate the registration process. They know
what to ask of the officials, who also tend to feel more comfortable
with people who act and dress like themselves.
As a consequence, the administrative complexities
of voter registration are far from neutral "Contemporary
voter registration obstacles thus function as de facto equivalents
of the poll tax, literacy test, and other class-and race- oriented
restrictions on the suffrage of an earlier era."
Most Western democracies operate on the
principle that it is the government s responsibility to solicit
or even enforce voter participation. Italy's registration system
is administered locally, but all citizens older than eighteen
are automatically enrolled registrars when moving. Austria requires
registration as a matter of law; Belgium and Australia go further
and mandate voting. Sweden registers voters through its national
tax collection bureaucracy, and in Britain local officials are
required to register voters once each year. In Canada, registrars
are required to prove that a citizen is ineligible to vote, unlike
the United States, where the voter must prove eligibility to a
registrar if challenged.
p104
| The Ideological Bias of Low Participation
The comparative study of election systems
suggests that turnout is related to the nature of the party system.
One study compared the level of electoral participation by citizens
from lower social and economic strata in several countries to
the degree of activity in the United States. It found that less
affluent groups were twice as active in campaigns in Austria than
in the United States; two to seven times more active in Japan;
and five to twenty times more active in the Netherlands.
Many nations with higher turnout rates
use proportional representation systems, which in principle means
that parties are awarded legislative seats "proportionate"
to the percentage of the vote they receive in the election. Thus,
even parties winning only 5 percent of the vote typically send
members to Parliament. In contrast the winner-take-all method
used in the United States nearly ensures that a vote cast for
a new party will be wasted, in the sense that even a sizable proportion
of votes such as 25 percent, will not send anyone to Congress
or to a state legislature. Studies of elections in the American
states show that the degree of competition between parties is
a major factor is determining voter turnout, suggesting that a
system of representation that would increase party competition
would also increase turnout. An electoral system that facilitated
the organization of new parties would presumably have the same
effect.
It may seem contradictory, but studies
show that more voters in the United States have firm loyalties
to a political party than do voters in Europe. It is important
however, to distinguish identification with a political party
from the function that parties serve in presenting policy options.
Voters more frequently change loyalties to parties in Europe than
in the United States, in part because there are a larger number
of parties arrayed on a broader ideological spectrum in Europe.
Voters in European nations are presented with a much larger range
of options on election day.
Consider, for example, two leaders of
the right and left wings of the two parties in the U.S. Senate:
Republican Jesse Helms and Democrat Ted Kennedy. A right wing
exists in Europe that corresponds to Helms's position in the United
States. But in the Western European political context, Kennedy
would at best qualify as a moderate leader in one of the labor-based
parties, like the Social Democratic parties of Germany, Britain,
or Scandinavia. He would find himself outflanked on the left by
several large Communist parties, the German Green party, most
of Britain's Labor party, the Greek Socialists, and several other
small parties. The parties on the left mobilize voters who otherwise
might not participate in elections at all. It is clear that the
Democratic party in the United States does not fulfill this function:
The Democratic party is not remotely to
be confused with a left party in organizational structure, or
in terms of serious motivation to mobilize the 'party of nonvoters'.
Accordingly, the party of nonvoters as a whole corresponds comparatively
to the place...that a genuinely left party would occupy if it
had been historically possible to organize it in this country.
The United States is the only major industrialized
country that does not have an influential socialist party. Ideological
competition in electoral politics is almost
nonexistent in comparison to other Western
democracies. From the perspective of political elites, however,
this is an entirely good thing because a higher level of competition
in the electoral arena, especially if it involved significant
ideological debate, might threaten control by the few.
Why Elites Prefer Low Participation
Pessimism about participation by the masses
in the political life of the nation did not end with the Progressive
reformers. The belief that democracy survives best when participation
is carefully regulated has survived to the present day. There
are plenty of contemporary advocates for the idea that eligibility
to vote should be tied to a demonstration of responsibility or
worthiness. Consider, for example, the argument advanced by some
politicians who oppose the idea of registering people in social
services agencies instead of requiring them to go to designated
sites on their own. Carl F. Gnodtke, a Republican member of the
Michigan House of Representatives, said in 1984: "Someone
like that would have more free time to do that than a working
individual....I think it would mean more to the individual, too,
[[if] they had to do something a little extra to be eligible to
vote. Anything you get for nothing, you take for granted."
Liberals tend to view voting as a device
to channel participation and to keep it manageable. In the 1960s,
the civil rights movement and Vietnam War preoccupied many politically
active young people. Liberal politicians paraded before a congressional
committee in 1968 to testify that the vote should be extended
to eighteen-year-olds, several of them arguing that the advocates
of civil disobedience on campus "would find themselves with
little or no support if students were given a more meaningful
role." Students needed the "right to make a positive
choice as an alternative to a negative protest"; in the absence
of an acceptable outlet, student energy might "dam up and
burst and follow less-than-wholesome channels"; they might
even "join the more militant minority of their fellow students
and engage in destructive activities of a dangerous nature."
The National Student Association favored extending the franchise
to eighteen-year-olds, but there were no demonstrations or campaigns
organized by youth to get the vote. Still, a constitutional amendment
went through to lower the voting age.
If conservatives are concerned that the
riffraff might disturb politics as usual, liberals evidently fear
that if enough people do not vote, they may express themselves
politically in more dangerous ways. The view that abstention poses
a threat to democracy has been eloquently stated by Arthur Hadley,
in an aptly titled book, The Empty Polling Booth:
As there is a critical mass of nuclear
material necessary to trigger an atomic explosion so there appears
to be a critical percentage of nonvoters necessary to produce
rapid political change. Historically that percentage has been
close to the 50 percent we now approach. They sit out there, the
great mass of refrainers, disconnected from the process of democracy,
but able at any moment to dominate our future. Our future is their
future. To start them back now as voters is important. Not because
our country will necessarily be governed better if they return,
but because their growing presence menaces any government.
When the question is posed about whether
low voter turnout is problematic or not, one's answer will depend
on whether elections are viewed as instruments of elite control
or as the means by which citizens control their government. In
treating this issue, the authors of a leading college textbook
on American government assert that all forms of apathy among the
masses are a good thing:
The irony of democracy is that democratic
ideals survive because authoritarian masses are generally apathetic
and inactive. Thus the lower classes' capacity for intolerance,
authoritarianism, scape-goatism, racism, and violence seldom translates
into organized, sustained political movements.
The authors' fear of popular participation
is founded on a belief that formal education, and possibly some
other characteristics that elites share (they are not clear on
this point), make them more protective of individual freedoms
than the common citizen. They assert that democracy requires that
the masses riot participate very much:
Reflecting the masses' antidemocratic,
extremist, hateful, and violence-prone sentiments, [their] activism
seriously threatens democratic values....Any genuine "peoples
revolution" in America would undoubtedly take the form of
a right-wing nationalist, patriotic, religious-fundamentalist,
anti-black, anti-intellectual, anti-student, "law and order"
movement.
They regard as "demagogues those
leaders who would mobilize the people," and claim, "Elites
give greater support to democratic values than do masses. Elites
are also more consistent than masses in applying general principles
of democracy to specific individuals, groups, and events."
In a similar vein, during the 1 970s a
prominent international group of business leaders, politicians,
and intellectuals associated with the Trilateral Commission expressed
a conviction that capitalist countries are better off when citizens
refrain from or are discouraged from extensive participation.
The events of the 1 960s and early 1970s unsettled political and
economic leaders. The Trilateralists feared that rising demands
from unions, consumers, minorities, women, and environmentalists
had created a "crisis of governability" in Western democracies
and in Japan. They warned that the American, Western European,
and Japanese political systems would not be able to satisfy all
of the demands placed on them. They urged that steps be taken
to reduce these demands by concentrating more power in governmental
institutions.
Throughout American history, elites have
tended to become alarmed when mass participation in politics has
reached "excessive" levels. During such times, elites
have initiated reforms to reduce and channel participation. In
the case of electoral reforms, the result has been to turn elections
into legitimating devices for elite control. The electoral process
in the United States has progressively lost its historic functions
of mobilizing new groups into the political system and creating
broad-based coalitions of diverse political interests. Legitimacy,
however, cannot be divorced from
these purposes. When elections become
little more than occasions for elite manipulation, they may even
fail to confer legitimacy, because the political community may
itself be weakened:
It...seems plausible that low participation
and voter apathy may damage social cohesion in American life.
The democratic political system is supposed to bind citizens,
communities, and social groups together. Choosing not to participate
in the common activity of governance weakens those ties.
Consultants to the Trilateral Commission
like political scientist Samuel Huntington walk a fine line when
they advocate lower levels of participation because above all
they want ruling elites to be blessed with the aura of legitimacy-but
not at the cost of accountability.
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