Introduction: Conformity and Dissent,
Doing What Others Do,
Obeying (and Disobeying) the Law
excerpted from the book
Why Societies Need Dissent
by Cass R. Sunstein
Harvard University Press, 2003,
paper
p1
A child, however, who had no important job and could only see
things as his eyes showed them to him, went up to ) the carriage.
"The Emperor is naked," he said.
Hans Christian Andersen, "The Emperor's
New Clothes"
p1
Silence is a way of talking, of writing; above all, it is a way
of thinking that obfuscates and covers up for the cruelty that
should today be a central preoccupation of those who make talking,
writing, and thinking their business. Breaking with this silence
is the moral obligation of every Arab, in particular the "intellectuals"
among us. Nothing else is of comparable importance.
Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War,
Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World
p1
Many of us display a great deal of independence. But most human
beings, including many apparent rebels, are strongly influenced
by the views and actions of others. Unchecked by dissent, conformity
can produce disturbing, harmful, and sometimes astonishing outcomes.
p5
One reason we conform is that we often lack much information of
our own, and the decisions of others provide the best information
we can get.'° If we aren't sure what to do, we might well
adopt an easily applied rule of thumb: Follow the crowd.
p6
Conformists follow others and silence themselves, without disclosing
knowledge from which others would benefit.
p6
Conformists are often thought to be protective of social interests,
keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By contrast, dissenters
tend to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on projects
of their own. But in an important sense, the opposite is closer
to the truth. Much of the time, dissenters benefit others, while
conformists benefit themselves.
p7
The honor roll of famous dissenters includes Galileo, Martin Luther,
Thomas Jefferson, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Gandhi, and Martin Luther
King, Jr.
p32
... I want to consider some of the most famous and most alarming
experiments in modern social science." These experiments,
conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgam, involved conformity
not to the judgments of peers but to the will of an experimenter.
For better or for worse, these experiments almost certainly could
not be performed today because of restrictions on the use of human
subjects. But they are of independent interest because they have
major implications for social influences on judgments of morality,
not merely facts. In discussing those experiments, my ultimate
aim is to connect them with some large issues in law and politics;
but they are well worth examining for their own sake.
The experiments asked people to administer
electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room. Subjects
were told, falsely, that the purpose of the experiments was to
test the effects of punishment on memory. Unbeknownst to the subject,
the victim of the electric shocks was a confederate and the apparent
shocks were not real. They were actually delivered by a simulated
shock generator, offering thirty clearly delineated voltage levels,
ranging from 15 to 450 volts, accompanied by verbal descriptions
ranging from "Slight Shock" to "Danger: Severe
Shock." As the experiment unfolded, the subject was asked
to administer increasingly severe shocks for incorrect answers,
up to and past the "Danger: Severe Shock" level, which
began at 400 volts.
In Milgram's original experiments, the
subjects included forty men between the ages of 20 and 50. They
came from a range of occupations, including engineers, high school
teachers, and postal clerks. They were paid $4.50 for their participation-and
were also told that they could keep the money no matter how the
experiment went. The "memory test" involved remembering
word pairs; every mistake by the confederate/victim was to be
met by an electric shock and a movement to one higher level on
the shock generator To ensure that everything seemed authentic,
at the beginning of the experiment the subject was given an actual
sample shock at the lowest level. But the subject was also assured
that the shocks were not dangerous, with the experimenter declaring,
in response to a prearranged question from the confederate, "Although
the shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue
damage. "59
In the original experiments, the victim
did not make any protest until the 300-volt shock, which produced
a loud kick, by the victim, on the wall of the room where he was
bound to the electric chair. After that point, the victim did
not answer further questions and was heard from only after the
315-volt shock, when he pounded on the wall again; he was not
heard from thereafter, even with increases in shocks to and past
the 400-volt level. If the subject indicated an unwillingness
to continue, the experimenter offered prods of increasing firmness,
from "Please go on" to "You have no other choice;
you must go on." 60 But the experimenter had no power to
impose sanctions on subjects.
What do you think subjects would do, when
placed in this experiment? Most people predict that over 95 percent
of subjects would refuse to proceed to the end of the series of
shocks. When people are asked to make predictions about what subjects
would do, the expected break-off point is "Very Strong Shock"
of 195 volts. But in Milgram's experiment, every one of the forty
subjects went beyond 300 volts. The mean maximum shock level was
405 volts. A strong majority-26 of 40, or 65 percent-went to the
full 450 volt shock, two steps beyond "Danger: Severe Shock."
Later variations on the original experiments
produced even more remarkable results. In those experiments, the
victim expressed a growing level of pain and distress as the voltage
increased. Small grunts were heard from 75 volts to 105 volts,
and at 120 volts the subject shouted to the experimenter that
the shocks were starting to become painful. At 150 volts the victim
cried out, "Experimenter, get me out of here! I won't be
in the experiment anymore! I refuse to go on! 1164 At 180 volts,
the victim said, "I can't stand the pain." At 270 volts
he responded with an agonized scream. At 300 volts he shouted
that he would no longer answer the questions. At 315 volts he
screamed violently. At 330 volts and more he was not heard.
In this version of the experiment, there
was no significant change in Milgram's results: 25 of 40 participants
went to the maximum level, and the mean maximum level was over
360 volts. In a somewhat gruesome variation, the victim said,
before the experiment began, that he had a heart condition, and
his pleas to discontinue the experiment included repeated reference
to the fact his heart was "bothering" him as the shocks
continued. This too did not lead subjects to behave differently.
Notably, women did not behave differently from men in these experiments;
they showed the same basic patterns of responses.
Milgram himself explained his results
as involving obedience to authority, in a way reminiscent of the
behavior of Germans under Nazi rule. Indeed, Milgram conducted
his experiments partly to understand how the Holocaust could have
happened. Milgram concluded that ordinary people will follow orders,
even if the result is to produce great suffering in innocent others
p36
... one or two dissenters, willing to follow their conscience,
can lead others to follow their conscience, too.
p37
The general lessons are straightforwardi When the morality of
a situation is not entirely clear, most people will be influenced
by someone who seems to be an expert, able to weigh the risks
involved. But when the expert's questionable moral judgment is
countered by reasonable people who are bringing their own moral
judgments to bear, most people are unlikely to follow experts.
They are far more likely to do as their conscience really dictates.
Here, we can learn something about cruelty among teenagers, against
oppressed groups, and on the battlefield.
p44
Now of course this is not all of the picture. Among some people,
the law has a high degree of moral authority just because it is
law. For them, the law's moral authority greatly exceeds the shared
but unenacted view of many people. If this is true, the law's
authority will extend well beyond that of Asch's unanimous confederates,
and probably well beyond that of Milgram's experimenter as well.
But we cannot fully appreciate law's moral authority without seeing
it as intertwined with the social influences that I have been
emphasizing.
This point suggests that the law's expressive
power depends on whether law is thought to convey good information
about what citizens should do, or about what most people think
that citizens should do. These conditions are most likely to be
met in democracies and least likely to be met in dictatorships.
Hence, democracies, far more than tyrannies, can count on compliance
without enforcement. In a democratic system, people know that
much of the time the law captures the judgments of their fellow
citizens. If the system is genuinely democratic, people know that
the law is not an arbitrary imposition by a self-appointed elite.
But when a tyrant issues an edict, people are likely to think
that it represents the tyrant's will alone. Unless the tyrant
is thought to be wise, his edict will carry no signal about what
should be done. It follows that as a general rule, tyrants, far
more than democratic rulers, need guns, ammunition, spies, and
police officers. Their decrees will rarely be self-implementing.
Terror is required. And if people are more likely to comply with
the law when they perceive it to be fair, then tyrants have an
additional problem. Those living under tyranny will not believe
that the law is treating them fairly, and for this reason too
noncompliance is likely.
In these circumstances, what do tyrants
do? If a tyrant is able to create a culture in which people are
fearful of random but horrendous punishments, compliance is more
likely. The likelihood of compliance increases further if the
dictator can create an army of private enforcers and informants,
themselves fearful that a failure to report wrongdoing will result
in punishment and even death.
p53
When a law no longer reflects citizens' values, people are unlikely
to obey it without a great deal of enforcement activity. And when
a law is so inconsistent with people's values that it cannot,
in a democracy, be much enforced, it loses its legitimacy.
p84
Full disclosure of accurate information is a central goal of good
institutions ...
Why
Societies Need Dissent
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