Epilogue
excerpted from the book
Inside the Shadow Government
National Emergencies and
the Cult of Secrecy
by Harry Helms
Feral House, 2003, paper
p145
After the World Trade Center was destroyed, the composer Karlheinz
Stockhausen called the act "the greatest work of art of all
time." This comment was justifiably greeted with outrage,
but Stockhausen was on to something. Like art, people tended to
see in the September 11 attacks what they wanted to see. And how
people reacted often told more about themselves than attacks.
Ominously, the reaction of many in Washington
was that the attacks were caused by inadequate internal security
and in order to fight terrorism, Americans must give up some of
their rights. "We are in a new world," said House Minority
Leader Dick Gephardt (D-Missouri) in late 2001. 5. "This
event will change the balance between freedom and security."
Gephardt introduced legislation to create
a national identification card for American citizens (even though
none of the September 11 hijackers were using false identification
or were American citizens). And ... other politicians called to
relax the Posse Comitatus Act and give the military an expanded
role in civilian law enforcement.
A little over six weeks after the attacks,
the "USA Patriot Act" was overwhelmingly approved by
Congress. This massive bill (over 340 pages) greatly expanded
government wiretap and surveillance powers (especially without
warrant), created a vaguely defined new crime of "domestic
terrorism," allowed the government to track e-mail and internet
use without a warrant, greatly expanded the ability to conduct
searches under a warrant without notifying the targets of the
search and loosened the Constitution's fourth amendment "Probable
Cause" restrictions. In many respects the USA Patriot Act
seemed to have as its basic premise that the Bill of Rights was
the true cause of the September 11 attacks instead of massive
and well documented failures by such government agencies as the
FBI and the INS. And some in the Bush administration even attempted
to link the war on terrorism with the war on drugs through ads,
aired during the 2002 Super Bowl, claiming that drug sales financed
terrorism (although, as it later developed during 2002, a significant
chunk of the funds for the September 11 attacks came from the
Saudi royal family).
Most "anti-terrorism" proposals
merely called for increased snooping on American citizens, even
though no American citizens were among the September 11 plotters.
One such effort was the Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS). This would have enlisted mail carriers, utility meter
readers, installation/service personnel, pizza delivery people
and others with access to private residences (a group estimated
to total over 11 million) to report any "suspicious"
activity or people to the FBI and other branches of the Department
of Justice. When TIPS was announced, the outcry from civil libertarians,
much of the media and some members of Congress caused the plan
to be quickly abandoned.
However, many TIPS critics were silent
when a more ominous effort to fight terrorism," the Total
Information Awareness Program (TIAP) was announced in November,
2002. Edward Aldridge, the Pentagon's Undersecretary of Acquisitions
and Technology, described it as a "prototype database to
seek patterns indicative of terrorist activity." And how
would it be able to seek such patterns? By collecting data on
credit card and bank transactions (including loans, checking accounts
and ATM withdrawals) travel (air, rail, rental car and hotel records),
traffic and driver's license records, insurance records, telephone
records, medical records (including prescription drug purchases),
passport and visa applications, tax records marriage and divorce
records and what was described as "reports of suspicious
activity given to law enforcement and intelligence agencies."
In short, almost any transaction or activity for which some kind
of record is produced, would eventually find its way into the
TIAP database. All this data, some from private databases such
as those used by telemarketers and credit reporting agencies,
some from public records and some from government agencies, would
then be analyzed to find those as yet undefined "patterns
indicative of terrorist activity."
It's clear that many Americans could quickly
find themselves flagged as potential terrorists under TIAP. One-way
air travel booked on short notice is one factor supposedly indicative
of terrorist activity. But any one who travels often on business
must sometimes book a flight on short notice (such as a few hours)
and without a return trip, since they do not know how long they
will need to be at their destination. Under TIAP, such business
travelers might wind up on a terrorist watch list. The same thing
could happen to those who have rented apartments near suspected
terrorists, taken certain classes (like Arabic or Middle Eastern
Studies) at college or who make frequent cash withdrawals from
an ATM. "What this (TIAP) is talking about is making us a
nation of suspects," said Chuck Pena, a senior analyst at
the Cato Institute.
Some people were unconcerned about TIAP,
noting that much of the data would come from private records that
are already available for rent by telemarketers, insurance companies
and other businesses. However, no private database is remotely
as comprehensive as the proposed TIAP database for each American.
The TIAP database would have access to government records that
are not available to businesses and, most importantly, private
businesses using a database don't have the power to arrest and
imprison people.
Inevitably, substantial errors would creep
in the TIAP database for some individuals (just as they do in
credit bureau records, for example) and some people will be unfairly
targeted as terror suspects and conversely, legitimate terror
suspects will go undetected because of erroneous information.
The potential for misuse of TIAP by a future Richard Nixon, Lyndon
Johnson or J. Edgar Hoover staggers the mind. For example, one
can easily envision the TIAP database being used to dig up dirt
(such as history of renting DVDs of Sharon Stone films?) on political
opponents or overly inquisitive journalists.
Adding to the anxiety over TIAP and its
potential for misuse, was that its development was headed by Admiral
John Poindexter, the former national security advisor to President
Reagan. Before TIAP, Poindexter was best known for his role in
the Iran-Contra scandal; he was found guilty on five counts of
conspiracy, obstruction of Congress and false statements in 1990.
Those convictions were overturned on appeal in 1991 on the grounds
that his testimony before Congress, which was given under immunity,
may have influenced witnesses against him during his trial. During
his testimony before Congress, Poindexter admitted not informing
President Reagan of the arms sales to Iran to fund the Contras
because he "wanted the President to have some deniability
so that he would be protected." Poindexter also said he "could
not recall" certain events in response to 184 questions during
his testimony to Congress. It was later discovered that Poindexter
and Oliver North had deleted over 5000 e-mails pertaining to Iran-Contra
from White House servers. Unfortunately for them, those e-mails
were saved on backup and they revealed Poindexter had been intimately
involved in the scandal from the beginning.
As if having a convicted (if overturned)
felon heading TIAP wasn't scary enough, the TIAP logo looked like
something designed by Orwell -an eye perched atop a Masonic pyramid,
scanning the world with the slogan "scientia est potentia"
(knowledge is power).
Encouragingly, the criticisms of TIAP
resulted in the program's development being suspended by the Pentagon
in January of 2003. The Pentagon announced that research into
less intrusive, more narrowly focused methods of compiling data
on potential terrorists would continue but without Poindexter
in a key capacity. But the temporary defeat of TIAP was soon offset
by efforts spearheaded by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to expand
the USA Patriot Act. These efforts included making permanent several
provisions set to expire in 2005 and enhancing permissible internet
monitoring without a court order (such as keeping track of web
sites a person visits).
Some people even felt the U.S. Iegal system
and Constitutional safeguards were not up to the task of fighting
terrorism and must be discarded. The December 1, 2002 Washington
Post reported the Bush administration was developing a parallel
(shadow?) legal system under which all terrorism suspects, including
U.S. citizens, could be investigated, detained, questioned, tried
and punished without the full rights-like being represented by
an attorney-normally available to civilians accused of a crime
under U.S. law. According to the Post, several elements of the
parallel system are already in place, such as indefinite military
detention for those designated as "enemy combatants"
and the liberal use of "material witness" warrants to
detain those who have not been charged with any crime.
Sources who spoke to the Post pointed
to the case of Jose Padilla, an American citizen arrested on May
8, 2002 when he flew into Chicago from Pakistan. Padilla had been
linked to Abu Zubaydah, an A1 Qaeda planner in Pakistan. Reportedly
Padilla was returning to the United States to do reconnaissance
and planning for a radioactive "dirty bomb" attack.
Soon after his arrest, he was declared an enemy combatant by President
Bush and transferred to the brig of a South Carolina naval base
where he remains and could, in theory, be held until the President
declares an end to the "war on terrorism." Padilla has
been unable to communicate with anyone, including family or lawyers
and Bush administration sources have indicated that if Padilla
is ever brought to trial, it would be in a military tribunal instead
of a civilian court.
TIAP and the Padilla case are just two
examples of the message that has been conveyed in multiple ways
to the American people since September 11, 2001:
If you want to be protected from terrorism,
you're going to have to sacrifice your privacy and liberty and
accept a more intrusive, powerful government role in your life.
That's why some people will see a book
like this as either treason or lunacy. Instead of less government
secrecy and emergency powers, those people will demand more. They
will be willing to give the government whatever it wants to fight
terror. But there is a problem with such reasoning. The government
was already spending billions on secret projects and planning
prior to September 11, 2001. The government had supposedly created
a worldwide eavesdropping program operated by the NSA. The military
was already training to fight terrorism in the United States and
was helping to patrol the country's borders. Contingency plans
had been made for all manner of conceivable terrorist threats
and attacks.
And it all failed on September 11, 2001.
It all failed completely, \ wretchedly and catastrophically, leaving
almost 3000 dead.
p150
Before surrendering more freedom to the government and granting
it more secret powers, maybe we should ask what we're getting
in return.
Some secrecy is indeed necessary in any
government, and especially w en fighting an elusive, faceless
enemy like terrorism. But it must be remembered that American
citizens exercising their constitutional rights did not carry
out the September 11 attacks. Instead, the attacks were made possible
by the failure of FBI managers to properly heed warnings they
were getting from the field about suspicious flight school students
from the Middle East. The attacks were also made possible by an
INS that had lost track of foreign citizens that had overstayed
or violated their visas. Before giving the government new powers,
maybe we should first demand they more professionally enforce
the laws already on the books and more intelligently use the powers
they have already been granted.
Maybe the term "Shadow Government"
was more appropriate than anyone realized. A shadow, after all,
has no substance.
What we need instead is a "Sunshine
Government" with open, honest debate on how best to respond
to new threats such as terrorism. For example, the issue on how,
or even whether, to use military forces in civilian law enforcement
can be openly debated without endangering national security-and
if the American people decide they want more military involvement
in civilian law enforcement, such military involvement will be
more widely accepted and considered legitimate if it's the result
of Congressional action instead of secret planning. During the
Cold War years, information was readily available to the public
on what to do in the event of a nuclear attack or warning of such
an attack. Similar information needs to be distributed to the
public for new terrorist threats such as chemical or biological
attacks-and if there is nothing the government could reasonably
do in the event of such attacks on a metropolitan area, that should
be made clear to the public as well. The definition of "national
emergency" needs to be clarified (such as a situation involving
the actual or imminent threat of widespread death and destruction)
instead of being left up to the whims of the current occupant
of the Oval Office. Instead of relying on presidential executive
orders, emergency plans and procedures can, and should be, developed
through the process provided in the Constitution for creating
new laws. Classification of information needs to be reformed so
that it is used to protect matters of genuine national importance
instead of as a shield to hide missing funds and a failure to
perform.
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the Shadow Government
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