The War at Home
U.S. Military Civil Disturbance
Planning
[Origins of Operation Garden Plot:
The Kerner Commission]
by Frank Morales
Rochester, New York is the former home
of Frederick Douglass's, North Star newspaper. In 1964, it erupted
in one of the first large-scale urban outbursts of the decade.
Precipitated by white police violence against the black community,
the July uprising lasted several days, subsiding only after the
arrival of 1500 National Guardsmen. In "the fall of 1964,
the FBI, at the direction of President Johnson, began to make
riot control training available to local police departments, and
by mid-1967 such training assistance had been extended to more
than 70,000 officials and civilians."(2)
On July 29, 1967, President Johnson issued
Executive Order 11365, establishing the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders. It is more commonly known as the Kerner Commission,
named for it*s chair, former Major General, and then Governor
of Illinois, Otto Kerner. The creation of the commission came
hot on the heels of the violence in Detroit, a conflict which
left 43 dead, several hundred wounded and over 5,000 people homeless.
Johnson sent troubleshooter Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of Defense,
as his personal observer to Detroit. The commission issued its*
final report, completed in less than a year, on March 1, 1968.
Although the Kerner Commission has over
the years become associated with a somewhat benign, if not benevolent
character, codifying the obvious, "we live in two increasingly
separate America*s" etc., the fact is that the commission
itself was but one manifestation of a massive military/police
counter-insurgency effort directed against US citizens, hatched
in an era of emergent post-Vietnam "syndrome" coupled
with elite fears of domestic insurrection.While the movement chanted
for peace and revolution, rebellious, angry and destructive urban
uprisings were occurring with alarming frequency, usually the
result of the usual spark, police brutality, white on black crime.
The so-called urban riots of 1967-1968 were the zenith, during
this period, of social and class conflict. "More than 160
disorders occurred in some 128 American cities in the first nine
months of 1967."(3)
The executive order establishing the commission
called for an investigation of "the origins of the recent
major civil disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations
or individuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of
violence."(4) The work of the commission was funded from
President Johnson*s "Emergency Fund." The executive
order sought recommendations in three general areas: "short
term measures to prevent riots, better measures to contain riots
once they begin, and long term measures to eliminate riots in
the future."(5) Their two immediate aims were "to control
and repress black rioters using almost any available means",
(6) and to assure white America that everything was in hand. Commission
members included Charles B. Thorton, Chairman and CEO, Litton
Industries, member of the Defense Industry Advisory Council to
the DoD and the National Security Industrial Association, John
L. Atwood, President and CEO, North American Rockwell Corporation
("Commission Advisor on Private Enterprise"), and Herbert
Jenkins, Atlanta Chief of Police and President of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police.
During the early stages of staff recruitment,
commission Deputy Executive Director Victor H. Palmieri "described
the process as a war strategy"(7) and so he might given the
overwhelming presence within the commission and its consultants
of military and police officials. One quarter of over 200 consultants
listed were big-city police chiefs, like Daryl F. Gates, former
chief LAPD. Numerous police organizations, including the heavily
funded Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (financiers of
SWAT), guided the commission*s deliberations. No less than 30
police departments were represented on or before the commission
by their chiefs or deputy chiefs.
A key player within the commission, "consultant"
Anthony Downs, stated at the time that, "it would be far
cheaper to repress future large-scale urban violence through police
and military action than to pay for effective programs against
remaining poverty." (8) As for the military, twelve generals,
representing various branches of the armed services appeared before
the commission or served as contractors. The commission*s "Director
of Investigations", Milan C. Miskovsky, was "on leave
as assistant general counsel of the treasury, and formerly connected
to the Central Intelligence Agency."(9)
The Kerner Commission*s "study"
of "civil disorder" lead directly to (civilian) recommendations
regarding the role of the military in domestic affairs. The report
dutifully "commends the Army for the advanced status of its
training." Further, it states that "the Department of
the Army should participate fully in efforts to develop nonlethal
weapons and personal protective equipment appropriate for use
in civil disorders." In addition, "the Army should investigate
the possibility of utilizing psychological techniques to ventilate
hostility and lessen tension in riot control, and incorporate
feasible techniques in training the Army and National Guard units."
THE ARMY AND CIVIL DISORDER
Under the heading, "Army Response
To Civil Disorders", the commission report states that "the
commitment of federal troops to aid state and local forces in
controlling a disorder is an extraordinary actäAn Army staff
task group has recently examined and reviewed a wide range of
topics relating to military operations to control urban disorders:
command and control, logistics, training, planning, doctrine,
personnel, public information, intelligence, and legal aspects."
The results of the Army brass*s study was subsequently, "made
known to the National Guard and to top state and local civil and
law enforcement officers in order to stimulate review at the state
and local level."(10)
The Army Task Force which assisted the
Kerner Commission issued its* own report in early 1968. In it,
the Pentagon took a multi-pronged approach to solving the civil
disturbance problem. "Expanding the suggestion of Cyrus Vance,
Military Intelligence , working with the FBI, local, county and
state police forces , undertook a massive domestic intelligence
gathering operationäthe Senior Officers Civil Disturbance
Course was instituted at the Military Police Academy in GeorgiaäSecurity
forces ranging from Army troops to local police were trained to
implement their contingency plansäContingency plans, called
planning packets, were prepared for every city in the country
that had a potential for student, minority or labor unrest."(11)
In addition, "the Army Task Force
that had designed this program took on a new name, the Directorate
of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations. The Army Task Force
transformation into the Directorate occurred during the massive
rioting that broke out in black ghettos of 19 cities after the
assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968."(12) At
that time "seven army infantry brigades, totaling 21,000
troops were available for riot duty. And a hugh, sophisticated
computer center kept track of all public outbursts of political
dissent, thereby furnishing the first of the Army Task Force*s
prescribed remedies: intelligence."(13)
By June of 1968, the Directorate had become
the Directorate of Military Support, setting up shop in the basement
of the Pentagon. "Better known as the domestic war room,
the Directorate had 150 officials to carry out around-the-clock
monitoring of civil disorders, as well as to oversee federal troop
deployments when necessary. At the cost of $2.7 million, this
massive directorate also developed policy advice for the secretary
of the Army on all disturbances and maintained intelligence packets
on all major U.S. cities."(14)
Even though the full extent of US military
intelligence activities during this period is far from generally
known, "by 1968, many Justice Department personnel knew that
the military was preparing to move in massively if needed to quash
urban riots, and some officials feared the development of a large
national military riot force. It was well known among top officials
that the Department of Defense was spending far more funds than
the Justice Department on civil disorder preparationsäindicative
of the growing trend at the federal level toward repression and
control of the urban black rioters."(15)
By 1971, Senator Sam Ervin, later of Watergate
reknown, had convened his Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
which "revealed that Military Intelligence had established
an intricate surveillance system covering hundreds of thousands
of American citizens. Committee staff members had seen a master
plan - Garden Plot , that gave an eagle eye view of the Army-National
Guard-police strategy."(16) "At first, the Garden Plot
exercises focused primarily on racial conflict. But beginning
in 1970, the scenarios took a different twist. The joint teams,
made up of cops, soldiers and spies, began practicing battle with
large groups of protesters. California, under the leadership of
Ronald Reagan, was among the most enthusiastic participants in
Garden Plot war games."(17)
As time went on, "Garden Plot evolved
into a series of annual training exercises based on contingency
plans to undercut riots and demonstrations, ultimately developed
for every major city in the United States. Participants in the
exercises included key officials from all law enforcement agencies
in the nation, as well as the National Guard, the military, and
representatives of the intelligence communityäAccording to
the plan, joint teams would react to a variety of scenarios based
on information gathered through political espionage and informants.
The object was to quell urban unrestä"(18)
Unrest of a different sort took place
on the evening of February 27th 1973. At that time, a group of
Native Americans occupied a trading post in the village of Wounded
Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. By the 2nd
of March the takeover had "triggered the army contingency
plan for domestic disturbances. Emergency Plans White , now coded
as Garden Plot , brought the Army into South DakotaäThree
army colonels, disguised as civilians, and reconnaissance planes
assisted", while "the Justice Department used the army
to conduct intelligence for civilian law enforcement around Wounded
Knee."(19) Information on other instances in which Garden
Plot was "triggered" over the intervening years is presently
locked in Pentagon vaults.
In essence, the contemporary roots of
militarized efforts to suppress domestic rebellion lie in the
US Army*s master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance
Plan 55-2, Garden Plot. Since at least 1968, the military has
expended billions of dollars in this effort. The plan is operative
right now, most recently during and after the Los Angeles uprising
of 1992. A view into details of this plan is possible by way of
an examination of United States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan
55-2, Garden Plot which is the "implementing" and "supporting
plan for the Department of the Army (DA) Civil Disturbance Plan
- GARDEN PLOT , dated 1 March 1984 (which) provides for the employment
of USAF forces in civil disturbances." It is specifically
drawn up "to support the Secretary of the Army, as DOD Executive
Agent for civil disturbance control operations (nicknamed GARDEN
PLOT), with airlift and logistical support, in assisting civil
authorities in the restoration of law and order through appropriate
military commanders in the 50 States, District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and US possessions and territories,
or any political subdivision thereof." The plan "is
effective for planning on receipt and for execution on order."(20)
U.S. AIR FORCE 55-2 - GARDEN PLOT
"The long title of the plan is United
States Air Force Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Employment of USAF
Forces in Civil Disturbances. The short title of this document
is USAF Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2. The nickname assigned by
Department of the Army is GARDEN PLOT." It's dated July 11,
1984.
The plan opens with some basic "assumptions",
namely that "civil disturbances requiring intervention with
military forces may occur simultaneously in any of the 50 States,
District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions
and territories." And like the current situation in Vieques,
Puerto Rico, "civil disturbances will normally develop over
a period of time." In the event it evolves into a confrontational
situation, under Garden Plot, it is a "presidential executive
order" that "will authorize and direct the Secretary
of Defense to use the Armed Forces of the United States to restore
law and order."
According to the Air Force plan, the military
will attempt "to suppress rebellion whenever the President
considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages,
or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make
it impractical to enforce the laws of the United States in any
state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedingsä(10
USC 332)". Applying its* own version of equal protection
under the law, the military can intervene "when insurrection,
domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in a
state so hinder or obstruct the execution of the laws as to deprive
individuals of their Constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities
or when the insurrection impedes the due course of justice, and
only when the constituted authorities of the state are unable,
fail or refuse to protect that right, privilege, immunity, or
to give that protection (10 USC 333)." In other words, the
Army makes an offer of "protection" that the citizenry
can*t refuse.
T.Alden Williams, in a sympathetic 1969
treatment of the Army in civil disturbances, put it this way:
"Where officials have not shown determination, or have invited
violence by predicting it, violence has developed. Hence, it follows
that with few exceptions, serious riots are evidence of police
failure and that, implicitly, it is at the point of police failure
that states and their cities redeem their national constitutional
guarantees and the Regular Army may be asked to intervene."(21)
Some redemption.
According to the Air Force plan's "Classification
Guidance", the roughly 200 page document "is UNCLASSIFIED
and does not come within the scope of direction governing the
protection of information affecting national security. Although
it is UNCLASSIFIED, it is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY as directed by
AFR 12-30. This plan contains information that is of internal
use to DOD and, through disclosure, would tend to allow persons
to violate the law or hinder enforcement of the law." Consequently,
the plan*s "operations orders and operating procedures must
be designed to provide the highest degree of security possible."
Therefore "the entire staff should identify known or suspected
opposition awareness of previous operations and operations plans",
while "procedures should be designed to eliminate the suspect
sources to the degree possible." And "in the event of
organized oppositionäsome sort of advisory intelligence gathering
capability should be assumed."
The Air Force document warns, under the
heading of "Open Literature Threat", presaging current
military discourse on "info-war", that "any information/document,
though seemingly unclassified, which reveals information concerning
this Plan is a threat to OPSEC (operational security)" This
is especially true given the nature of the "Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) Threat." Recognizing that, "prior to and during
sustained military operations in Support of the Plan, the potential
HUMINT threat could be considerable", the plan recommends
that "every effort should be made to reduce vulnerability
to this threat by adhering to OPSEC procedures and safeguarding
Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)."
Under "Operations to be Conducted:
Deployment", the Air Force plan states that "a civil
disturbance condition (CIDCON) system which has been established
to provide an orderly and timely increase in preparedness for
designated forces to deploy for civil disturbances control operations,
will be on an as required basis for USAF resources for such operations
as aerial resupply, aerial reconnaisance, airborn psychological
operations, command and control communications systems, aeromedical
evacuation, helicopter and weather support." The Air Force
does have some experience in this area. "In response to the
US invasion of Cambodia, student unrest broke out. Under Operation
Garden Plot, from 30 April through May 4, 1970, 9th Air Force
airlift units transported civil disturbance control forces from
Ft. Bragg to various locations throughout the eastern US."(22)
In fact, two years earlier, "Air Force Reserve C-119 and
C-124 units participated in Garden Plot operations set up to quell
domestic strife that followed the assassination of Martin Luther
King."(23)
Although the section on "Counterintelligence
Targets and Requirements" is "omitted", the plan
does specify its* targets, namely, those "disruptive elements,
extremists or dissidents perpetrating civil disorder." A
"civil disturbance" is defined as a "riot, acts
of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages,
or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term
civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring the
use of federal armed forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter
15, Title 10, United States Code." Conditions precipitating
Garden Plot activation are "those that threaten to reach
or have reached such proportions that civil authorities cannot
or will not maintain public order." As for legal authority,
"the Constitution of the United States and numerous statutes
provide the President with the authority to commit Federal military
forces within the United StatesäDOD Directive 3025.12 provides
guidance in committing Federal armed forces."
FORCE STRUCTURE
The "application of forces should
be in the following order: local and state police, Army and (in
support role) Air National Guard under State control, Federal
civil law enforcement officials, federal military forces to include
Army and (in support role) Air National Guard." According
to the plan, "State Adjutants General prepare civil disturbance
plans for the employment of National Guard units under state control."
Specifically, "as a general rule for planning purposes, the
minimum forces to be supported in any single objective area is
5,000. The maximum to be supported is 12,000 for any objective
area other than Washington, DC and 18,000 for Washington, DC."
The "objective areas" are "those specified by the
Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order in which the Secretary
of Defense has been directed to restore law and order", and
as "further defined by the Letter of Instruction issued to
Task Force Commanders by the Chief of Staff, US Army."
In order to avoid the unseemly implications
of "martial law", "requirements for the commitment
of Federal military forces will not result in the declaration
of a National Emergency". In this regard, the "Public
Affairs Objectives" include the development of "procedures
for the public release of appropriate information regardingäcivil
disturbance control operations." Media and other queries
"concerning employment of control forcesämay be locally
answered by an interim statement that the: Department of Defense
policy is not to comment on plans concerning the possible employment
of military units and resources to carry out assigned missions."
Concerning "Force Requirements",
the plan states that, "US Army and Marine Corps units designated
for civil disturbance operations will be trained, equipped and
maintained in readiness for rapid deployment, (with) ten brigades,
prepared for rapid deployment anywhere in CONUS. A Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) will be considered to be on a 24 , hour alert status
and capable of attaining a CIDCON 4 status in 12 hoursä"
Upon receipt of orders, "the Task Force Commander assumes
operational control of the military ground forces assigned for
employment in the objective area", including "specials
operations assets." In case the soldiers are unfamiliar with
"urban terrain", the "Defense Mapping Agency Topographic
Center provides map services in support of civil disturbance planning
and operations."
The "Summary of the Counterintelligence
and Security Situation" states that "spontaneous civil
disturbances which involve large numbers of persons and/or which
continue for a considerable period of time, may exceed the capacity
of local civil law enforcement agencies to suppress. Although
this type of activity can arise without warning as a result of
sudden, unanticipated popular unrest (past riots in such cities
as Miami, Detroit and Los Angeles serve as examples) it may also
result from more prolonged dissidence." USAF Garden Plot
advises that "if military forces are called upon to restore
order, they must expect to have only limited information available
regarding the perpetrators, their motives, capabilities, and intentions.
On the other hand, such events which occur as part of a prolonged
series of dissident acts will usually permit the advance collection
of that type of informationä"
The United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), "provides training programs and doctrine
for civil disturbance operations to military services." The
US Army Force Command (FORSCOM), "organizes, trains, and
maintains in readiness Army forces for civil disturbance operations",
while the Director of Military Support (DOMS), "conducts,
on a no-notice basis, exercises which direct headquarters of uniformed
services, appropriate CONUS command, and other DOD components,
having GARDEN PLOT responsibilities to assume a simulated increased
preparedness for specified forces." In addition, the DOMS,
"maintains an around-the-clock civil disturbance command
center to monitor incipient and on-going disturbances."
The document, the United States Air Force*s
"implementing plan" for the US Army*s Civil Disturbance
Plan 55-2, Garden Plot, goes on to detail every aspect of military
"suppression" of "rebellion against the authority
of the United States", including who pays, who bills and
how to secure "loans" to cover the costs "attributable
to GARDEN PLOT." Ominously, under "Resources Employed
Without Presidential Directive", the document states that
when the "immediate employment of military resources is required
in cases of sudden and unexpected civil disturbances or other
emergencies endangering life or federal property, or disrupting
the normal processes of Government, expenses incurred will be
financed as a mission responsibility of the DOD component employing
the military resources."
PENTAGON DIRECTIVES
Department of Defense Directive 3025.12,
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) became effective
on February 4, 1994 when signed by then Defense Secretary William
Perry. It states that, "the President is authorized by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to suppress insurrections,
rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and
circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government
and the Department of Defense for civil disturbances are important,
do to the potential severity of the consequences of such events
for the Nation and the population." Further, "the Secretary
of the Army, as DoD Executive Agent, shall provide guidance to
the other DoD Components, through DoD 3025.12-R, the DoD Civil
Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT), or both, in accordance with this
Directive".
DoDD 3025.12 makes it clear that "MACDIS
operations are unprogrammed emergency requirements for the Department
of Defense", and that in order to "ensure essential
control and sound management of all military forces employed in
MACDIS operations, centralized direction from the DoD Executive
Agent (the Army) shall guide planning by the DoD component."
Thus, "MACDIS missions shall be decentralized through the
DoD Planning Agents or other Joint Task Force Commanders only
when specifically directed by the DoD Executive Agent."
According to the directive, the "Army
and Air National Guard forces have primary responsibility for
providing military assistance to state and local governments in
civil disturbances." Accordingly, "the Army National
Guard State Area Commands (STARCs) shall plan for contingency
use of non-Federalized National Guard forces for civil disturbance
operations." The directive further outlines policy, guidelines,
and legal justification for "military assistance for civil
disturbances", including policy regarding domestic law enforcement,
designating the Army as "the principle point of contact between
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Justice
(DoJ) for planning and executing MACDIS." (24)
The militarization of domestic "law
enforcement" is founded, in part, upon Department of Defense
Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
Officials, dated January 15, 1986, five years after Congressional
"drug warriors" passed the Military Cooperation with
Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act. Referencing the 1971 version
of DODD 3025.12 (above), the directive states that, "it is
DoD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials
to the extent practicaläconsistent with the needs of national
security and military preparedness." In addition, "the
Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training
to Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials."
Apparently, military Judge Advocates (lawyers)
have no problem with the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, (18 U.S.C.1385)
which states that: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both." Nor
is there much concern shown for "the historic tradition of
limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement
activities." For even though the Act is cited within the
directive as "the primary restriction on military participation
in civilian law enforcement activities", it is rendered null
and void in deference to "actions that are taken for the
primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function."
In fact, "under guidance established by the Secretaries of
the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies
concerned, the planning and execution of compatible military training
and operations may take into account the needs of civilian law
enforcement officials for information when the collection of the
information is an incidental aspect of training performed for
a military purpose." (25)
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
United States Army Field Manual 19-15,
Civil Disturbances, dated November 1985, is designed to provide
hands-on "guidance for the commander and his staff in preparing
for and providing assistance to civil authorities in civil disturbance
control operations." The Army manual opens by noting that,
"the DA Civil Disturbance Plan, known as Garden Plot, provides
guidance to all DOD components in planning civil disturbance missions."
Its' thirteen chapters cover, in depth, every aspect of military
"tasks and techniques employed to control civil disturbances
and neutralize special threats." Subjects include the nature
of civil disturbances, participants ("the crowd"), federal
intervention, information planning ("intelligence"),
control force operations, crowd control operations, threat analysis
("criminal activists"), about which "law enforcement
sources can provide useful information", riot control agents,
extreme force options, apprehension, detention, and training.
According to the Army manual, "civil
disturbances in any form are prejudicial to public law and order."
They "arise from acts of civil disobedience", and "occur
most often when participants in mass acts of civil disobedience
become antagonistic toward authority, and authorities must struggle
to wrest the initiative from an unruly crowd." They are caused
by "political grievances" and "urban economic conflicts",
or maybe even by "agents of foreign nations", but mostly,
"urban conflicts and community unrest arise from highly emotional
social and economic issues." And in a statement that resonates
with the "benign neglect" of some years ago, the manual
points out that disturbances may arise because "economically
deprived inner-city residents may perceive themselves treated
unjustly or ignored by the people in power."
Utilizing Garden Plot language, the manual
states that "the president can employ armed federal troops
to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful assemblies,
and conspiracy if such acts deprive the people of their constitutional
rights and a state*s civil authorities cannot or will not provide
adequate protection." Never mind the Congress or Constitution,
"federal intervention in civil disturbances begins with the
issuance of a presidential proclamation to the citizens engaged
in the disturbance." In other words, the President reads
"the riot act" and "a control force" is sent
in to "isolate the disturbance area." The goal is to
"isolate the people creating the disturbance from those who
have not yet become actively involved."
According to FM 19-15, the Army can gather
intelligence on civilians if their "activities can be linked
directly to a distinct threat of a civil disturbance that may
involve federal forces." This is especially important, given
that "during civil disturbances many people engage in unlawful
behavior." Therefore, "when at all possible, civil law
enforcement agents are integrated with the military control force
team making apprehensions", and "if police are not available,
military personnel may search people incident to an apprehension."
Useful measures for "isolating an area include barriers,
patrols, pass and ID systems, and control of public utilities."
Also, "imposing a curfew is a highly effective control measure
in many civil disturbances." Army "saturation patrols",
"integrated with civil police patrols", blanket the
area, creating "the psychological impression of the control
force being everywhere at once."
The Army field manual points out that
when "control forces" resort to "forceful measures"
they can turn to a host of weaponry, including "the M234,
which is a nondeadly force measure, to the machine gun, which
is the most deadly force measure." The manual states that
"machine guns, 7.62 millimeter and below, may accompany units
on civil disturbance missions." In addition, the "control
forces" can utilize the M234 launcher, which is "a riot
control weapon" mounted on an M16 rifle which "fires
a projectile that causes pain on impact." In addition, "the
riot shotgun is an extremely versatile weapon. Its appearance
and capability have a strong psychological effect on rioters."
MARTIAL RULE
The concept of martial rule, as distinct
from martial law, is not written, and therefore is an eminently
more workable arrangement for "law enforcement forces".
That*s because, as FM 19-15 points out, "martial rule is
based on public necessity. Public necessity in this sense means
public safety." According to the manual, U.S. state authorities
"may take such action within their own jurisdictions."
And yet, "whether or not martial rule has been proclaimed,
commanders must weigh each proposed action against the threat
to public order and safety. If the need for martial rule arises,
the military commander at the scene must so inform the Army Chief
of Staff and await instructions. If martial rule is imposed, the
civilian population must be informed of the restrictions and rules
of conduct that the military can enforce." Realizing the
power of free speech, the manual suggests that "during a
civil disturbance, it may be advisable to prevent people from
assembling. Civil law can make it unlawful for people to meet
to plan an act of violence, rioting, or civil disturbance. Prohibitions
on assembly may forbid gatherings at any place and time."
And don*t forget, "making hostile or inflammatory speeches
advocating the overthrow of the lawful government and threats
against public officials, if it endangered public safety, could
violate such law."
During civil disturbance operations, "authorities
must be prepared to detain large numbers of people", forcing
them into existing, though expanded "detention facilities."
Cautioning that "if there are more detainees than civil detention
facilities can handle, civil authorities may ask the control forces
to set up and operate temporary facilities." Pending the
approval of the Army Chief of Staff, the military can detain and
jail citizens en masse. "The temporary facilities are set
up on the nearest military installation or on suitable property
under federal control." These "temporary facilities"
are "supervised and controlled by MP officers and NCOs trained
and experienced in Army correctional operations. Guards and support
personnel under direct supervision and control of MP officers
and NCOs need not be trained or experienced in Army correctional
operations. But they must be specifically instructed and closely
supervised in the proper use of forceä"
According to the Army, the detention facilities
are situated near to the "disturbance area", but far
enough away "not to be endangered by riotous acts."
Given the large numbers of potential detainees, the logistics
(holding, searching, processing areas) of such an undertaking,
new construction of such facilities "may be needed to provide
the segregation for ensuring effective control and administration."
It must be designed and "organized for a smooth flow of traffic",
while a medical "treatment area" would be utilized as
a "separate holding area for injured detainees." After
a "detainee is logged in and searched", "a file
is initiated", and a "case number" identifies the
prisoner. In addition, "facility personnel also may use hospital
ID tags. Using indelible ink, they write the case number and attach
the tag to the detainees* wrist. Different colors may be used
to identify different offender classificationsä" Finally,
if and when it should occur, "release procedures must be
coordinated with civil authorities and appropriate legal counsel."
If the "detainee" should produce a writ of habeas corpus
issued by a state court, thereby demanding ones* day in court,
the Army will "respectfully reply that the prisoner is being
held by authority of the United States."
Training under FM 19-15/Garden Plot must
be "continuous" and must "develop personnel who
are able to perform distasteful and dangerous duties with discipline
and objectivity." Dangerous to the local citizenry given
that "every member of the control force must be trained to
use his weapon and special equipment (including) riot batons,
riot control agent dispersers and CS grenades, grenade launchers,
shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable videotape recorders,
portable public address systems, night illumination devices, firefighting
apparatus, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, bulldozers, Army aircraft,
armored personnel carriers, and roadblock and barricade materials."
Sounding a lot like recent Urban Warrior war-games, the manual
makes note that although unit training must address "the
sensitivity and high visibility of civil disturbance operations",
the "unit training must be realistic." In this regard,
"the unit commander should try to include local government
officials in field training exercises. The officials can be either
witnesses or participants. But care must be taken to prevent adverse
psychological effects on the local populace, especially if tension
is high."(26)
Sources:
1.. New York Times, "Pentagon Misused
Millions in Funds, House Panel Says", July 22,1999, pg. A-1.
See also, on the subject of "unacknowledged Special Access
Programs" wherein "the USAF's $7.4 billion budget for
classified procurement is more than a third of the service's total
budget", Bill Sweetman, "In search of the Pentagon's
billion dollar hidden budgets - how the US keeps its R&D spending
under wraps", International Defense Review, Jane's Defense
Weekly, January 2000 www.janes.com/defence/editors/pentagon.html
2.. James W. Button, Black Violence, The
Political Impact of the 1960*s Riots, Princeton University Press,
1078, pg.116.
3.. Button, pg.121. Also, see, Cyrus R.Vance,
Final Report of Cyrus R.Vance, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense, Concerning the Detroit Riots, July 23 Through August
2, 1967.
4.. Michael Lipsky and David J. Olson,
Commission Politics: The Processing of Racial Crisis in America,
Transaction Books, 1971, pg.161. The Executive Order is reprinted
in US Riot Commission Report, Bantam Books, 1968, pgs.534-535.
5.. Lipsky and Olson, pg.163, citing pg.198
of a transcription of Lyndon B. Johnson, "Statement by the
President", July 29, 1967.
6.. Button, pg.107.
7.. Lipsky and Olson, pg.165.
8.. Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs:
An Urban Strategy for America, Yale University Press, 1973, pg.176.
Downs, a leading "housing expert", believed that the
key to effective urban based counter-insurgency was the notion
of "spatial deconcentration", or the "adequate
outmigration of the poor" from the cities. Downs wrote Chapters
16 and 17 of the Kerner Report which deal with "housing".
He is the leading exponent of "deliberate dispersal policies"
designed to "disperse the urban poor more effectively".
The origins of "homelessness" (state repression) lie
here.
9.. Lipsky and Olson, pg.168.
10... Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, DC, March 1, 1968,
pgs.279-281.
11.. Ron Ridenhour and Arthur Lubow, "Bringing
the War Home", New Times Magazine, 1975, pg.20.
12.. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg.20.
13.. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg.20.
14.. Button, pg.133.
15.. Button, pg.133.
16.. Ridenhour and Lubow, pg18.
17.. Donald Goldberg and Indy Badhwar,
"Blueprint for Tyranny", Penthouse Magazine, August
1985, pg.72.
18.. Goldberg and Badhwar, pg.72.
19.. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance
in America, 1775-1980, Yale University Press, 1991, pgs.257-258.
This excellent historical account actually does what it says,
tracing American "internal security measures" right
back to the "founders". t.. United States Air Force
Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, Garden Plot, Headquarters, United
States Air Force, June 1, 1984. (roughly 200 pages, not paginated)
21.. T. Alden Williams, "The Army
in Civil Disturbance: A Profound Dilemma?", pg.161, in ed.
Robin Higham, Bayonets in the Streets, University of Kansas Press,
1969.
22.. Federation of American Scientists,
Military Analysis Network, "Garden Plot", Nov.1998.
23.. US Air Force News Service, Kelly
Air Force Base, Texas, "Air Force 50th Anniversary: April
History", March 25, 1997, pg.2. In fact, Garden Plot may
have been operative prior and during the assassination of Martin
Luther King Jr. William F. Pepper, attorney for the late James
Earl Ray, as well as the King family in their current attempts
to get to the bottom of the murder, claims (Orders To Kill, Carroll
and Graf Publishers, 1995, pg.424) that the orders to kill King,
which were delivered to special forces operatives in Memphis were
tied to Garden Plot. Pepper states that the orders to kill King
"appeared to come from the office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and were issued under the umbrella of the anti-black terrorist
operation Garden Plot which was a part of the overall U.S. Command
antiriot operation CINCSTRIKE which was activated with the outbreak
of any major riot."
24.. Department of Defense Directive 3025.12,
Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), February
4, 1994. (http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d302512p.txt) Note: DoDD
3025.12 is one quarter of 4 correlated directives that deal with
civil disturbance. The others include DoDD 3025.1, Military Support
to Civil Authorities (Jan. 93), DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance
for Civil Authorities (Feb.97), and DoDD 3025.1-M, Manual for
Civil Emergencies (June 94).
25.. Department of Defense Directive 5525.5,
DoD Cooperation With Civili an Law Enforcement Officials, January
15, 1986. (http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/re ferenc/briefngs/wmd/DODD5525.5DoDCooperationwithCivilianLawEnforcementOffic
ials.htm)
26.. United States Army Field Manual 19-15,
Civil Disturbances, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington,
DC, November 25, 1985.
(An edited version of this article currently
appears in CovertAction Quarterly, #69 Spring/Summer 2000 http://covertaction.org)
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