Global Capitalism:
From triumph to crisis
by Walden Bello
International Socialist Review, Aug/Sep 2001
The historical context of the July 2001 meeting of the G8
in Genoa, Italy, is that in a little over a decade, the system
of global capitalism has passed from triumph to crisis. As the
world stands on the brink of a deep recession, it would be useful
to reflect on some of the key dimensions of this historic transition.
The last decade of the twentieth century began with the resounding
collapse of the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and a lot
of triumphalist talk about the genesis of a new market-driven
global economy that rendered borders obsolete and rode on the
advances of information technology. The key agents of the new
global economy were the transnational corporations, which were
depicted as the supreme incarnation of market freedom owing to
their superior ability to bring about the most efficient mix of
land, labor, capital, and technology.
Midway in the decade was born the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which was painted by partisans of globalization as providing
the legal and institutional scaffolding for the new global economy.
By creating a rules-based global system based on the primordial
principle of freer trade, the WTO would serve as the catalyst
of an economic process that would bring about the greatest good
for the greatest number. It was the third pillar of a holy trinity
that would serve as the guardian of the new economic order, the
other two being the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which promoted
ever freer global capital flows, and the World Bank, which would
supervise the transformation of developing countries along free-market
lines and manage their integration into the new world economy.
U.S. corporations and globalization
Yet even as the prophets of globalization talked about the
increasing obsolescence of the nation-state and the growing irrelevance
of national interests, the main beneficiaries of the new global
order were U.S. transnational corporations. Supposedly an agent
of free trade, the WTO's most important agreements promoted monopoly
for U.S. firms: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights consolidated the hold over high-tech innovations
by U.S. corporations like Intel and Microsoft, while the Agriculture
Agreement institutionalized a system of monopolistic competition
for third-country markets between the agribusiness interests of
the United States and the European Union.
When the Asian financial crisis engulfed countries that had
been seen by many in the U.S. business and political elites as
America's most formidable competitors, Washington did not try
to save the Asian economies by promoting expansionary policies.
Instead, it used the IMF to dismantle the structures of state-assisted
Asian capitalism that had been regarded as formidable barriers
to the entry of goods and investments from U.S. transnationals
that had been clamoring vociferously for years to get their piece
of the "Asian miracle." It was less the belief in spreading
the alleged benefits of free trade than maximizing geoeconomic
and geostrategic advantage that lay behind U.S. support for the
policies of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. As Chalmers
Johnson [of the Japan Policy Research Institute] has noted, a
good case can be made that Washington's opportunistic behavior
during the Asian financial crisis reflected the fact that "having
defeated the fascists and the communists, the United States now
sought to defeat its last remaining rivals for global dominance:
the nations of East Asia that had used the conditions of the Cold
War to enrich themselves."
The increasingly brazen employment of the global multilateral
system to serve the interests of the United States was one of
the causes of the crisis that gripped the system at the end of
decade. "Hegemonic leadership," in short, was giving
way to direct control-a reality that was underlined by wry jokes
from European and Japanese technocrats that during the Asian financial
crisis, the IMF managing director Michel Camdessus was micromanaged
by U.S. treasury secretary Robert Rubin and his key aide, Larry
Summers.
The multilateral system in crisis
Equally important as a source of de-legitimization was the
spreading realization that the system could not deliver on its
promise. That the system could not create prosperity for all but
only the illusion of it was something that many observers had
known for sometime. However, the realities of growing global poverty
and inequality were neutralized by the high growth rates and prosperity
of a few enclaves of the world economy, like East Asia in the
1980s, which were (mistakenly) painted as paragons of market-led
development. However, when the Asian economies collapsed in 1997,
the follies of neoliberal economics were brought to the fore.
All of the talk about the Asian financial crisis being caused
by crony capitalism could not obscure the fact that it had been
the liberation of speculative capital from the constraints of
regulation, largely on account of pressure from the IMF, that
brought about Asia's collapse. The IMF also came under severe
public scrutiny for imposing draconian programs on the Asian economies
in the wake of the crisis-policies that merely accelerated economic
contraction, saved foreign banks and speculative investors, and
restructured economies along "American lines."
The IMF's role in East Asia triggered a fresh reexamination
of its role in imposing structural adjustment programs in much
of Africa, South Asia, and Latin America in the 1980s. The fact
that these programs had, as they did in Asia, exacerbated stagnation,
widened inequalities, and deepened poverty now became widely recognized-so
much so that the IMF, in a desperate effort to exorcise its record,
felt compelled to change the name of the extended structural adjustment
fund facility into the poverty reduction and growth facility prior
to the World Bank-IMF annual meeting in Washington in September
1999.
The Asian financial crisis triggered the unraveling of the
legitimacy of the IMF. In the case of the WTO, the situation was
even more dramatic. In the last five years of the decade growing
numbers of people and communities began to realize that in signing
on to the WTO, they had signed on to a charter for corporate rule
that enshrined what consumer advocate Ralph Nader called the principle
of "trade uber alles," or corporate trade above equity,
justice, environment, and most everything else we hold dear. Many
developing countries discovered that in signing on to the WTO,
they had signed away their rights to development. The many streams
of discontent and opposition converged in the streets of Seattle
and in the meeting rooms of the Seattle Convention Center in December
1999 to bring down the third ministerial of the WTO and to trigger
a severe institutional crisis from which the organization has
yet to recover.
The World Bank, under the leadership of Australian-turned-American
James Wolfensohn, appeared to be charting a course that would
allow it to escape the damage inflicted on its sister institutions,
until it was subjected to fire in early 2000 from an unexpected
quarter: the Meltzer Commission. Ever since he took over as chief
of the institution in the mid-1990s, Wolfensohn had managed to
defuse criticism through very skilled public relations work and
co-optation of nongovernmental organizations. But when a commission
created by the U.S. Congress made the same criticisms that had
been made by people from the left, the game was up. Headed by
a banker Alan Meltzer, the commission concluded that the Bank's
performance when it came to addressing its avowed goal of eliminating
global poverty was miserable and that it would be better to devolve
the task to regional bodies.
The crisis of the corporation
By the end of the last decade of the twentieth century, in
short, the triumphalism that marked the beginning of the decade
had evaporated and given way to a deep crisis of legitimacy of
the multilateral order. The crisis of the multilateral system
was, moreover, translating into a deepening unease globally with
the prime actor of globalization: the corporation. Several factors
came together to focus public attention on the corporation in
the 1990s-the most egregious being the predatory practices of
Microsoft; the environmental depredations of Shell; the irresponsibility
of Monsanto and Novartis in promoting genetically modified organisms;
Nike's systematic exploitation of dirt-cheap labor; and Mitsubishi,
Ford, and Firestone's concealment from consumers of serious product
defects. A sense of environmental emergency was also spreading
by the beginning of the 21st century. To increasing numbers of
people, the rapid melting of the polar ice caps could be traced
to Big Oil and the automobile giants' continuing promotion of
an environmentally destabilizing petroleum civilization and, more
generally, to the process of uncontrolled growth driven by the
transnational corporations.
Ironically, in the United States, it was during the apogee
of the New Economy that the distrust of the corporation was also
at its highest in decades. According to a Business Week survey,
"72 percent of Americans say business has too much power
over their lives." And the magazine warned: "Corporate
America, ignore these trends at your peril."
Some of the more enlightened members of the global elite took
such warnings seriously, and their annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland,
became the venue to elaborate a response that would go beyond
the bankrupt strategy of denying that corporate-driven globalization
was creating tremendous problems to promote a vision of "globalization
with compassion." Yet, the task was formidable, for it became
increasingly clear that, in an unregulated global market, it was
even more difficult to reconcile the demands of social responsibility
with the demands of profitability. The best that "globalization
with a conscience" could offer was, as C. Fred Bergsten-a
noted proglobalization advocate-admitted, a system of "transitional
safety nets...to help the adjustment to dislocation" and
"enable people to take advantage of the phenomenon [of globalization]
and roll with it rather than oppose it."
Strategic power and corporate power
Corporate power is one dimension of U.S. power. But there
is, equally of consequence, the strategic power of the U.S. state.
Strategic power cannot be reduced, as in orthodox Marxism, to
simply being driven by the dynamics of corporate control. The
U.S. state cannot be reduced simply to being a servant of U.S.
capital. The Pentagon has its own dynamics, and one cannot understand
the U.S. role in the Balkans or its changing posture toward China
as simply determined by the interests of U.S. corporations. Indeed,
in Asia, it has been strategic extension, not corporate expansionism,
that has been the mainspring of U.S. policy, at least until the
mid-1980s. And, in the case of China, U.S. capital's desire to
exploit the Chinese market has increasingly found itself in opposition
to the Pentagon's definition of China as the Enemy that must be
headed off at the pass instead of assisted by Western investment
to become a full-blown threat. In many instances, indeed, corporate
power and state power may not be in sync.
Having said this, a primordial aim of the U.S. transnational
garrison state that is ensconced deeply in East Asia, the Middle
East, and Europe and projects power to the rest of the globe is
the maintenance of a global order that secures the primacy of
U.S. economic interests. With the growing illegitimacy of corporate-driven
globalization and the growing divide between a prosperous minority
and an increasingly marginalized majority, military intervention
to maintain the global status quo will become a constant feature
of international relations, whether this is justified in terms
of fighting drugs, fighting terrorism, containing "rogue
states," opposing "Islamic fundamentalism," or
containing China.
One cannot say, however, that the military structure of U.S.
hegemony is suffering as profound a crisis of legitimacy as that
which has gripped the processes and institutions of corporate
globalization. The U.S. military structure remains solidly rooted
in both Europe and Asia. The reason it remains so is to be found
at the level of the ideological: the deep-seated fear of both
European and Asian elites that, without the U.S. to serve as a
"benevolent hegemon," they would not be able to create
by themselves benign regional orders that would ensure the peace
among themselves.
The crisis of liberal democracy
It is not, however, corporate power or military power that
is the strongest asset of the United States, but, following the
thinking of Antonio Gramsci, its ideological power-what one may
call its "soft power."
The United States is a Lockean democracy, and its ability
to project its mission as the extension of systems centered on
free elections to choose governments devoted to promoting liberal
rights and freedoms continues to be a strong fountain of legitimacy
in many parts of the world. Now, the trend away from authoritarian
regimes and toward formal democracies in the Third World happened
in spite of, rather than because of, the United States. Yet, especially
under the Clinton administration, Washington was able to skillfully
jibe to catch the democratic winds, in the process reconstructing
its image from being a supporter of repressive regimes to being
an opponent of dictatorships.
In the last few years, however, Washington or Westminster-style
democracies, with their focus on formal rights and formal elections
and their bias against economic equality achieved through such
measures as asset and income redistribution, have degenerated
into increasingly stagnant and polarized political systems, such
as those in the Philippines, Brazil, and Pakistan. This stagnation
of Third World liberal democratic systems has been paralleled
by the realization of increasing numbers of Americans that their
liberal democracy has been so thoroughly corrupted by corporate
money politics that it deserves to be designated a plutocracy.
The fact that a man who lost the popular vote-and, according to
some studies, the electoral vote as well-ended up president of
the world's most powerful liberal democracy has not helped in
shoring up the legitimacy of the political system in a country
that has been described by many observers as being in a state
of "cultural civil war."
The new protest movement
In light of the deepening crisis of legitimacy of the key
institutions of the global system, Seattle was a cataclysm that
was waiting to happen. The force of pent-up global rage went on
to manifest itself in Washington, D.C., during the World Bank-IMF
spring meeting in April 2000; in Chiang Mai, Thailand, during
the Asian Development Bank annual meeting in May 2000; in Melbourne,
Australia, during the World Economic Forum gathering in early
September 2000; and in Prague, during the World Bank-IMF annual
meeting in late September 2000.
While the global elite assembled in Davos in late January
2001 to ponder the meaning of the burgeoning "antiglobalization
movement," some 12,000 representatives of civil society organizations
and political movements met in Porto Alegre, Brazil, to declare
that "another world is possible." The World Economic
Forum had found its political and ideological nemesis in the World
Social Forum. Celebration of the power of the movement was one
aspect of Porto Alegre; the other was the gathering of energies
for the next move. That move was directed at the Summit of the
Americas in Quebec City, Canada, in late April 2001, which had
been called to push forward a key project of the U.S. corporate
elite, the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Despite the effort
of some of the established media to portray the protesters as
either uninformed or anarchists, the confrontation in Quebec,
as in Seattle, was a major setback, in terms of legitimacy, for
the system of corporate-driven globalization.
Now, the G8 meeting in Genoa has provoked a greater intensity
of protest than did Quebec.
One must not, of course, overestimate the impact of these
protests so far, nor gloss over their weaknesses in terms of shared
agendas or decision making. However, neither must one underestimate
their consequences. Bergsten, one of the most ardent promoters
of the Washington Consensus, admits that "the antiglobalization
forces are now in the ascendancy." Bergsten is haunted by
a Gramscian fear: The structures of the system may still appear
to be solid, but when legitimacy or consensus goes, it may only
be a matter of time before the structures themselves begin to
unravel, especially when one factors in the crisis of overproduction
that has hit the global economic system with the recession, unemployment,
and increases in poverty and inequality that will come with it.
The challenge
Yet the crisis of the system does not necessarily result in
its replacement by a more benign system of international relations.
As Rosa Luxemburg so presciently pointed out before the rise of
fascism in crisis-ridden Europe, the outcome may be "barbarism,"
where the ideals and themes of the progressive opposition are
hijacked and perverted by demagogic forces that are hostile to
freedom, equality, and democracy. This is why the articulation
of an alternative is so critical at this point in time. Creating
this alternative vision and program centered on a participatory
process to create the institutions that would once again subordinate
the market to society, promote genuine equality across gender
and color lines and within and among countries, and establish
a benign relationship between human community and the biosphere
remains the great challenge of the opponents of corporate-driven
globalization.
On the success of this enterprise depends our future.
Walden Bello is executive director of Focus on the Global
South, a research and advocacy program of the Chulalongkora University,
Bangkok. He is also professor of sociology and public administration
at the University of the Philippines and the chairperson of the
Akbayan Citizens' Action Party of the Philippines.
This article is adapted from the introduction to The Future
in the Balance, published by Food First Books in May 2001.
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