The Lobby in Action
excerpted from the book
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy
by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen
M. Walt
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007,
paperback
p199
The United States has three main interests in the Middle East
today: keeping Persian Gulf oil flowing to world markets, discouraging
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and reducing anti-American
terrorism originating in the region. There are instances where
the [Israel] lobby has supported policies that advanced these
interests, but many of the policies that organizations in the
lobby have promoted over time have ultimately left the United
States worse off. That was not their intention, of course, and
the groups and individuals who pushed for these policies undoubtedly
believed that the actions they favored would be good for the United
States. They were wrong. Indeed, although these policies were
intended to benefit Israel, many of them have damaged Israel's
interests as well.
p200
ln addition to preserving U.S. aid to Israel, groups in the lobby
have sought to ensure that American power is used to shape the
Middle East environment in ways they believed would advance Israel's
interests, especially in security. In practical terms, this meant
backing Israel in its long struggle with the Palestinians and
directing American power against other movements or states that
might be at odds with Israel.
p200
Most pro-Israel groups-and especially the central organizations
in the lobby - want the United States to help Israel remain the
dominant military power in the Middle East. In addition to maintaining
generous aid to Israel's military establishment, these groups
favor using American power to deal with Israel's main regional
adversaries: Iran, Iraq under Saddam, and Syria. At the very least,
the lobby wants America to contain these so-called rogue states
and to make sure that they do not acquire nuclear weapons. Some
of these groups have gone farther, advocating that the United
States use its power to topple the regimes in Iran, Iraq, and
Syria and replace them with leaders willing to live peacefully
with Israel.
p200
The [Israel] lobby has pushed American leaders to disarm Hezbollah
and help create a Lebanon that is friendly to Israel. But these
goals cannot be accomplished without radically changing the behavior
of Iran and Syria, since those states support and arm Hezbollah,
and Syria has a long history of involvement in Lebanese politics.
Given these and other links among Israel's adversaries, the lobby
tends to see all of them as part of a seamless web of evil that
the United States must at least keep at bay if not destroy.
p349
The [Israel] lobby would be less influential if it no longer enjoyed
generous financial support, or if its ability to direct campaign
contributions and to pressure media organizations declined. Neither
of these developments is realistic, however, because it is not
likely to lose wealthy and generous supporters anytime soon. Although
the number of Americans who are unconditionally committed to Israel
is declining, there will almost certainly be a sufficient number
who feel strongly enough to give large sums to support the lobby's
leading organizations. Banning such contributions is unlikely
and would probably be illegal. Plus, trying to restrict support
for pro-Israel groups would clearly be anti-Semitic, as all Americans
are within their rights to contribute to any legitimate cause.
The obvious way to reduce the lobby's
influence (along with other special interest groups) is campaign
finance reform. Public financing of all elections would seriously
weaken the link between the lobby and elected officials and make
it easier for the latter to pressure Israel (or simply withdraw
U.S. support) when doing so would be in America's interest. Such
a step would not eliminate the lobby's influence, as politicians
would still court Jewish and Christian Zionist voters, and groups
and individuals within the lobby could still press their case
with U.S. officials and work to shape public opinion. Campaign
finance reform would almost certainly attenuate its influence,
however, and would encourage more open deliberations within the
corridors of power.
Unfortunately, the prospects for meaningful
campaign finance reform are dim. Incumbents have too great a stake
in the current system, and plenty of other special interest groups
would join forces to resist any effort to revise the system that
currently gives them disproportionate influence. It would probably
take a bevy of Jack Abramoff-style scandals to convince Americans
to purge private money from the electoral process. In the short
term, trying to weaken the lobby directly is not going to work.
p350
Creating a "counterlobby" to balance the Israel lobby
is also likely to fail... Arab-American and Muslim groups are
much weaker than the organizations in the Israel lobby, and the
vaunted oil lobby exerts much less influence on foreign and national
security policy than is commonly believed. Other countervailing
organizations-such as the nonpartisan Council for the National
interest or Americans for Middle East Understanding-are also significantly
smaller and less well financed than the Israel lobby.
But even if these various groups were
bigger and richer, they would still find it hard to overcome the
collective action dynamics that lie at the heart of interest group
politics. As noted earlier, pro-Israel groups succeed in part
because their members place an especially high priority on backing
Israel, which means that they tend to engage in single-issue politics-backing
only candidates whose pro-Israel credentials are well established.
Even if many Americans are aware that unconditional support for
Israel is not in America's national interest, this issue is not
the top priority for most of them, and there are significant differences
among the various groups that are either skeptical of unconditional
aid to Israel or strongly opposed to it. As a result, trying to
balance the lobby's influence by pulling these disparate groups
into a sufficiently cohesive coalition is not a promising strategy.
We would also view attempts to form an explicitly "anti-Israel"
lobby with grave misgivings, as this sort of group could easily
foster a resurgence of genuine anti-Semitism.
p350
The third option, which is much more promising than the first
two, is to encourage a more open debate about these issues, in
order to correct existing myths about the Middle East and to force
groups in the lobby to defend their positions in the face of a
well-informed opposition. In particular, Americans need to understand
the real history of Israel's founding and the true story of its
subsequent conduct. Instead of passively accepting the Leon Uris
version of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Americans need to absorb
and reflect on the findings of Israel's "new historians,"
whose courageous scholarship has shed much-needed light on what
the Zionists' campaign to build a Jewish state in the midst of
an indigenous Arab population entailed. Although the two situations
are hardly identical, one cannot understand Zionism without understanding
the long history of Christian anti-Semitism, and one cannot fathom
contemporary Palestinian nationalism without being aware of the
events surrounding the 1948 war, which Israelis call the War of
Independence but Palestinians call al-Nakba, or "the Catastrophe".
Because most Americans are only dimly
aware of the crimes committed against the Palestinians, they see
their continued resistance as an irrational desire for vengeance,
or as evidence of unwarranted hatred of Jews akin to the anti-Semitism
that was endemic in old Europe. Ignorance about the past also
encourages Americans to reject the Palestinians' demands for compensation
- especially the right of return - as utterly unjustified. Although
we deplore the Palestinians' reliance on terrorism and are well
aware of their own contribution to prolonging the conflict, we
believe their grievances are genuine and must be addressed, even
if, as noted above, some of their aspirations (such as the unrestricted
right of return) will have to go unmet or be resolved in other
ways. We also believe most Americans would support a different
approach to the conflict if they had a more accurate understanding
of past events and present conditions.
As the primary source of independent thinking
in democratic societies, scholars and journalists should be encouraged
to resist the lobby's efforts to shape public discourse and to
encourage more open discussion of these important issues. The
objective is not to single out Israel for criticism or to challenge
the legitimacy of the Jewish state, but rather to help Americans
gain a more accurate picture of how past behavior casts a giant
shadow over the present. Israel will still have plenty of vocal
defenders - as it should - but America would be better served
if its citizens were exposed to the range of views about Israel
common to most of the world's democracies, including Israel itself.
Journalists have a particular responsibility
to ask hard questions during political campaigns. As noted at
the beginning of this book, virtually all the major presidential
candidates began the 2008 campaign by expressing a strong personal
commitment to Israel and by making it clear that they favor unconditional
U.S. support for the Jewish state and a confrontational approach
toward its adversaries. Politicians should not get a free pass
when they utter the usual pro-Israel platitudes. Reporters and
commentators
should insist that those who aspire to
be president explain why they favor such strong support for Israel
and ask if they support a two-state solution and will push hard
for it once elected. The candidates should also be asked to consider
whether a more conditional U.S. policy-for example, one that linked
American military aid to genuine progress toward peace-might be
good for the United States and Israel alike. And it should be
fair game to ask those who aspire to the highest office in the
land if their views have been influenced by campaign contributions
from pro-Israel PACs or individuals, just as one might legitimately
ask about the impact of contributions received from oil companies,
labor unions, or drug manufacturers.
To foster a more open discussion, Americans
of all backgrounds must reject the silencing tactics that some
groups and individuals in the lobby continue to employ. Stifling
debate and smearing opponents is inconsistent with the principles
of vigorous and open dialogue on which democracy depends, and
continued reliance on this undemocratic tactic runs the risk of
generating a hostile backlash at some point in the future.
We condemn all attempts to silence legitimate
forms of discussion and debate-including the occasional efforts
to silence pro-Israel voices-and we hope that this book will contribute
to a more open exchange of views on these difficult problems.
Both the United States and Israel face vexing challenges in dealing
with the many problems in the Middle East, and neither country
will benefit by silencing those who support a new approach. This
does not mean that critics are always right, of course, but their
suggestions deserve at least as much consideration as the failed
policies that key groups }the lobby have backed in recent years.
p355
Israel's creation and subsequent development is a remarkable achievement.
Had American Jews not organized on Israel's behalf and convinced
important politicians to support their objectives, Israel might
never have been established. U.S. and Israeli interests have never
been identical, however, and Israel's current policies are at
odds with America's own national interests and certain core U.S.
values. Unfortunately, in recent years the lobby's political clout
and public relations acumen have discouraged U.S. leaders from
pursuing Middle East policies that would advance American interests
and protect Israel from its worst mistakes. The lobby's influence,
in short, has been bad for both countries.
There is, nonetheless, a silver lining
in America's current plight. Because the costs of these failed
policies are now so apparent, we have an opportunity for reflection
and renewal. Although the lobby remains a powerful political force,
its adverse impact is increasingly hard to overlook. A country
as rich and powerful as the United States can sustain flawed policies
for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored forever.
What is needed, therefore, is a candid
but civilized discussion of the lobby's influence and a more open
debate about U.S. interests in this vital region. Israel's well-being
is one of those interests-on moral grounds-but its continued presence
in the Occupied Territories is not. Open debate and more wide-ranging
media coverage will reveal the problems that the current "special
relationship" creates and encourage the United States to
pursue policies more in line with its own national interest, with
the interests of other states in the region, and, we firmly believe,
with Israel's interest as well.
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