Elections
Journalism in the Public
Interest
excerpted from the book
The New Progressive Era
Toward a Fair and Deliberative
Democracy
by Peter Levine
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000,
paper
p113
In order to run for high office, any potential candidate needs
enormous funds. Unless he or she is personally rich, these funds
must come from individuals or groups that have compelling political
interests. And since the bulk of campaign contributions go to
incumbent politicians, they can win reelection even when their
behavior and decisions have been basically unpopular.
ln total, candidates spent about $10 billion
of private money to gain office between 1988 and 1996. Those who
pay for the broadcast advertisements, publications, mailing lists,
airplane rentals, and phone banks of a modern campaign determine
to a significant degree what is said and who wins. These contributors
are, by any measure, an extremely affluent slice of the American
population. Less than 1 percent of Americans give the vast majority
of political contributions. In 1996, 95 percent of the people
who contributed at least $200 to congressional campaigns were
white; 81 percent were male; 87 percent were older than 45; and
81 percent made over $100,000 per year. More than half made over
$25O,000; and more than half belonged to "high status mainline
Protestant churches."
Under these conditions, citizens do not
have equal weight; candidates have grossly unequal resources;
the campaign dialogue is distorted; and true deliberation is rare.
On election day, the wheels of public opinion are supposed to
interlock with the apparatus of government, so that citizens can
control the whole mechanism. However, in privately funded campaigns,
a different kind of coupling occurs. Public opinion hardly forms
on most issues; it certainly doesn't direct the course of political
events. Instead, the market manipulates the political system.
A democracy gives each of its citizens
one vote; but a market assigns power in proportion to wealth.
In a democracy, majorities pass general, binding rules; but in
a market, individuals register immediate, concrete, personal preferences.
Since these two mechanisms are fundamentally different, their
outcomes often conflict. Those who admire the market should be
able to vote against government regulation and taxation, and they
can argue for their beliefs in public. But they should not have
disproportionate political power as a result of their wealth,
or else democracy will be swamped by the marketplace. A privately
funded election is not fully democratic; to a large extent, it
is a financial transaction.
p115
No government elected under capitalism will even seriously try
to change the economic system, and political reform is pointless.
p118
Congress passes more than 7,000 pages of legislation in any two-year
period. Only a handful of members help to draft or amend each
of these pages; hardly anyone else can say what was in them, let
alone influence their details. Particularly in the House of Representatives
(where floor amendments are generally prohibited), a vote cannot
affect the content of legislation.
In order for a specific provision to be
included in a bill, to reach a committee, to receive hearings,
to survive a floor vote, and to pass unscathed through a conference
committee, it must have active sponsors who are either exceptionally
dedicated and focused or else powerful. In some cases, writes
Richard Hall, "a standing committee of reputed legislative
specialists reduces to only two or three players, who bargain
among themselves with relative impunity on significant (though
not necessarily salient) matters of public policy." What
lobbyists need, therefore, is the active and careful attention
of a few members who are willing to draft language, move bills
through the committee process, and conduct negotiations. In addition,
they want their potential opponents in Congress not to interfere
until the formality of a final vote.
This is why lobbyists give most heavily
to well-placed incumbents who are either especially friendly or
else deeply hostile to their concerns.
p131
James Fishkin, whose experiments in Deliberative Polling have
worked well in the United States and Britain.
The idea is simple. Take a . . . random
sample of the electorate and transport these people . . . to a
single place. Immerse the sample in the issues, with carefully
balanced briefing materials, with intensive discussions in small
groups, and with the chance to question competing experts and
politicians. At the end of several days of working through the
issues face to face, poll the participants in detail. The resulting
survey offers a representation of the considered judgments of
the public.
p131
It is difficult to dispute the merits of voter guides or Deliberative
Polling. The next few steps are more controversial, but they are
also more important. All levels of government should provide free
television and radio time to qualified candidates, requiring them
to address the audience in person for periods of at least one
minute. Such proposals have generated a debate about whether broadcasters
can be forced to provide free time. Proponents note that the industry
is granted use of the spectrum in return for serving the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity." In response, broadcasters
invoke their First Amendment rights and flex their lobbying muscle
to prevent meaningful reform. If necessary, the government should
subsidize political broadcasts-a reasonable price to pay for real
democracy. In any case, the state should buy time on cable television,
which is not subject to the same regulations as broadcast media
but which attracts a large share of the viewing audience. The
government could also buy time for broadcast debates and/or deliberative
sessions with voters. After all, nothing is more instructive than
a sustained, face-to-face interaction among the candidates.
Some people have objected to free-time
proposals that require politicians to appear in person without
expensive video presentations. Indeed, this is not a neutral provision:
it discriminates in favor of good speakers and reduces the power
of media consultants. It rewards positive presentations and discourages
personal attacks. Candidates who lack personal charisma may suffer
as a result, and some capable people may be kept out of public
office. But no campaign system is neutral, and effective speaking
is a worthy skill in a deliberative democracy. In any event, it
is better to have good speakers than skillful fundraisers in Congress.
As Woodrow Wilson wrote, "It is natural that orators should
be the leaders of a self-governing people." Still, candidates
have a First Amendment right to opt out of any particular forum,
so they should not be required to attend deliberative sessions
or to use publicly funded broadcast time.
In addition to free broadcast time, qualifying
candidates could be given free postage to mail campaign letters
written over their own signatures. Currently, members of Congress
have this privilege (known as "the frank"), which helps
to protect their incumbency. The House Republicans cut the average
frank allowance to $216,000 per two-year term, but this amount
still exceeds the entire budget of an average major-party challenger
in 1998.75 The frank should be granted to both sides, not just
to incumbents.
These ideas have limited value-they are
just components of a definitive solution. Sooner or later, we
will have to offer full (but optional) public financing to all
qualified candidates. This is already done in presidential general-election
campaigns-now marred by soft money-and in Maine's legislative
and gubernatorial races. Public funding could be combined with
more modest ideas like voter guides and government-sponsored Internet
sites and debates. This is not an unrealistic goal. In 1997, 50
percent of Americans agreed that "public financing of campaigns
would reduce the influence of special interests." To qualify
for public funds, candidates would file petitions signed by a
specified number of registered voters. The signature requirement
should be set high enough to exclude marginal candidates, but
low enough that teams of volunteers could manage petition drives.
Campaigns would be able to use their public funds to buy any combination
of broadcast advertisements, mailings, travel, and printing. In
addition, they could spend limited sums on rent, salaries, telephone
charges, lawyers and accountants, outside contracts, and miscellaneous
expenses. But they would not be able to raise or spend a penny
of private money.
As a result, two kinds of candidate would
compete in American elections. One type would continue to use
private donations to buy professional campaign services. Such
candidates would no doubt attack their opponents for receiving
public funds, and voters would be free to agree with them. On
the other hand, they would have to spend time and money raising
contributions, and they would be beholden to their contributors.
Politicians with large personal fortunes would be able to avoid
fundraising burdens, but very few millionaires have political
ambitions and are acceptable to the electorate.
The other type of candidate would use
public funds to run truly independent campaigns. These candidates
would have to defend their use of tax money, but they would owe
nothing to special-interest donors, so they could freely choose
their themes and agendas. Although their spending would be limited,
they would be given sufficient funds to compete. Beyond a certain
point, campaign spending hardly affects election results, so publicly
funded candidates would fare reasonably well against opponents
with very large war chests. Candidates who accepted government
money could not spend much on professional advice. If they were
successful, then the political consulting industry would shrink-perhaps
below sustainable levels.
Some people object to public financing
of campaigns by arguing that it is . "welfare for politicians,"
a waste of taxpayers' money. But imagine the most expensive possible
outcome: that all campaigns from school board to pre dent were
covered all eligible candidates participated, the broadcast industry
bore none of the expense and current spending patterns were sustained.
Even then, ._, the total cost of public financing would be about
$20 per capita. That is not a high price to pay for democracy.
In any case, billions of dollars might be saved if lobbyists were
not able to purchase government subsidies and tax breaks.
p141
"The basis of our government being the opinion of the people,
the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate
for a moment to prefer the latter." So wrote Thomas Jefferson
in typically provocative style.' Thanks in part to him, the Bill
of Rights declares: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." Justice Potter Stewart
once noted that the press is "the only organized private
business that is given explicit constitutional protection."
Freedom of the press is important because
most of us have little direct contact , with politics; what we
know comes from reading newspapers and magazines, listening to
the radio, or watching television. James Madison argued that American
J journalists had performed an invaluable service by "canvassing
the merits and measures of public men." Politicians' "merits
and measures" presumably included their records, platforms,
beliefs, and at least their public behavior. Without a free press,
voters would not know the "comparative merits and demerits
of the candidates for public trust," and consequently their
right to govern would be without "value and efficacy."
Madison rightly thought that citizens
who have values and preferences should be able to obtain the information
necessary to assess and control their leaders. He did not, however,
explain how voters can acquire preferences in the first place.
p142
The original Progressives sought to preserve and enhance the freedom,
independence, and effectiveness of the press, so that it could
survey government on the public's behalf. First of all, Progressive
writers and editors developed a new approach to political journalism,
which influenced the leading publications of the day. Traditionally,
newspapers and magazines had been partisan outlets, often controlled
by politicians or parties. But the Progressives wanted their publications
to be independent and nonpartisan. In the popular press, nonpartisanship
meant a continuous crusade against powerful people-politicians
and industrialists alike-sparing only the publishing magnates
themselves. Joseph Pulitzer captured the philosophy of muckraking
Progressive journalism in 1907, saying that his newspapers would:
always fight for progress and reform,
never tolerate injustice or corruption, always fight demagogues
of all parties, never belong to any party, always oppose privileged
classes and public plunderers, never lack sympathy with the poor,
always remain devoted to the public welfare, never be satisfied
with merely printing news, always be drastically independent,
never be afraid to attack wrong, whether by predatory plutocracy
or predatory poverty.
The fact that Pulitzer himself could be
considered a "predatory plutocrat" did not negate the
importance of his creed. His commitment to reform, independence
of mind, and the public welfare was classically Progressive, and
he turned these ideas into an effective strategy for selling newspapers.
Although Pulitzer, Hearst, Scripps, and others of their ilk often
protected their friends and harassed their personal enemies, they
also competed fiercely for readers who now wanted the press to
serve as a public watchdog. In the long run, a newspaper that
spared anyone lost subscribers. It would be difficult to overstate
the importance of investigative journalism in exposing financial
scandals, corporate misconduct, and poverty; and many Progressive
reforms were the direct result of these muckraking articles. Jacob
Riis, Upton Sinclair, Lincoln Steffens, and David Graham Phillips
were major figures in the Progressive movement.
Meanwhile, in the more highbrow press,
nonpartisanship meant an effort to present a balanced, judicious
debate about the public good, unencumbered by partisan loyalties.
Progressive reporters were not free of ideology and bias, nor
did the sophisticated ones claim to be. Croly and Lippmann of
The New Republic were men of strong political opinions, as were
the nonjournalists who frequently contributed to their journal,
including Dewey. But they thought that a permanent identification
with individuals and parties would undermine their objectivity.
The Progressive-Era cult of neutrality, independence, and objectivity
has been widely criticized. But there is such a thing as good
independent reporting, and journalists like Lippmann set a high
standard.
It was also the Progressives who invented
modern First-Amendment law. They _~ developed their position,
in part, as a reaction to the oppressive sedition acts that Woodrow
Wilson signed during the First World War. Wilson's postmaster
general. Burleson, announced that no one could print and mail
any document saying:
that this government got in the war wrong,
that it is in it for the wrong purposes, or anything that will
impugn the motives of the Government for going into the war. They
can not say that this Government is the tool of Wall Street or
the munitions makers. That kind of thing makes for insubordination
in the Army and Navy and breeds a spirit of disloyalty through
the country.
Protected by his senatorial immunity,
La Follette often said just what Burleson forbade. As a result,
the Senate seriously considered impeaching him. La Follette also
argued that the war should be financed with higher taxes instead
of loans, but an issue of The Public that took the same line was
suppressed. The experience of being denounced for his political
opinions-while others were jailed for expressing the same views-turned
La Follette into a militant critic of government censorship. Many
Progressives agreed, since public deliberation required a completely
free flow of information and ideas. During the war, the Supreme
Court upheld the federal sedition acts, but Justices Holmes and
Brandeis prepared the ground for a more liberal constitutional
doctrine. Just as La Follette made his last run for president,
Brandeis summarized the Progressive position on freedom of speech:
Those who won our independence . . .
believed that freedom to think as you will and ) to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussions would
be futile; [and] that with them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.
In the 1960s and '70s, the Supreme Court
fully articulated a concept that was latent in Madison's and Brandeis's
writings: the press as public watchdog. For example, in New York
Times v. United States, the Court upheld the right of newspapers
to publish classified national-security documents that had come
into their possession. Where Madison had praised journalists for
revealing the "merits and measures" of public officials,
Justice Hugo Black now wrote:
The press was protected so that it could
bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free
and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of government from deceiving the people
and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation
for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the
purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly."
Although Justice Black was a civil libertarian,
his view of press freedom was not strictly a libertarian one.
According to civil libertarians, all citizens have perfect rights
of thought and speech; journalists are citizens, too, so they
can write anything they like. Reporters who exercise their right
to free expression need not accept any special responsibilities.
By the same token, the libertarian position offers journalists
no special privileges, such as guaranteed access to government
information, automatic admission to courtrooms and legislatures,
immunity when called to testify, the right to protect sources
and publish classified documents, and so on. Justice Black, by
contrast, argued that journalists gain unique rights in return
for their service as public watchdogs. The state, as a potential
menace, cannot restrain the press with any kind of leash or muzzle.
But in return journalists acquire both the power and the responsibility
to bare official secrets, expose corruption, and reveal the policies
and characters of public officials. Black's position derived from
Madisonian ideas, but especially from Progressive ones: Charles
Evans Hughes had argued, for example, that the public required
I a "vigilant and courageous press" to overcome government
"malfeasance and corruption."
p144
The state always poses a threat to free speech because of its
power to censor, but so does capital. Newspapers, magazines-and
now, broadcast networks-are privately owned, and their owners
have economic interests. In 1912, La Follette gave a speech in
Philadelphia, in which he charged that "the money power ...
controls the newspaper press." The public, he said, "is
fast coming to understand that wherever news items bear in any
way upon the control of government by business, the news is colored;
so confidence in the newspaper as a newspaper is being undermined."
La Follette delivered this speech during
a hectic presidential campaign and immediately after he had learned
that his daughter required a dangerous operation. Speaking before
an audience of magazine publishers, he received a hostile welcome
and responded by losing his temper and lecturing for two hours.
The next morning's press reported that he had suffered a nervous
breakdown; editorial writers assailed him for his radical ideas.
Although an editor of the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph told
him that his view of the press was correct, most coverage of his
speech was scathing. In fact, it was the ruin of his presidential
campaign: prominent Republicans used the news of his "breakdown"
or "collapse" as an excuse to back Roosevelt.
But La Follette kept making the same case
throughout his career. In 1918, for example, he wrote: "Except
for the subserviency of most of the metropolitan newspapers, .
. . 65 percent of all the wealth of this country would not now
be centralized in the hands of two percent of all the people.
And we might today be industrially and commercially a free people,
enjoying the blessings of a real democracy." La Follette
implied the following argument: the owners of newspapers influenced
what was printed; what was printed influenced public opinion;
and public opinion influenced policy. Therefore, to some unknown
but disproportionate extent, the people who owned the mass media
influenced public policy to serve their own interests. As a result,
democracy was corrupted.
p148
... the electronic media-television and radio-are in some ways
more important than print, since 70 percent of Americans cite
TV as their major source of news, compared to 20 percent who cite
newspapers. However, the electronic media are much less diverse
and accessible than books and newspapers. This is primarily because
the electromagnetic spectrum has room for only a limited number
of channels. Moreover, a television station is not a bundle of
separate products, like a newspaper. It can only broadcast one
program at a time, and if people don't like it, they will switch
channels-perhaps for good. Therefore, broadcasting, more than
print, is subject to majority tyranny and a decline to the lowest
common denominator.
The government's response to the poor
quality of commercial television has been typical of interest-group
liberalism. Instead of deliberating about what good TV would look
like, Congress has delegated vague powers to the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC), which negotiates with broadcasters and the industry
lobby. The FCC is supposed to grant free use of the spectrum to
whichever applicant would best serve "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity." Until deregulation in the 1980s,
the FCC translated this general formula into a few significant
regulations, notably the Fairness Doctrine, which required broadcasters
to cover all issues that were of public importance and to cover
them fairly Thus a local television station could not, in theory,
refuse to cover a major strike in its area, nor slant its coverage
in favor of one side in the strike. If it did, it would be subject
to lawsuits.
It should not be surprising that the FCC
has never demanded much under the public interest clause or the
now-defunct Fairness Doctrine. Appointed regulators do not have
the mandate to debate values, conflicting interests, or public
priorities. Besides, they are subject to manipulation by powerful
lobbyists who can influence their selection, threaten to erase
their rulings through legislation, and hire them after they leave
the government. Congress should take the bull by the horns, publicly
debate what "the public interest" means in broadcasting,
and pass content-neutral requirements for licensees (such as a
certain number of minutes devoted to public-affairs programming).
Federal courts should then uphold such requirements as enhancements
of free speech.
At the same time, Congress should be generous
in its subsidies of public television and radio, which present
minority views and highly substantive programming. The government
could also distribute broadcasting rights in a different way.
Since passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC has granted
one company total control over each part of the spectrum in each
geographical area. Instead, the government could give part of
the day to commercial broadcasters and reserve part for nonprofit
or public use. Or it could retain control of the spectrum and
give out individual broadcast slots to private groups, both commercial
and nonprofit. A very modest reform would be to provide free broadcast
time for political candidates. The high cost of TV advertising
is one cause of politicians' dependence on private money. Along
with Sri Lanka, the United States is one of only two countries
in the world that do not give politicians free broadcast time.
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