Latin America by Coletta
Youngers,
The Response by John Feffer,
How Things Should Change
by Miriam Pemberton and John Feffer,
Afterword by Susan F. Hirsch
excerpted from the book
Power Trip
U.S. Unilateralism and Global
Strategy After September 11
edited by John Feffer
Seven Stories Press, 2003,
paper
Latin America
by Coletta Youngers
p152
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE REGION
Across Latin America, a general malaise
has set in due to the never-ending and escalating economic crisis,
deep-rooted corruption, and the inability of democracy to truly
take root. Years of following Washington's prescribed free-market
economic policies have not only failed to pay off, the region
has moved backward-poverty has increased, privatizations have
led to rampant corruption and often skyrocketing prices for basic
services, and inequality is worse than ever. The combination of
economic and political instability can be deadly for weak governments,
as was so brutally illustrated in the protests in Argentina in
December 2001 that brought down the de la Rua government. Yet
the Bush administration's response to the Argentina crisis is
symbolic of its present approach to the region. Like an angry
father, former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill scolded Argentina
and suggested that it get its own house in order, and the rest
of the Bush administration largely adopted a similar tone.
This may not be what President Bush intended
upon assuming office, when he promised to develop a special relationship
with Latin America and with Mexico in particular. Encouraged by
Mexican President Vicente Fox and fueled by the desire to capture
more of the Hispanic vote at home, the Bush administration began
moving in the direction of a radical reform of U.S. immigration
policy, which could have significantly reshaped not only U.S.-Mexican
relations, but also, more broadly, U.S.-Latin American relations.
All of this, however, was derailed by September 11.
U.S. policy toward the region in the wake
of September 11 has largely returned to the "rollback"
framework adopted by the Reagan administration at the height of
the Cold War. Latin America is viewed as a region where "terrorist"
threats are to be eliminated, particularly in the tumultuous Andean
countries and Communist Cuba. As such, the region is viewed not
as an opportunity for constructive international engagement but
as a threat. This strategy was unleashed full force in the wake
of September 11. Speaking of Colombia, Representative Henry Hyde
(RIL), chairman of the House International Relations Committee,
went so far as to warn that "three hours by plane from Miami,
we face a potential breeding ground for international terror equaled
perhaps only by Afghanistan. The threat to American national interest
is both imminent and clear."
p154
THE VENEZUELA DEBACLE
... the Bush administration's first major
foreign policy debacle in the region took place in Venezuela as
a result of an apparent military-led coup against President Chavez.
Several days of business and labor protests in that country culminated
in a massive march on April 11, 2002, in which unidentified gunmen
killed at least eighteen people. Chavez's foes moved against him
later that night, taking Chavez prisoner and announcing his resignation
from office. Business leader Pedro Carmona was asked to head the
unconstitutional, military-installed government. Carmona's rise
to power, however, was short-lived. Within two days, Chavez, who
claimed never to have resigned, was back in the presidential palace.
In stark contrast to its attitude toward
most Latin American governments, the Bush administration immediately
accepted the illegitimate Carmona government, issuing an unusually
undiplomatic statement on April 12 that blamed Chavez for his
own fall. U.S. involvement in the coup attempt itself is not at
all clear; however, it does appear that the administration had
decided that Chavez had to go.
As the fourth-largest supplier of U.S.
crude oil to the United States, Venezuela has been an obvious
target for U.S. hegemonic designs, particularly in light of Chavez's
preferred policy of cutting production to keep prices high. Moreover,
Chavez had angered many in Washington with his overtures to "rogue"
rulers in Iraq, Libya, and particularly Cuba.
Months prior to the coup, a steady stream
of Venezuelan opposition leaders made their way to Washington,
many with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy,
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and right-wing
think tanks. They met with a range of U.S. officials who, while
maintaining opposition to an outright coup, likely made it clear
that they would very much like "Chavez to go away,"
ideally via a constitutional maneuver. A strong message of support
for some sort of action was sent.
The Bush administration's quick embrace
of the short-lived Carmona government was criticized across the
region, providing "Latin Americans cause to wonder,"
according to analyst David Corn, "if the United States is
continuing its tradition of underhandedly meddling in the affairs
of its neighbors to the south." It also sent a dangerous
message about the weak U.S. commitment to democratic principles.
The U.S. stance toward Chavez, as well as interventions in electoral
campaigns in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Brazil in favor of or in
opposition to particular candidates, sends the very clear message
that Washington supports electoral democracy-as long as its candidate
wins.
CASTRO'S CUBA
The impact on the Bush administration
of Chavez's relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro cannot be underestimated.
The appointment of Otto Reich as President Bush's first assistant
secretary of state for Latin America was widely interpreted as
a payback to the conservative, Miami-based Cuban-American community
for its support of Bush in the Florida recount, as well as "pay-forward
for their continued support in the 2002 gubernatorial and congressional
elections.'' A Cuban-American and former lobbyist for Bacardi,
Reich has strong ties to that community. Despite growing support
on Capitol Hill for a reform of U.S. policy toward Cuba, the Bush
administration has remained firm in its commitment to the U.S.
economic embargo and to continued isolation of the Cuban government,
with no significant policy change likely in the foreseeable future.
In an explosive speech before the Heritage
Foundation on May 6, 2002, John Bolton, undersecretary for arms
control and international security, went even further, bluntly
stating: '`The United States believes that Cuba has at least a
limited offensive biological warfare research and development
~ effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue
states." He also noted that Castro had recently visited Iran,
Syria, and Libya, all states designated by Washington as sponsors
of terrorism. Administration officials frequently repeat a statement
allegedly made by Castro on his visit to Iran that operating together,
Iran and Cuba could "bring America to its knees." Bolton
offered no evidence to support his assertions of biological warfare,
which were quickly deflated by former president Jimmy Carter's
historic May 2002 trip to Cuba. Carter said that he was told by
U.S. officials that "there was no evidence linking Cuba to
the export of biological weaponry," and while in Cuba, he
was given complete access to the country's biomedical facilities.
p157
The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba's Health and Nutrition
Drugs and Medical Equipment:
The Cuban Democracy Act (1992), by forbidding foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies from selling to Cuba, posed new and almost insurmountable
obstacles to the sale of medicines and medical supplies.
Food Security:
U.S. sanctions reduce Cuba's import capacity for basic foodstuffs.
Shipping regulations and the ban on direct and subsidiary trade
in food close Cuba off from an otherwise natural market.
Water Quality:
The embargo contributes to serious cutbacks in supplies of safe
drinking water and was a factor in the increase in morbidity rates
in the 1990s.
HIV Infection and AIDS:
The embargo limits access to life-prolonging drugs for Cuban HIV/AIDS
patients, and otherwise impairs prevention, diagnosis, treatment,
and research in this field.
Women's Health:
The U.S. embargo directly contributes to lapses in prevention,
diagnosis, therapeutic and surgical treatments of breast cancer;
diminished alternatives for contraception; gaps in availability
of in-vitro genetic testing resources; reduced access to medications
associated with pregnancy, labor and delivery; and deficient nutrition
during pregnancy.
Children's Health:
Cuba's economic crisis, exacerbated by embargo restrictions, exacts
a toll on children's health, particularly in neonatology, immunizations,
pediatric hospital care, access to medicines, and treatment of
acute illnesses.
Hospital Care:
The economic crisis and the U.S. embargo have seriously eroded
surgery, radiology, clinical services, and access to medication,
hospital nutrition, and hygiene.
Oncology:
The U.S. embargo bars Cubans' access to state-of-the-art cancer
treatment under U.S. patent, subjects all diagnosis and treatment-related
imports to delays due to the shipping ban, and hinders domestic
research, development, and production due to the ban on biotech-related
exports.
Cardiology:
The U.S. embargo constitutes a direct threat to patient care,
by denying Cuban heart patients access to lifesaving medications
and equipment only available in the United States.
Nephrology:
The embargo limits the chance of survival of Cuban patients with
chronic renal failure, increases their suffering, and adds significant
expense to already costly care.
Professional Advancement and Scientific
Information:
The embargo remains a formidable barrier to the free flow of ideas
and scientific information between Cuban medical researchers and
their colleagues in the United States.
Humanitarian Donations:
Donations do not compensate to any major degree for the hardships
inflicted by the embargo on the health of the Cuban people. There
are restrictions placed on charitable donations from the United
States. similar to those placed on commercial trade. Contributions
rarely match needs in terms of specific drugs, equipment, or replacement
parts.
Source: American Association of World
Health, "The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health and Nutrition
in Cuba," 1997.
The Response
by John Feffer
p176
... European leaders are well aware of the U.S. strategy, leaked
to the press in 1992, of discouraging "the advanced industrial
nations from challenging our leadership or...even aspiring to
a larger regional or global role." The European Union boasts
a new currency, is about to absorb ten new members and may grow
to more than thirty by the end of the decade, and generally pursues
a different approach than the United States to a range of problems
from global poverty to global warming. European countries bristle
at being treated as irrelevant, weak-kneed, or insufficiently
mature. As one EU official put it, "It is humiliating and
demeaning if we feel we have to go and get our homework marked
by Dick Cheney and Condi Rice." These frustrations, coming
to a head in the late l990s, pushed the Europeans to explore an
independent military capability, the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP), backed up by a sixty-thousand-strong rapid reaction
force. The creation of this force by the target date of 2003 is
unlikely because of internal politics, but few doubt that Europe
will eventually develop what Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok and
others have championed, namely a "counterweight to the United
States."
European frustrations are intensified
by feelings of impotence. "America is waking up to the huge
preponderance of its military power," editorialized The Economist.
"Europe, realising this, is worried both about the wise application
of that power, and its own relative weakness." The Bush administration's
2002 military budget increase of $48 billion is twice the size
of the German military budget. In the early 1990s, it was not
uncommon for analysts to predict the formation of three roughly
equal blocs of power defined more by economic than military might-the
European Union, the North American Free Trade Area, and the yen
bloc. While economic power is distributed more evenly among industrialized
countries, military might remains the domain of the United States,
and Europeans are being relegated to peacekeeping and humanitarian
tasks. Disagreements over trade, which have proven so acrimonious
in the past, will only intensify in such an atmosphere of resentment.
European countries became even more uncomfortable
with U.S. policy as a localized strike against the Taliban and
al-Qaeda quickly became a global war. The January 2002 "axis
of evil" speech marked a turning point in European reactions.
Tony Blair and conservative prime ministers in Italy and Spain
applauded Bush's words. Everyone else was appalled. Viewed from
Brussels or Bonn, there is no axis of evil, just three very difficult
diplomatic challenges. With the exception of Ireland and France,
every member of the EU has extended diplomatic recognition to
North Korea, and the EU has strongly backed the engagement policy
of South Korean president Kim Dae Jung. European leaders have
reached out to moderates in Iran, setting up a comprehensive dialogue
on nonproliferation, human rights, and trade (the EU is Iran's
major trading partner). And European countries, with the exception
of Britain and Spain, went to great lengths to avoid a war with
Iraq.
Europe and the United States also look
at terrorism very differently. Europeans put more stress on addressing
the root causes of terrorism, which is not surprising, since countries
such as Britain and Spain have been forced to approach their own
"terrorists" with more than mere firepower. European
leaders have stressed the importance of addressing global poverty
in the wake of September 11, but such calls, even from Bush ally
Tony Blair, have "found little resonance in Washington, DC."
There have also been legal differences. According to the European
Convention on Human Rights, European countries cannot extradite
suspects to countries with the death penalty, and some countries
have refused to send anyone to U.S. military tribunals. Even Britain,
the strongest U.S. ally in the war on terrorism, refused to extradite
two suspects because of lack of evidence. The United States, meanwhile,
has unsigned the International Criminal Court treaty and has promised
to go to extraordinary measures to prevent U.S. soldiers from
being tried for war crimes at the Hague. We won't send our soldiers;
they won't send their suspects.
p181
... politicians the world over acknowledged the dire threat of
global terrorism, then quickly took advantage of September 11
to advance their own states' interests. Authoritarian leaders
in Central Asia traded their strategic support for U.S. military
and economic aid that was free of accompanying demands for democratic
change. Colombia and the Philippines took advantage of the changed
geopolitical climate to prosecute their own civil wars more harshly.
Countries as diverse as Azerbaijan, Djibouti, and Ecuador lined
up to receive military handouts from the Pentagon. Regardless
of how much U.S. unilateralism rubbed countries the wrong way,
they were not above taking advantage of the new dispensation.
How Things Should Change
by Miriam Pemberton and John Feffer
p188
... the hawks in the Bush administration-Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld,
Paul Wolfowitz-are anything but conservative. They have pushed
at the very limits of traditional military doctrine: embracing
preemptive strikes, contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in
warfare, violating long-standing arms control treaties, and spreading
weapons everywhere from Uzbekistan to outer space. There is a
dangerous liberality in these policies. Weapons are being given
away liberally; arms control treaties are being interpreted liberally.
This liberality verges on the libertine: the United States is
acting without moral restraint in its military policy.
This inability to act with restraint extends
to the field of resources. The American addiction to petroleum
propels our policies in the Middle East and justifies the expansion
of U.S. military operations into West Africa, Central Asia, and
Latin America. The more oil we burn, the more oil we need, and
neither arctic wilderness nor human rights abroad has interfered
with getting our fix. The Bush administration's ties to Big Oil,
"just say yes" approach to increased oil consumption,
and reluctance to redirect U.S. policy toward renewable energy
sources have made a bad situation considerably worse.
p189
According to polls, Americans believe that foreign aid constitutes
roughly 20 percent of the federal budget... in fact the United
States provides less in foreign aid (as a percentage of GNP) than
any other industrialized nation: a mere sliver of one percent.
p192
Barbara Lee's (D-CA) solitary vote against going to war in Afghanistan,
Russell Feingold's (D-WI) solitary vote against the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act.
Afterword
by Susan F. Hirsch
p197
Current efforts toward U.S. global domination-through military,
political, and ideological means-repeat the serious political
and moral flaws of previous attempts, although perhaps on a larger
scale... First, attempts to dominate are routinely accompanied
by a lack of interest in areas of the world not of direct and
immediate concern to what the U.S. government perceives to be
its economic and strategic goals. Obtaining knowledge about marginalized
regions of the world and the people living there holds low priority.
For example, in the rush to achieve influence in both the emerging
states of the former Soviet Union and the new markets in Asia,
U.S. attention toward much of Africa declined in the 1980s and
1990s. Ironically, directing support to fledgling democracies
in regions such as Eastern Europe coincided with ignoring human
rights and civil liberties violations by virtual dictators in
Africa and other regions.
Rather than examining the African continent's
political complexities, the United States propped up the likes
of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Daniel arap Moi in Kenya in an
effort to maintain stability. As the United States built new embassies
in Eastern Europe and Asia, it allowed many in Africa to deteriorate
with respect to facilities and security, including those in Dar
es Salaam and Nairobi. Disinterest in African nations, and insufficient
respect for African people, is a tragic and recurring consequence
of policies that put U.S. power and gain before thoughtful, egalitarian
connection with other nations, especially the poorest. Unstable
and threatening situations are likely to result, as well as strained
relations with people and nations that might have been reliable
allies. Moreover, the dearth of knowledge means that ossified
stereotypes persist. For example, the confrontation of "radical
Islam" and "the West" leaves out of the picture
large moderate Muslim populations, especially those living throughout
Africa.
A second major flaw of U.S. power moves
is that they are pursued with little concern for the severe inequalities
of current global economic relations. The U.S. drive to dominate
proceeds as if unaware of the rising resentment of large segments
of the world's population that suffer under crushing debt burdens,
crumbling infrastructures, and weakened health and education systems.
Disenfranchised people doubtless view power in the face of economic
injustice as corrupt and illegitimate. No one should be surprised
if they mount, join, or support struggles to bring down that power.
For instance, women's organizations, Ogoni liberation groups,
and ordinary West African people have long contested the environmental
degradation and labor exploitation that Shell and other multinational
oil companies are responsible for in Nigeria. Little known to
American consumers are their protest tactics, which include sophisticated
Internet sites, work stoppages, and a traditional practice whereby
women remove their clothes in public to shame those who ignore
pleas for relief from oppression. Because they do not touch the
lives of most Americans, such inequalities and such protests remain
largely invisible to those who pump Nigerian oil into their cars.
p199
... many victims of September 11 argued strenuously against the
war in Afghanistan, although their voices were muffled by the
media emphasis on conventional representations of patriotism.
Amber Amundson, whose husband was killed while working at the
Pentagon, wrote in a Chicago Tribune editorial: "I have heard
angry rhetoric by some Americans, including many of our nation's
leaders, who advise a heavy dose of revenge and punishment. To
those leaders, I would like to make clear that my family and I
take no comfort in your words of rage. If you choose to respond
to this incomprehensible brutality by perpetuating violence against
other innocent human beings, you may not do so in the name of
justice for my husband."
p201
... a candid discussion of the: U.S. role worldwide requires considerable
attention to the global economic inequality that U.S. foreign
policy exacerbates. Many people and groups worldwide are working
for global economic justice. The goals and commitments motivating
these groups serve as counterpoints to current U.S. goals, which
amount to little more than military and political support for
economic expansion, ultimately benefiting l only a few.
p201
Julius Nyerere, the first Tanzanian president, said in 1996
"Each of us, as individuals, as 'workers
by hand or by brain,' and as leaders, has the responsibility to
act against the oppressions of poverty, ignorance, and disease....
Neither public recognition nor lack of it provides an excuse for
slackening our efforts. Without violence or hatred, we must work
for a world where all human beings can live in peace and justice."
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