Non-Violent Direct Action
by Howard Zinn
excerpted from the book
Howard Zinn on History
Seven Stories Press, 2000, paper
The experience of the civil rights movement forced me to think
about the process of social change-about the alternatives of violence
and parliamentary reform, and about the principle that was at
the heart of the Southern movement for equal rights-non-violent
direct action. I presented this paper at the 1965 annual meeting
of the American Orthopsychiatric Association in New York, and
it was published in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, January,
1966.
In 1937 sociologist Robert S. Lynd wrote a little gem of a
book entitled Knowledge for What? in which he attacked the divorce
of scholarship from the problems of his day. The book has just
been reissued 27 years later. In the interim the world has experienced
Auschwitz and Hiroshima and Birmingham, yet the accusation in
that book against the world of scholarship remains exactly as
true in every line. Social scientists for the most part still
are not focusing their research directly on the world's urgent
problems. True, they are accumulating data
on these problems, but too often they avoid moving to close
to the presentation of solutions because at that point controversy
enters. So the scholarly monographs and the social evils keep
rising higher and higher in separate piles, parallel to one another
with such Euclidian perfection that we begin to despair they ever
will intersect.
I would like in this brief paper to at least initiate a discussion
on the uses of power, not as an academic exercise, but in relation
to what we see around us and to what we hear, which is more and
more these days the sound of crowds in the streets.
The health of society, I assume, is dependent on a balance
between people's expectations and the fulfillment of those expectations.
Both the Buddhism of Gautama in the East and the Stoicism of Epictetus
in the West in their emphasis on resignation as a means to happiness
were fitted to the limits of a crude technology. Today the momentum
of science has created worldwide waves of demand which can be
fulfilled. Quiescence and resignation are no longer pertinent,
and the clamor everywhere for change, though expressed in passion,
is reasonable.
There is little question any more that change in our social
institutions must come. Never before in history has there been
such a consensus in objectives all over the world, nor such a
variance of method in trying to achieve these objectives. Most
men everywhere agree they want to end war, imperialism, racism,
poverty, disease and tyranny. What they disagree about is whether
these expectations can be fulfilled within the old frameworks
of nationalism, representative government and the profit system.
And running through the tension between agreement and disagreement
are these questions: How much violence will be necessary to fulfill
these expectations? What must we suffer to get the world we all
want?
We have three traditional ways of satisfying the need for
institutional change: war, revolution, and gradual reform. We
might define war as violence from without, revolution as violence
from within and gradual reform as deferred violence. I would like
to examine all three in the new light of the mid-twentieth century.
Assuming that change always involves a degree of dislocation
and of social cost, man's problem is then how to achieve maximum
desirable change at minimum cost. War at best has been a haphazard
way of deciding this question, for the impetus of war piles up
the dead with little regard for social consequence, so that even
those wars fought against the most obvious of evils, such as the
Civil War (with Negro slavery at stake) and World War II (with
global slavery at stake), brought in the first case the uncontrolled
gushing of what Edmund Wilson calls "patriotic gore"
and in the second the needless bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima.
At its worst, war has been mass slaughter without even the saving
grace of a definable social goal. The Trojan War was the first
and classic case, and that element of idiocy has persisted in
all wars in varying degree.
Up to the hydrogen bomb, it was still possible to weigh cost
and consequence. Now we can throw away the scales, for it should
be clear to any rational and humane person that there is no piece
of territory (not Berlin or Viet Nam or Hungary), there is no
social system yet put into operation anywhere by man (not socialism
or capitalism or whatever) which is worth the consequence of atomic
war. If war ever in its shotgun way represented a method of achieving
social progress, the illimitable table scale of warfare today
removes it forever as a justifiable method of social change. John
U. Nef of the University of Chicago put it this way in his book
War and Human Progress, which he wrote soon after World War II:
The only justification for war is the defense of a culture
worth defending and the states of the modern world have less and
less to defend beyond their material comforts, in spite of the
claims of some to represent fresh concepts of civilization. The
new weapons have made nonsense of defensive war. Peoples have
been left without any means of defending except by destroying
others, and the destruction is almost certain to be mutual.
What of revolution? Here the balance of achievement and cost
is less haphazard, though still far from rational. The four great
revolutions of modern times (the American, the French, the Russian
and the Chinese) though all erratic in their movement towards
social progress, in the end, I believe, justified the relatively
small amount of violence required to fulfill them. But today,
can we still look to revolutions as the chief means of social
change, and as a useful means, whereby great change can be achieved
at relatively small cost?
In some exceptional instances, yes. But, as a general rule,
it seems to me that the conditions of the contemporary world have
removed the feasibility of revolutions in the old sense. There
are several reasons for this. One is that the power of weapons
in the hands of the ruling elite makes popular uprisings, however
great is the base of support, a very dubious undertaking. The
other consideration, and probably more important, is that revolutions
like wars no longer can be contained. They almost always involve
one or more of the great nations of the world, and are either
crushed by an outside power (as were the Hungarians in their revolt)
or are prolonged to the point of frightful massacre (as the revolt
in Viet Nam was met by the intervention of the French and then
the Americans, and as the revolt in the Congo was stymied by Belgians
and other forces). The Cuban revolution was an oddity; it was
able to subsist because it brought into the picture not one but
both the two leading world powers. There, even in success we can
see the perils posed by revolution in the contemporary world,
for the Cuban missile crisis almost set off a global disaster.
This removal of both war and revolution as methods of ushering
in the inevitable changes would seem to leave us with the stock-in-trade
of Western liberals: gradual reform. Here the United States is
the prime example of peaceful accommodation, harmonizing gracefully
with the requirements of change.
There is a double trouble with this pleasant solution: it
does not square with the facts of the American past, and it does
not fit the requirements of the American future. Let me explain
what I mean.
It is remarkable how many persons, both in the United States
and abroad, accept the legend that our country is the quintessential
example of peaceful, progressive development as opposed to the
violent change characteristic of other parts of the world. Yet
the United States was born in violent revolution, and then solved
its chief domestic problem not by reform but by one of the bloodiest
wars in modern times. Its history has been punctuated with bursts
of violence. Each outbreak was a reminder, quickly forgotten,
that the changes we made through gradual reform were not fast
enough or large enough to match the growing expectations of sections
of the population: the slow steps made against slavery, for instance
(the abolition of the slave trade as agreed to in Philadelphia
in 1787, the Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850) were
all failures, and the Civil War resulted.
Congress did not move fast enough to alleviate the pains of
exploitation for the new industrial working class of the latter
half of the nineteenth century, and so the period from 1877 to
1914 saw a series of labor explosions unmatched in their ferocity
in any country in the world: the railroad insurrections of 1877,
the Haymarket killings of 1886, the Homestead strike of 1894,
the textile strike at Lawrence in 1912 and the Ludlow Massacre
in Colorado in 1914. What, if not the failure of American reformism,
explains the growth of the Socialist Party to a million supporters
in 1912, the emergence of the Industrial Workers of the World
as a radical, militant labor union devoted to the abolition of
the capitalist system? It took the hysteria of world war to help
crush both these movements.
How successful was the reform of the Progressive Era of Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson when the whole structure they built
up to keep the economy intact (Federal Reserve System, Federal
Trade Commission, antitrust legislation) collapsed in 1929, and
ushered in another decade of violence (bonus marches and marches
of the unemployed, of sit-down strikes and clashes between workingmen
and police) and again ended not in prosperity but in war? Is it
New Deal reform or war expenditures that keep today's economy
from collapsing into another period of violent conflict? Can we
really say that the history of our nation is of carefully phased
reform measures, of peaceful evolution towards domestic prosperity
and national peace?
And now, in this last decade, we suddenly have learned that
what we thought was gradual progress towards ending race prejudice
in the United States was not nearly sufficient. It has taken mass
demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama; mass arrests in Albany,
Georgia; the violence of the Freedom Rides; the bombings in Birmingham,
and the murders in Mississippi to make us aware of the failure
of piecemeal reform to establish racial justice in America.
There are lessons in this, I believe, far beyond the race
crisis in the United States, and I want to explore some of them.
My point is that gradualism, even in that presumed mecca of reform,
the U.S.A., never really has matched the push of events, and that
today the momentum of world change has made it even less able
to do so. Thus, none of the traditionally approved mechanisms
for social change (not war, nor revolution, nor reform) is adequate
for the kind of problems we face today in the United States and
in the world. We need apparently some technique which is more
energetic than parliamentary reform and yet not subject to the
dangers which war and revolution pose in the atomic age.
This technique, I suggest, is that which has been used over
the centuries by aggrieved groups in fitful, semi-conscious control
of their own actions. With the Negro revolt in America, the technique
has begun to take on the quality of a deliberate use of power
to effect the most change with the least harm. I speak of non-violent
direct action. This encompasses a great variety of methods, limited
only by our imaginations: sit-ins, freedom rides and freedom walks,
prayer pilgrimages, wade-ins, pray-ins, freedom ballots, freedom
schools, and who knows what is on the horizon? Whatever the specific
form, this technique has certain qualities: it disturbs the status
quo, it intrudes on the complacency of the majority, it expresses
the anger and the hurt of the aggrieved, it publicizes an injustice,
it demonstrates the inadequacy of whatever reforms have been instituted
up to that point, it creates tension and trouble and thus forces
the holders of power to move faster than they otherwise would
have to redress grievances.
The crucial problems of our time no longer can be left to
simmer on the low flame of gradualism, only to explode. Poverty,
for instance, will not be attacked on the scale which is required
until the ease of the well off is punctured in some brusque way.
And in this shrinking world, for how long can the United Sates
contain its vast wealth inside the national membrane and spend
billions on useless products while a million people starve in
Calcutta? Once people begin to measure the distribution of wealth
on global lines there may well be a clamor against the deformed
concentration of it in one country of the world. Jet travel makes
the world smaller than the Roman Empire. Then why shouldn't the
parallel existence of America and India be as much as object of
concern as the parallel existence in Rome of the opulence of emperors
and the misery of slaves? And how else will horror be expressed
under conditions of today except by some form of popular protest?
Consider another issue: with the possession of nuclear bombs
proliferating the world and with the mathematical probability
of war by error increasing, can we depend on the normal parliamentary
processes for concerned people to express to the powers of the
world their revulsion against war? Should we not have an increasing
number of those little bands of pacifists, from Bertrand Russell
to the ones who sailed into the Pacific on the Goklen Rule?
Also there is the problem of freedom for dissenters, which
exists in East and West, North and South, in communist and capitalist
countries, in the old nations and in the new nations. How else
but by Poznan uprisings, by demonstrations and civil disobedience,
can such freedom be maintained and extended?
For us in the United States, it is hard to accept the idea
that the ordinary workings of the parliamentary system will not
suffice in the world today. But recall that Jefferson himself,
watching the Constitution being created, and thinking of Shay's
Rebellion, spoke of the need for revolutions every twenty years.
And Rousseau, at the very moment representative government was
beginning to take hold, pointed to the inability of anyone to
truly represent anyone else's interests. And Robert Michels, the
Swiss sociologist, 150 years after Rousseau, showed us how an
"iron law of oligarchy" operates within any government
or any party to separate top from bottom and to make power-holders
insensitive to the needs of the mass. No matter how democratic
elections are, they represent only fleeting and widely separated
moments of popular participation. In that long span between elections,
people are passive and captive.
Thus, we face a dilemma: wars and revolutions today cannot
be limited and are therefore very perilous. Yet parliamentary
reform is inadequate. We need some intermediate device, powerful
but restrained and explosive but controlled, to pressure and even
to shock the decision-makers into making the kinds of changes
in institutions which fit our world. Walter Millis, in an essay
written for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
has argued persuasively that the price we may have to pay for
a world without war is a kind of intermittent guerrilla warfare,
constantly bringing society into rough accord with popular demands.
It turns out (and we have the experience of all bourgeois, socialist
and national revolutions to support this) that no form of government,
once in power, can be trusted to limit its own ambition, to extend
freedom and to wither away. This means that it is up to the citizenry,
those outside of power, to engage in permanent combat with the
state, short of violent, escalatory revolution, but beyond the
gentility of the ballot-box, to insure justice, freedom and well
being, all those values which virtually the entire world has come
to believe in.
This idea links the Negro uprising in America to the turmoil
everywhere in the world. It also links present to past, for what
I am suggesting is a more deliberate, more conscious, more organized
use of those techniques of constructive dissent which man has
used in spontaneity and in desperation throughout history.
Those of us reared in the tradition of liberal, gradualist
reform, and cherishing tranquillity, may have to learn to sacrifice
a little of these in order not to lose all of them. Such a course
may not be easy, but it is not a bad substitute for the world
as we have known it up to now, a world of simplistic and terrible
solutions, where we oscillated constantly between two alternatives:
the devastation of war or the injustice of peace.
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